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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

The

struggle for

Democracy

in Africa will doubtless take

many forms and

directions”.'

During the 1990s many countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have undergone
significant political changes.

These changes can be broadly characterized as

from authoritarian towards more democratic and
focus of this thesis

transitions

is

to shed light

transitions

pluralistic political systems.

The main

on some of the many forms and directions these

have taken by undertaking a comparative study of the democratization

process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.

As

a result of various internal and external pressures

regimes embarked on a democratization process

many

authoritarian African

in the early 1990s.

The

internal

pressure for democratization was spearheaded mainly by different elements of civil
society such as trade unions, clerics, students, businessmen and professional

associations.

A decisive

factor

beyond the

and democratization were the economic

internal pressure for political liberalization

difficulties

many

countries of Sub-Saharan

Africa experienced during the 1980s. While these economic difficulties varied from

country to country in their severity and were caused by various factors, the Structural

Adjustment Programs (SAPs)
International

that

were imposed by the World Bank and the

Monetary Fund (IMF) since the early 1980s were one of the

contributed to the economic difficulties

'

Quoted

in

Shaw

many

1993: p. 103.

1

factors that

African countries faced during the 1980s.

To comply with SAPs African governments had

to sharply devalue their currencies,

reduce public sector spending, impose fees on a range of public services,
remove price

on basic commodities, and

controls

implementation of these measures
difficult for

many of Africa’s

patronage networks and
political class

SAPs

costs of

liquidate unproductive state enterprises.

in

exchange

for

new

made

it

increasingly

authoritarian regimes to maintain their extensive

made

the monopolization of economic benefits

by a shrinking

around the president more and more obvious. Furthermore, the
delegitimized

many

of popular support for

War

in

many of Africa’s

SAPs

contributed to an erosion

authoritarian regimes during the 1980s.

1989 decreased the willingness of western donors

reforms

democracy)

respect for

(i.e.

if the recipients

a nutshell, these were

that will

be analyzed

human

wanted

rights, political pluralism

to continue to receive

some of the developments

in this study in

some

detail

The methodology

that will

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia
least

^

^

is

and multiparty

developmental assistance. In

by comparing

changes

the democratization

3

to study the democratization process in

the comparative method. In order to apply this

two cases and two variables

Lancaster 1993:

be applied

demand

that brought about the political

process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.

The end

to support

Africa’s authoritarian governments for strategic reasons and they started to

political

social

African “governments in the eyes of their people and

fueled the spreading of political discontent”.^ In short,

of the Cold

loans

The

method

are necessary. In contrast to the statistical method.

p. 40.

441-443; Nwokedi
See Lancaster 1993: pp. 39-43; Clapham 1993: pp. 430-433; Wiseman 1993: pp.
1995: pp. 38-55; and Joseph 1997: pp. 368-372.

2

at

^

quantify'* how
which

tries to

*

the comparative

method

different variables covary or correlate across

tries to identify

many

cases,

or qualify which independent variables (causal

variables) account for the variation in the dependent variable (outcome
variable)

without trying to quantify

how

strong the relationship between these variables

Therefore the nature of the comparative method

is

other words the focus of the comparative method

among

qualitative and not quantitative. In

is to

discover empirical relationships

variables without trying to quantify them. In studies such as this, where the

number of cases
method

is

is

small and the number of variables fairly large, the comparative

the best methodological approach to identify which independent variables

explain the variation in the dependent variable.

studies

is.

where the number of cases

The dependent

The

large and the

is

variable of this study

is

statistical

method

is

number of variables

better suited for

is fairly

small.

the trajectory of the democratization

process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s. For analytical purposes the

democratization process will be broken
liberalization, democratic transition

/

of the 1991 elections

is

in

some

variation between the three countries. In

Zambia President Kenneth Kaunda was

replaced by the presidential candidate of the

(MMD),

into three phases, namely, political

democratization and democratic consolidation.^

Regarding the dependent variable there
short, as a result

down

Movement

for Multiparty

Democracy

Frederick Chiluba. Several opposition parties boycotted the 1996 elections

Zambia, while the 2001 elections were again hotly contested among various
parties. After

This
*

is

two

thirds

political

of Malawi’s voters had favored the introduction of the

done by calculating a correlation coefficient such

as Pearson’s

r.

Aarebrot
See Lijphart 1971: pp. 682-685; Ragin 1987; pp. 12-18; Beyme 1988: pp. 50-68;
105-153.
Ragin
1994;
and
pp.
507-517;
Nohlen
1994:
51-59;
pp.
1992: pp.

3

in

/

Bakka

multiparty system in the 1993 referendum, the presidential
candidate of the United

Democratic Front (UDF), Bakili Muluzi, defeated the incumbent President
Hastings

Banda

in the

Kenya

President Daniel arap

1994

elections. President

against a divided opposition.

Muluzi narrowly won the 1999

Moi managed

to

win the

The main goal of this

1

992 and the

thesis

is it

1

elections. In

997 elections

to identify

which

independent variables can be used to explain the different trajectories the
democratization process has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.

Among the

independent variables to be considered are the type of the ancien regime,

the structure of civil society, the formation of political parties, the elections and the role

of donors.

The comparative method can be

best applied to identify which independent

variables account for the variation in the dependent variable in cases that are

comparable. According the Arend Lijphart comparable cases are “cases that are similar
in a large

number of important

between which a relationship

characteristics, but dissimilar with regard to the variables

is

hypothesized”.^ Kenya, Malawi and

Zambia were

selected for this comparative study, since they can be considered as comparable cases.

Before the democratization process got under

and Zambia had quite a few things

in

common.

colonial rule prior to independence. In

political

way

all

in the early

1990s Kenya, Malawi

All three countries were under British

three countries Britain tried to establish a

system that resembled the British system

to a certain

degree before

independence. Soon after they had gained their political independence they changed

*

The meaning of these terms

^

Lijphart 1988; p. 55.

will

be delineated

in chapter 3.

4

their constitutions

and replaced the parliamentary systems introduced by Britain
with

presidential systems and the multiparty systems with de
facto or de jure one-party

Between independence and

systems.

the early 1990s

and

intervals

in

all

the beginning of the democratization process in

three countries conducted parliamentary elections in fairly
regular

most of them voters could choose between more than one candidate of

the ruling party.^

The democratization process was preceded by

authoritarian and neopatrimonial’° regimes in

Kaunda

all

fairly stable

three countries. In

Zambia President

ruled the country from independence in 1964 until 1991. In Malawi President

Banda ruled

the country from independence in 1964 until 1994.

Kenya was

President Kenyatta from independence in 1963 until his death in 1978
President, Daniel arap Moi,

became

ruled

when

his Vice-

his constitutional successor and has ruled the

country since then. Finally, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia have been

fairly free

of military

interference in the political process and were continuously under civilian rule.

Kenya experienced an unsuccessful coup
Zambia have many
their

independence

trajectories.

characteristics in

until they

d’etat in 1982. Thus,

common,

Malawi became

’

See Hartmann, Dirk 1999:

a

p.

Kenya, Malawi and

embarked on democratization processes

de jure one-party system

in 1966,

482; Meinhardt 1999;

Zambia
p.

Only

especially with regard to the period from

This means that the characteristics they have in

*

by

in

common

1972 and Kenya

that took different

can be treated as

in 1982.

553; and Krennerich 1999:

p.

945.

Bratton and van de Walle discern three informal political institutions that characterize neopatrimonial
rule in Africa. First, presidentialism which “implies the systematic concentration of political power in

hands of one individual, who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks”
the president
/ van de Walle 1997: p. 63). Second, systematic clientelism which means that
relied on the reward of personal favors as a means of strengthening his grip on power. Usually, these
favors took the form of public sector jobs within the state and the distribution of public resources
the

(Bratton

through projects, contracts, and licenses within society. In return for these favors, clients mobilized
for political
political support and showed their loyalty to the president. Third, the use of state resources
networks
clientelist
legitimation is a sine qua none for establishing and maintaining extensive
throughout a country. (See Bratton

/

van de Walle 1997: pp. 61-68).

5

background variables, which should not play a significant

role in explaining the

variation in the dependent variable. This approach, which

Arend

Lijphart calls the

comparable-cases strategy, should allow one to identify more easily which
independent
variables influenced the trajectory of the democratization process
in Kenya,

Zambia during

the 1990s as against a study of countries

Malawi and

where the colonial and

postcolonial history differs significantly from country to country."

This thesis will be structured as follows. Chapters two and three will provide the
theoretical

framework

and Zambia.

for the study

In chapter

two

of the democratization process

in

Kenya, Malawi

different concepts of democracy will be introduced and the

question raised as to whether particular African concepts can be distinguished from
universal concepts. In chapter three the terms “political liberalization”, “democratic

transition

their

/

democratization” and “democratic consolidation” will be introduced and

meaning

in the context

of this study will be delineated. Chapters

four, five

are the empirical core of this study. In

them the democratization process

Malawi and Zambia

Each of these three chapters

along the same

will be analyzed.

lines. First, the historical

analysis of how political liberalization

behind

it

will

be

context for each country

came about

will follow

identified. Subsequently, the formation

will

is

in

and

six

Kenya,

be structured

introduced.

Then an

and the main actors

of political

parties, the

multiparty elections and other major political developments such as constitutional

reform efforts will be examined. Based upon

this review, the prospects for

democratic

consolidation in each country will be assessed. Using the empirical findings of chapters

four, five

and

six,

chapter seven will lay the groundwork for identifying which

" See Lijphart 1988; pp. 54-60.

6

independent variables

may

explain the different trajectories the democratization process

has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s. In the concluding remarks
the author will

summarize the main findings and suggest various measures

that

might

increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.

7

CHAPTER 2
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF DEMOCRACY

Many scholars

tried to conceptualize or define the

past few hundred years.

To provide

term “democracy” over the

a comprehensive overview of the

conceptualizations that emerged as a result of this effort

is

many

different

beyond the scope of this

study. Rather than providing a comprehensive overview, this chapter tries to outline
different conceptualizations

democracy. One

is

of democracy

that

can be found

in the literature

two

about

a procedural or minimalist conceptualization and the other one

is

a

substantive or maximalist conceptualization of democracy.*^ Finally, the question

whether there

is

a particular African conceptualization of democracy will be addressed.

Based upon the writings of Joseph Schumpeter and Robert Dahl Larry Diamond,
Juan

J.

Linz and Seymor Martin Lipset came up with the following procedural or

minimalist conceptualization of democracy:

“Democracy

[.

.

.]

denotes a system of government that meets three

essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition

among

individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for

all

effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and

excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political
at least through

participation in the selection of leaders and policies,

regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group

excluded; and a level of

civil

and political

liberties

is

- freedom of

expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations
sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and

participation”.'^

'^See Shin 1994:

p. 142.

Diamond / Linz

/

Lipset 1988: p. xvi.

8

-

In addition to the

above conceptualization some proponents of a procedural
or

minimalist conceptualization of democracy also include an
independent judiciary and
civilian control over the military. Furthermore Philippe
C. Schmitter and Terry

Lynn

Karl stressed that elected officials must be able to exercise their powers
without the
possibility that their decisions are overridden or reversed

the polity

by unelected

officials

must be self-governing meaning national policy decisions do not

and

that

require

approval by extraterritorial actors such as the World Bank or the IMF."* Proponents of a
procedural or minimalist conceptualization of democracy are of the opinion that their
conceptualization of democracy

is

exist if the conditions contained in

differently, a political

universal in

it

its

scope and that democracy cannot

are not at least

met

to a certain degree. Put

system can only be considered democratic when certain

procedural'^ and institutional requirements'^ are met. In this context

keep

in

mind

that there

can be quite some variation with regard

important to

it is

to the

degree to which

these requirements are met. For instance, while a country’s constitution contains the

necessary provisions to guarantee in principle that

its

political

system

democratic, the

is

implementation of these constitutional provisions can vary considerably from country
to country.

To

See Schmitter

/

take this into account

some

political scientists differentiate

between

Karl 1991: pp. 81-82.

The main procedural requirements

are competition and inclusive participation.

Robert Dahl delineates the following

institutional requirements: (i) elected officials

governmental policy decisions (accountability);

and peacefully remove elected

(ii)

officials (coercion is

who

control

relatively frequent free and fair elections to select

comparatively uncommon);

for practically all adults; (iv) the right to run for public office for

most

(iii)

the right to vote

adults; (v) an effectively

enforced right to freedom of expression for all citizens; (vi) free access to sources of information that
and
are different from that of the government (Moreover, such alternative sources of information exist
of
members
become
and
to
found
right
to
enforced
effectively
the
are protected by law.); and (vii)
Schmitter / Karl 1991: p.
political interest groups and political parties (see Dahl 1989: p. 233; see also
81).

9

normative (what should be) and empirical (what

is)

concepts of democracy.

Furthermore, in the literature about democracy one finds

all sorts

of adjectives such as

limited, oligarchical, controlled, restrictive, electoral, illiberal, liberal,
guarded and

protected, to

met

a few, that precede the

word “democracy” and

that all describe

systems in which the procedural and institutional requirements outlined above

political

are

name just

to varying degrees.'^

During the

last

two decades the procedural or minimalist conceptualization of

democracy has been broadened. While Juan Linz’s conceptualization of democracy
emphasizes the holding of free and competitive elections

at

regular intervals, other

scholars such as Terry Karl criticized Linz’s conceptualization as too minimalist and

called

it

the “fallacy of electoralism”.'*

They argued

that privileging electoral over

other dimensions of democracy ignores “the degree to which multiparty elections, even

if competitive

and uncertain

in their

outcome,

may

exclude significant sections of the

population from the effective capacity to contest for power or advance and defend their
interests, and/or

may

leave significant arenas of decision-making power beyond the

reach or control of elected officials”.*^ Karl and Schmitter pointed out that while
elections are a necessary condition for a political system to be called democratic they

alone are not sufficient to justify classifying a political system as a democracy.
Elections “occur intermittently and only allow citizens to choose between the highly

For a good overview of the different subtypes of more or less democratic political systems see Collier
Levitsky 1997: pp. 433-451; and Pinkney 1994: pp. 5-17. See also Monshipouri 1995: pp. 15-17;
Harbeson 1998: pp. 39-42; and Reynolds 1999: pp. 20-22.
See Shain 1995:

Diamond 1997:

p. 46.

p. 8.

10

/

aggregated alternatives offered by political parties”.^® In response
to the criticism of

Linz

s

minimalist or procedural conceptualization of democracy as too
minimalist

Larry Diamond developed a very useful typology that differentiates between
electoral

democracy,
electoral

liberal

democracy and pseudodemocracy. According

democracy

legislative

is

and chief executive offices are

that

and

filled

through regular, competitive,

Diamonds conceptualization of a

of an electoral democracy.

intermittent, free,

Diamond an

defined as “a civilian, constitutional system in which the

multiparty elections”.^'

beyond

to

liberal

democracy goes

In addition to universal suffrage

fair elections, liberal

and

democracy requires according

to

Diamond’s

conceptualization “the absence of ‘reserved domains’ of power for the military or other
social

and

political forces that are not accountable to the electorate, directly or

indirectly”.^^ Furthermore, “in addition to the ‘vertical’ accountability

ruled (which

secured most reliably through regular, free and

is

of rulers

fair elections),

to the

it

requires ‘horizontal’ accountability of office-holders to one another; this constrains

executive power and also helps protect constitutionalism, the rule of law, and the

deliberative process”.

Finally, liberal

democracy according

to

Diamond “encompasses

extensive provisions for political and civic pluralism, as well as for individual and

group freedoms, so that contending interests and values

may be

expressed and compete

through various ongoing processes of articulation and representation, beyond periodic

Karl 1991:

Schmitter

/

Diamond

1997: p. 10.

Diamond 1 997

Diamond

:

p. 78.

p. 11.

1997: p. 11.
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elections

electoral

According

.

to

Diamond

democracy and a purely

a

pseudodemocracy

is

situated

between an

authoritarian regime. Multiparty elections also take

place in pseudodemocracies in regular intervals, however, in contrast
to an electoral

democracy a pseudodemocracy lacks “a
the ruling party

may be

sufficiently fair arena of contestation so that

turned out of power”.^^ In contrast to purely authoritarian

regimes, pseudodemocaracies “tolerate the existence of genuine (not merely

artificial,

state-controlled) opposition parties”.^^

In the

words of Mahatma Gandhi the essence of a substantive or maximalist

conceptualization of democracy

opportunity as the strongest”.^^

is that

“under

To achieve

it

the weakest should have the

this ideal substantive or

same

maximalist

conceptualizations of democracy incorporate social and economic desiderata and

embrace economic equality and

social justice.^^ Substantive or maximalist

conceptualizations of democracy do not restrict democracy to the political sphere and

are often referred to as social

means

democracy

as to reduce

its

Diamond 1997:

at

regulating the market

p.

1 1.

See also Diamond 1997:

Diamond

1997:

Diamond

1997: p. 17. See also

after

to

p.

considered as a

mechanism

in

that, a social

such a

way

so

12 for a detailed description of the nine different

Diamond.

p. 17.

Arat 1991:

See Shin 1994:

is

adverse impact on equality. Social democracies attempt to reduce

components of liberal democracy according

Quoted

Democracy

and economic outcomes. To achieve

to increase equality in social

democratic political system aims

in the literature.

p. 142;

Diamond

1999: pp. 7-17.

p. 15.

and Diamond 1997:

p. 5.
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inequalities in society through the provision of basic social
services such as health care

and education for

When

all

citizens either free

at

a relatively low cost.^’

addressing the question of whether any particular African

conceptualization of democracy exists,
Africa.

of charge or

many

scholars turn to studies of precolonial

While a great variety of political systems such

amorphous non-centralized communities
pointed out that many, possibly

all,

as highly centralized states and

existed in precolonial Africa,

“traditional African societies

Kwasi Wiredu

were

communalistic”.^® In a communalistic society extended kinship linkages play an
important role in structuring societal relations and individual interests are
to those

of society and not vice versa. Wiredu further pointed out

dominant mode of group decision-making

aimed

at

reaching a compromise

making system.
sit

is

in

communalistic

that

to

be adjusted

consensus

is

the

societies. Deliberation

an important element of a consensual decision-

In such a system for instance the

members of a

under a large tree and talk as long as necessary

village council

would

Based on these

to reach a consensus.

precolonial political traditions of African societies Wiredu proposes that African
intellectuals should get together “to explore the history, rationale, conceptual basis, and

constitutional

framework

points out that there

party system.

”

is

for a nonparty

system of politics based on consensus”.^' He

a fundamental difference between a nonparty system and a one-

The “former embraces

the freedom of political association while the latter

See Mengisteab 1996: pp. 1 10-1 12; Sklar 1996: pp. 39-40; Huber
323-324; and Mengisteab 1999: pp. 31-32.

Wiredu 2001:p.

171.

Wiredu 2001 :p.

182.

13

/

Rueschemeyer

/

Stephens 1997: pp.

execrates

In

it”.

Wiredu’s African conceptualization of democracy

political

associations play an important role as a forum of discourse and as vehicles of political

education and representation. Furthermore, they mediate between
state. Finally,

Wiredu points out

civil society

that political associations motivated

and the

by ideological or

specific policy considerations could play an important role in reducing the saliency of

ethnicity in African politics.^^

Based on the existence of consensual decision-making systems
African societies Maxwell

Owusu

argued that the consensus model of democracy^'*

modus operandi

better suited as the

for

democracy

model of democracy.^^ Claude Ake pointed out
suitable for Africa

would have

real

would have

in precolonial

is

in Africa than the majoritarian

that the kind

of democracy

that is

the following four characteristics. First, the people

decision-making power. This would be ensured through a powerful

legislation, decentralization,

and “the development of institutions

and articulation of interests”.^^ Second,

it

would

for the aggregation

invest heavily in the

improvement of

people’s health and education to enable the people to participate effectively in the

political process. Third,

Wiredu 200 l;p.

”

it

would emphasize individual and

collective rights equally.

183.

See Wiredu 2001: pp. 171-184.

model of democracy aims at “restraining majority rule by
(grand
requiring or encouraging: the sharing ofpower between the majority and the minority
and
chambers,
legislative
two
legislature,
and
executive
(among
coalitions), the dispersal ofpower
delegation
the
of
representation),
(proportional
power
distribution
of
several minority parties), a fair
of
means
power
(by
on
limit
and
a
formal
groups),
organized
nonterritorially
territorially or

According

power

to

Arend

Lijphart the consensus

(to

the minority veto)” (Lijphart 1984: p. 30).

See

Owusu

Ake 1996:

1992: p. 377.

p. 132.
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Fourth,

it

would be

as inclusive as possible.^^ Like Wiredu,

Owusu and Ake

made

also

reference to precolonial African societies and traditions, however, unlike Wiredu they

do not make a case

for a specifically African conceptualization of democracy. Other

scholars emphasized that while rudiments of democratic practices and principles

existed in various precolonial African societies

with advanced forms of democracy.

See Ake 1996: pp. 132-134.
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it

would be dangerous

to equate

them

.

CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter introduces the theoretical framework that will be used
to analyze
the democratization process in Kenya,

Malawi and Zambia. The framework

will

be

derived from the literature concerning the study of democratization. This
literature can
basically be divided into

approach.

It

two

different approaches.

was developed by Seymour Martin Lipset

that certain prerequisites such as

literacy rate

The
d’etat in

One

is

in the late

place.

wave of democratization”^’, which began with

1974 and spread from Southern Europe

finally reached Central

1950s and assumes

economic development, urbanization and increased

must be met before democratization can take
“third

the structural or macro-level

to Latin

the Portuguese coup

America during the 1980s and

and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa by the end of the 1980s and

early 1990s, called the assumptions of the structural or macro-level approach into

question. During the third

meet the

wave democratization took

place in countries that did not

structural prerequisites outlined above. In response to this

and empirical

gap between theory

Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead

reality

developed the agency or micro-level approach based on Dankwart A. Rustow’s

article

“Transitions to Democracy”."'® This approach focuses on the transition process from

See Simiyu 1988: pp. 68-69; Schmidt 1994: pp. 236-237; and Nwokedi 1995: pp. 9-12. See also Ake
1991:p.34;Chazan 1992: pp. 113-116; Ake 1993: pp. 242-244; Ellis 1993: pp. 133-134; and

Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 28-31.
Huntington

1

99 1

Rustow 1970:

:

p.

2

1

pp. 337-363.
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authoritarian rule to

democracy and analyses the

interaction and choices

made by

various actors such as individuals and groups during this
process.

The agency

or micro-level approach for the study of democratization
has been

developed mainly based on studies of transitions from authoritarian rule
in

Southern European and Latin American countries. While not

all

democracy

to

aspects of the agency

or micro-level approach are equally useful for the study of African
transitions, given the

economic and

different political,

useful to

some

extent

different periods.

is

social context

of African countries, one aspect

that is

the distinction of the democratization process into three

These are

political liberalization,

democratic transition

/

democratization, and democratic consolidation. These terms, which provide the
theoretical

3.1

framework

for the empirical part of this study, will

be delineated below.

Political Liberalization

Political liberalization entails an easing

of repression and the granting or

extension of political rights previously denied by the authoritarian regime. During the
period of political liberalization authoritarian regimes respond to internal and external
pressure and relax controls on the political activities of their citizens. “In such openings,

governments restore previously repudiated freedoms of movement, speech, and
association to individuals and groups in society”."^^

authoritarian governments

become somewhat

As

a result of political liberalization

less authoritarian. Political

measures

taken towards this end can include the release of political prisoners and the

See Pridham 1994:
Bratton

/

p. 16;

Monshipouri 1995;

van de Walle 1997:

p. 6;

and Schmitz

p. 159.
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/

Sell 1999: pp. 23-24.

lifting

of

government censorship. John Healy and Mark Robinson pointed
out
are introduced in the absence of political

compromise between

measures

that these

the regime and

its

opponents, with the result that they are neither guaranteed by the
state nor formally
accepted by various interest groups, which gives them a provisional
and arbitrary
character

.

In the context of chapters 4.2, 5.2 and 6.2 political liberalization

as a step-by-step process that leads to a less authoritarian and

more open

is

political

regime and concludes with the formal decision by the authoritarian government
the reintroduction of a multiparty system.

Some of the

context of political liberalization are as follows.

What

defined

to allow

issues to be addressed in the

role did various internal actors

play during the liberalization process and which ones were most influential in bringing
it

about?

What

role did external actors such as donors play and

what impact did

events in other world regions as well as other African countries

3.2

Democratic Transition

The

literature that deals

/

political

have?"*"^

Democratization

with transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy

provides different conceptualizations of the terms “democratic transition” and
“democratization”. Broadly speaking one can differentiate between narrow and broad
conceptualizations of these terms. While the process of democratization encompasses

all

three stages (political liberalization, democratization

democratic consolidation), scholars

who

utilize a

/

democratic transition and

narrow conceptualization of the terms

“democratic transition” and “democratization” such as Bratton and van de Walle focus

Healey
''''

/

Robinson 1992: 128.

Schmitter 1986: p. 7; Mainwaring 1989: pp. 4-8; Linz
van de Walle 1997: pp. 159-193.

See O’Donnell
/

/
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/

Stepan 1996:

p. 3;

and Bratton

their attention

president

is

mainly on the founding elections^^

replaced as a result of free and

transition “can

be said

to

have occurred

[..]

in

which ideally an authoritarian

fair elections.

when

For them a democratic

a regime has been installed on the

basis of a competitive election, freely and fairly conducted within
a matrix of civil
liberties,

with results accepted by

^precluded trunsition when

all

participants”.^^ If this

political conditions

when

political

Rwanda and Burundi;

not the case, they speak of

were unconducive

of any kind of functioning form of govemance”^^ such as
transition

is

to the construction

in Liberia;

of a blocked

reforms were launched but never fully realized such as

or of a flawed transition

when

in

authoritarian presidents allowed

the reform process to unfold to a considerable extend, but then “exploited the powers of

incumbency

to dictate the rules

of the

political

game by manipulating

monopolizing campaign resources, or interfering with the
in

power such

as in

Gabon

polls”'^^ to

electoral laws,

ensure they remain

or Cameroon.

Scholars like Joel Barkan and John Harbeson are

critical

of the temporally

constrained, election-centric conception that underpins Bratton and van de Walle’s

conceptualization of democratic transitions. Harbeson pointed out that their
conceptualization assumes that “democratic elections will ipso facto produce regime

change from an incumbent authoritarian
“initial

to a

new, democratically inclined regime”;

that

multiparty elections and/or regime change will ipso facto generate the

founding election occurs when “for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of
national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions” (O’Donnel / Schmitter

A

1986: p. 57).

Bratton

/

van de Walle 1997:

p. 194.

Bratton

/

van de Walle 1997:

p.

Bratton

/

van de Walle

1

997

:

1

19.

p. 121.

19

momentum
“this

necessary to produce subsequent, broader patterns of
democratization”; that

momentum

will

be sufficient

means

to generate the

to fulfillment

array of democratization tasks in the ‘consolidation’
phase”; that “the

of this broader
multiparty

initial

elections taking place at the national level will lead to
democratization processes at

subnational levels

transition

;

and that “the polity

itself will

remain sufficiently stable

to sustain

and subsequent consolidation phases of democratization”.^^ As the analysis of

the democratization process in

Zambia and Malawi, which

are considered

and van de Walle as having undergone successful democratic

by Bratton

transitions, in chapters 5

and 6 will show, these assumptions are not necessarily always reflected by the

political

events that unfold after founding elections that resulted in the replacement of an
authoritarian president

by a democratically

for a broader conceptualization

transition”.

He

elected one. Therefore Joel Barkan called

of the terms “democratization” and “democratic

pointed out that democratization “is fundamentally a process of

institution-building, and not the occurrence or non-occurrence of single events”.^® In the

context of chapters 4.3, 5.3 and 6.3 a broad conceptualization of the terms “democratic

transition”

and “democratization”

is

adopted which considers democratic transition

democratization in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia as
fact that in all three countries constitutional

place.

Some of the

ongoing. This

and other reform

is

efforts are

evident by the

still

taking

issues to be addressed in the context of democratic transition

democratization are as follows.
(cohesive or fragmented)?

What

What

is

the nature of the opposition

role if any did the military play?

Harbeson 1998: pp.42-43.
Barkan 1994a:

still

p. 180.
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/

movement

Along which

/

cleavages were political parties formed?

What

how

efforts

far to

the elections reasonably free and fair?

reform the constitution and/or electoral laws;

successful have these efforts been; and

who was

the driving force behind them?^'

Democratic Consolidation

3.3

As
rule

have been made so

Were

a result of democratic consolidation regime reversal back to authoritarian

becomes

less likely.

institutionalization

game

in

town”

as

Democratic consolidation requires the legitimation and

of democratic practices

Giuseppe

di

Palma put

it.

ensure that democracy becomes “the only

to

Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan proposed a

conceptual framework for democratic consolidation that consists of three dimensions.
First, the

behavioral dimension of democratic consolidation requires that no significant

political

groups seriously attempt to overthrow a democratically elected government or

try to

is

secede from the

state.

Furthermore, in a consolidated democracy the government

no longer concerned about the

attitudinal

possibility of democratic

dimension of democratic consolidation requires

breakdown. Second, the
that

“even

in the face

of

severe political and economic crises, the overwhelming majority of the people believe

that

any further

formulas”.

political

change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic

Third, the constitutional dimension of democratic consolidation requires

that all actors in the political arena

will

be resolved according

“become habituated

to the established

norms and

to the fact that political conflict

that violations

See O’Donnell / Schmitter 1986: pp. 7-11; Mainwaring 1989: pp. 4-8; Linz
and Bratton / van de Walle 1997: pp. 194-232.

”

Linz

/

Stepan 1996a:

p. 5.
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/

of these norms

Stepan 1996a: pp. 3-5;

are likely to be both ineffective and costly”.” In
addition to these three dimensions of

democratic consolidation Linz and Stepan argue that five
“interconnected and mutually
reinforcing conditions must also exist or be crafted for a democracy
to be

consolidated”.”

civil society

First,

must

an environment conducive to the development of a free and lively

exist.

Second, while

civil society

can play an important role

in

dismantling an authoritarian regime, democratic transition and consolidation requires
a
relatively

society.

autonomous and valued political society

The core

institutions

of a democratic

as well in addition to a diverse civil

political society are political parties,

legislatures, elections, electoral rules, political leadership,

and inter-party

alliances. In a

consolidated democracy these institutions are well established and accepted by the

overwhelming majority of the population. Furthermore,
differentiated

by ideology

political parties are

or programmatic concerns and not

concerns. Third, “throughout the territory of the state

all

mainly

by ethnoregional

major

political actors,

especially the government and the state apparatus, must be subjected to a rule of law
that protects individual

freedoms and associational life”.” This requires a strong

consensus by

political actors regarding the constitution

all

major

and “a clear hierarchy

of laws, interpreted by an independent judicial system and supported by a strong

”

Linz

/

Stepan 1996a:

p. 5.

Linz

/

Stepan 1996a:

p. 7.

legal

According to Linz and Stepan civil society refers “to that arena of the polity where self-organizing
groups, movements, and individuals, relatively autonomous from the state, attempt to articulate values,
create associations and solidarities, and advance their interests. Civil society can include manifold
social movements (women’s groups, neighborhood associations, religious groupings, and intellectual
organizations) and civic associations from
journalists, or lawyers)” (Linz

Linz

/

Stepan 1996b:

/

all

social strata (such as trade unions, entrepreneurial groups,

Stepan 1996a:

p. 7).

p. 17.
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culture in civil society”.

the

[..]

well

it

democratic government”.^® In order for a democratic government

needs an effective capacity to command, regulate and

ensured

on

Fourth, “there must be a state bureaucracy that

if its civil service is

merit. Fifth, “there

and Stepan mean a
institutions,

set

extract.

usable by

is

to function

This

is

best

competent and recruitment as well as promotion are based

must be an

institutionalized

economic society

By

that

Linz

of socio-politically crafted and socio-politically accepted norms,

and regulations

that

mediate between the

state

certain degree of state regulation markets cannot exist.

The

and market. Without a
state

must protect public and

private property, establish corporate laws, regulate the stock market and standards for

weight, measurement, and ingredients in order for markets to exist and to function. For

markets

to function well

reduced by the

must provide
well as

some

market

state. Finally, in

failures

must be corrected and

their social costs

order for democracy to be sustainable the government

certain public goods such as education, health care, and transportation as

safety net to help citizens hurt

by market swings or

failures,

and

it

must

take measures aimed at alleviating inequalities. In sum, in a consolidated democracy

all

the five conditions mentioned above exist and interact with each other.^°

As has been

pointed out in chapter 3.2, the theoretical framework applied to

analyze the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia assumes that

democratic transition

/

democratization

Linz

/

Stepan 1996b:

p. 19.

Linz

/

Stepan 1996b:

p. 17.

Linz

/

Stepan 1996b:

p. 17.

is still

ongoing

in these three countries, since

also Mainwaring 1986. pp. 1Stepan 1996a: pp. 5-15; Linz / Stepan 1996b: pp. 14-23. See
and Schedler 1998. pp.
/ van de Walle 1997: pp. 233-255;
23; Diamond 1997b: pp. xviii-xxiii; Bratton
91-107.

See Linz

/
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various reform efforts are

still

being pursued

at different levels in all three countries.

Therefore, in chapters 4.4, 5.4 and 6.4 only the prospects for democratic consolidation
in

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia respectively can be discussed. Some of the issues

addressed in this context are as follows.

What

a less salient factor in the political process?

future political parties will

emerge

programmatic concerns and

less

that

are the prospects for ethnicity to

Can

it

be expected

by ethnoregional

criteria?

likely is

it

become

that in the foreseeable

What

are the prospects for

economy and

of a sizable middle class and formal private sector as well as

how

be

can be differentiated mainly by ideology or

the government to play a less predominant role in the

rates? Finally,

to

for

for the

improving

development
literacy

that the legislature, the judiciary, political parties

civil society will facilitate the prospects for

democratic consolidation?

24

and

CHAPTER 4

KENYA

The Republic of Kenya
580,367 sq

km

is

located in Eastern Africa and covers a total area of

(224,081 sq miles). Appendix

A

contains a

map of Kenya

that

shows

eight provinces as well as major cities and towns. In mid-2001 Kenya’s
population
officially estimated at 30,765, 916.

groups are by

far the largest

Embu, Meru, Kamba,
Luo

[...];

Kisii,

the Nilo-Hamitics

Many

ethnic groups live in Kenya.

“The Bantu

(70%) of Kenya’s population and include

the Kikuyu,

encompass the Maasai, Turkana and Kalenjin, while
in the

population”.^’'

The

Lake

(1

1%) and Kalenjin

and Meru/Embu, these groups account

regional distribution of Kenya’s

The Kikuyu mainly
the shores of

Kisii

live in central

main ethnic groups

Kenya, the Luhya

in

is

Decalo 1998:

p. 177.

See Foeken

Dietz 2000:

/

p.

123; and

Morgan 2001:
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p.

490.

1%).

of the

as follows.

western Kenya, the Luo along

Victoria, the Kalenjin in the central Rift Valley, the

of Mount Kenya.^’^

(1

75%

for

Kamba

south-east of Nairobi, the Kisii in the south-west of Kenya, and finally the

east

the

Northeast. Kenya’s largest ethnic groups

Kikuyu (21%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kamba

Together with the smaller

was

Baluhya, Taita, and Giriama. The Nilotics include primarily

Hamitic include the Galla and Somali
are the

its

cast

Meru

and

live

4.1

Historical Context

After the British colonial administration allowed the formation
of political
parties in 1959,

two

were formed

political parties

African National Union

(KANU) was

founded.

more educated, more urbanized, and more
Kikuyu, the

Embu

Odinga and

Tom Mboya emerged

and

Mem,

the Luo, the

as

in 1960.

On

14

May

1960 the Kenya

KANU brought together the larger,

politically mobilized ethnic groups

Kamba

KANU’s

and the

Kisii.

leading figures.

Jomo

of the

Kenyatta, Oginga

KANU’s

leaders favored

a strong central government. Various smaller or internally divided ethnic groups “that

had been largely bypassed by the colonial economy, and whose members therefore
tended to be less educated, less urbanized, and less mobilized”^^ and

dominance of the Kikuyu and Luo within

who

feared that the

KANU would submerge their interests and

welfare in an independent Kenya founded the Kenya African Democratic Union

(KADU)

on 25 June 1960.

KADU brought together the Abaluhya

Western Province, the Kalenjin of the western

/

Luhya of the

Rift Valley Province, the Mijikenda of

the Coast Province and the semi-nomadic populations of the sparsely populated

southern Rift Valley and the remote Northeastern Province. Ronald Ngala and Daniel

arap

Moi were KADU’s

leading figures.

KADU received considerable

financial

and

administrative support from European settlers who, like the ethnic groups that formed

KADU,

feared that

independence.

KANU members would descend on “their” land after Kenyan

KADU’s

leadership

was opposed

to a strong central

government and

favored “a federal form of government called majimho, with six regions, each with

own

legislature, financial

Barkan 1994b:

and executive power, and control over land, police and

p. 10.
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its

administration, and with a

weak

central

government comprising a lower house and a

senate”.^'^

The Kenyatta Era 1963-1978

4.1.1

On

12

December 1963 Kenya gained

its

independence with Jomo Kenyatta as

Prime Minister. At independence Kenya had a decentralized

constitutional structure

with a bicameral legislature that was based on the Westminster model of parliamentary
sovereignty. During the years following independence Kenyatta significantly

transformed Kenya’s political system to “consolidate his personal authority and
create a

government of national

unity”.

Using a combination of carrots and

persuaded the members of KADU^^ to join
facto single-party

which the

office

state.

He

KANU during

to

sticks

he

1964 making Kenya a de

also initiated various constitutional changes as a result of

of the Prime Minister was abolished and replaced with a strong

executive President in 1964. The bicameral parliament was replaced by a unicameral

National Assembly in 1966.

67

KTUDU’s incorporation

into

KANU accelerated the process of internal division

between moderate and more radical elements within
moderates such as Daniel arap Moi into
the

^

radical elements of

more

Osabu-Kle 2000;

p. 155.

KANU. The infusion

of KADU

KANU strengthened Kenyatta’ s hand vis-a-vis

KANU around Vice-President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga

See also Barkan 1994b; pp. 10-11; Ogot 1995;

p. 65;

andMuigai 1995;

pp. 166-167.
**

Throup
In

/

Hornsby 1998;

December 1964

p. 12.

arap Moi,
the former deputy chairman of KADU, Daniel

became Minister of Home

Affairs in President Kenyatta’s government.

See Barkan 1994b; p.l

1;

Ochieng 1995; pp.107-108; Throup

27

/

Hornsby 1998;

p. 12.

who were

critical

to nationalize

of Kenyatta’s pro-Western and pro-business policies and
who wanted

foreign-owned companies and seize

After a series of rigged
faction

KANU elections aimed at eliminating supporters of the radical

from party posts, Odinga and

formed a new

political party, the

his supporters

was

to

farms without compensation.

settler

KANU in April

1966 and

Kenya People’s Union (KPU). The aim of Odinga and

more

create a

his supporters^* left

left-wing party, to oppose the growing

conservatism and Western orientation of the

KANU leadership, and to try to replace the

persistently ethnic basis of politics with a cleavage based

on ideological,

class or socio-

economic grounds”.^^ Between 1966 and 1969 President Kenyatta took various
measures against
party outside

constitution

KPU making

KANU.

had

left

As

quite clear that he

Immediately

was changed

face a by-election.

it

after the

requiring

was not

willing to tolerate another

formation of KPU in April 1966 the

MPs who

defected to another party to resign and

a result of ethnic pressure and rigging, out of the 29

MPs who

KANU only nine MPs, mainly Luos from the Nyanza Province, emerged

victorious in the by-elections.

The

result

aspect of Kenyan politics. Ethnicity

of this by-election revealed an important

and

state

power were more important

in

determining political preferences than class or ideology. The formation of KPU brought

an end to the Kikuyu- Luo alliance. Kenyatta replaced

Kikuyu and the Kalenjin by giving

**

it

with a

new

alliance

between the

the coveted Vice-Presidency to the Kalenjin

Odinga’s move was backed by roughly one

fifth

of KANU’s legislators including

Moi

in

many Kikuyu and

Luo.

Throup

™

/

Hornsby 1998:

p. 13.

Githu Muigai defines ethnicity as “the consciousness among people with shared cultural and
roots that gets utilized for political affiliation and mobilization to compete with other groups
resources” (Glickman 1995;

p. 387).
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linguistic

for scarce

January 1967. During 1967 and 1968 KPU’s
various ways.

KPU

officials

were

were detained and harassed, branch

denied, candidates were disqualified and

youth wing. In October 1969
President Kenyatta to

political activities

KPU

Kisumu

in

KPU

curtailed in

registrations

meetings were interrupted by

was banned and

its

Luoland had ended

were

KANU’s

leaders detained after a visit of

in violence.

The

brief existence of

an opposition party from 1966 to 1969 demonstrated “two fundamental
features of

Kenyan
rule,

political culture

—

the refusal of government to accept challenges to

and the rapid reversion of the constitutional opposition

While Kenyatta suppressed competition between

mechanism

to allocate

right to

to its ethnic bastion”.’’

political parties, as

above, he institutionalized a significant measure of competition within
central

its

and define positions of his elaborate

shown

KANU as the

clientelist

system

beginning with the parliamentary elections of 1969. All Kenyans were permitted
participate in

KANU’s

primary elections as long as they did not challenge

to

KANU’s

Kenyatta’s monopoly of power. Under this system of semi-competitive elections

single-member constituencies the

in

in

KANU primaries were basically local referenda that

gave the electorate the opportunity
success

and

to

confirm or replace

MPs

depending on

their

securing state resources. This led to a relatively high turn-over and

reshuffling of personnel within Kenya’s clientelist structures. For instance, as a result of

the 1969 parliamentary elections,

26% of the ministers

and

37%

of the assistant

ministers lost their parliamentary seats and hence also their ministerial appointments.

” Throup / Hornsby

1998:

p. 15.

See Throup

/

Hornsby 1998:

29

pp. 12-15.

The

possibility

of being repudiated by the electorate ensured

that

MP’s

paid attention to

the concerns of the inhabitants of their districts.^^

In addition to conducting regular parliamentary elections under a semi-

competitive framework the political system established under Kenyatta’s presidency

was

also characterized

by a professionally run and

as a relatively free press

fairly

independent judiciary as well

and the emergence of an autonomous associational

electoral politics, as long as the press

and

civil society organizations did not

life.

Like

in

challenge

Kenyatta’s authority directly they could serve as a platform for muted criticism of

government

policies.

society organizations

Within these norms of permissibility, a broad spectrum of civil

emerged during the 1970s. These included professional

associations such as the

Law

Society of Kenya (LSK); economic interest groups such as

the Central Organization of Trade Unions

(COTU); church organizations of various

denominations such as the National Christian Council of Kenya; and ethnic welfare
organizations such as the Gikuyu

In

Embu Mem Association (GEMA)

sum, while “Kenyatta’s Kenya was not democratic,

open and
real

resilient

competition

4.1.2

From

it

and the Luo Union.

was nonetheless

a relatively

system with multiple secondary centers of power and a measure of

- and hence

accountability

-

Clientelism to Personal Rule

at the local

and regional

51

73

levels”.

- The Presidency of Daniel arap Moi

After President Kenyatta’s death on 22 August 1978 his Vice-President, Daniel

arap

Moi of the

Kalenjin ethnic group, became his constitutional successor. During the

1978: pp. 100-103; Barkan 1992: pp. 172-173; Throup
and Hartmann, Dirk 1999: pp. 476-477.

See Barkan

/

Barkan 1992:

Okumu

p. 175.
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Hornsby 1998: pp. 15-17;

first

ten years of his presidency

Moi dismantled

the clientelist network established

under the presidency of Kenyatta and transformed

it

into a

system of personal

order to achieve that goal he adopted an increasingly
authoritarian stance.

became an important

tool in this transformation.

moderating articulator of interests

expense of parliament and other

While Moi
soon

to a

Kikuyu

senior

at the

in his cabinet for strategic reasons,

he undertook various measures

including the wealthiest of them, the Gikuyu,

many

turned the party “from a bottom-up,

institutions”.^"*

of the Kikuyu establishment. In 1980 he banned

also replaced

KANU

top-down instrument of personal control -

initially retained several

after taking office

He

rule. In

Kikuyu

officials in

to

undermine the

political

power

ethnic welfare associations

all

Embu

and

Mem Association (GEMA).

He

government with members of his own

Kalenjin ethnic group as a means of gaining greater control over the political process

and

to ensure that the will

of the central government was enacted

1982 Oginga Odinga and George Anyona

Kenyan

Socialist Alliance. In response

Constitutional

state.

amendment

bill

tried to register a

new

Moi mshed^^ through

in the regions. In early

political party, the

the National

on 9 June 1982 making Kenya a de jure

Assembly

a

single-party

Subsequently Moi revitalized the stmctures of KANU and used the party more

and more as a control mechanism for instance by making party membership obligatory
for all civil servants

and by using

KANU branch organizations to break up clientelist

networks, which were used under Kenyatta to advance ethnoregional

*

Brown 2000:
The

p.

legislation

interests.

206.

was passed by

the National

Assembly

31

after

only 45 minutes of debate.

Following an attempted Air Force coup d’etat

armed

in

August

1982"^^

Moi

restructured the

forces, further tightened his control over the state, curtailed press

freedom and

suppressed any dissent. Political opponents were detained and tortured and
university professors

were

fired. In

political process in his favor

electoral procedures in 1986.

an attempt to further control and manipulate the

Moi announced

He

several controversial changes of the

replaced the secret ballot in the party primaries with a

queuing system under which voters had

Another change stipulated

critical

to line

up behind pictures of each contestant.

that “candidates receiving

70 percent of the vote

time would be declared elected”.^^ These changes were applied

in the

at

queuing

1988

parliamentary elections and lead to widespread rigging. At least one third of the
electoral contests in these elections

were manipulated

to ensure that candidates favored

by Moi won. This destroyed the confidence of ordinary Kenyans

in the political

process

and deprived the National Assembly of its watchdog role vis-a-vis the executive^^.
his efforts to

maximize

autonomy of various

his control over the political process

civil society organizations. In

Organization of Trade Unions

Maendeleo ya Wanawake,

Moi

largest

Barkan 1992:

organization,

Kenyan

1980s President

political system.

As

consequences see Decalo 1998: pp. 242-246.

p. 182.

Makau wa Mutua

pointed out that queue voting

behind pictures of candidates known
reprisals (see

its

women’s

In short, during the

significantly increased the authoritarian nature of the

For a detailed account of the coup d’etat and
’’

KANU.

also reduced the

1989 Moi forced the Central

(COTU) and Kenya’s

to affiliate with

Moi

In

wa Matua

made

it

much

less likely that

people would

line

up

government
to be critical of government policies out of fear for

1992a: p.23).
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a

result various

groups of Kenyan society expressed their desire for fundamental

political

changes since the mid-1980s7^

4.2

Political Liberalization

Kenyan churches and lawyers played an important
political liberalization in

Kenya. In contrast

role in bringing about

to the Central Organization

of Trade

Unions (COTU) and the national women’s organization, which became

auxiliary

organizations of KANU, the churches, particularly the

National Council of Churches in Kenya

managed

(NCCK)

to maintain a relatively high degree

President Moi.

Roman

Catholic church and the

as well as the legal profession

of independence from the government of

On the one hand, Kenyan churches

and lawyers occupied a

space which government could not interfere with without dragging

political

and ideological facade of constitutionalism and legalism”.

Kenyan churches and lawyers possessed

down

On

“political

the entire

the other hand,

organizational advantages they could use to

protect themselves and others. In contrast to newspapers and leaflets, church sermons

were

less subject to state control

clergymen took

it

and bans. During the

upon themselves

to

late

1980s especially younger

preach the Gospel against

state oppression.

Furthermore, Kenyan churches like the Anglican Church of the Province of Kenya

(CPK) and

the Presbyterian

Church of East Africa (PCEA)

are

members of international

denominations, whose members in other countries might have drawn international
attention to the

Kenyan government

if their local representatives

would have been

229-255; Throup
See Barkan 1992: pp. 178-188; Widner 1992b: pp. 133-161; Decalo 1998: pp.
205-208.
Hornsby 1998: pp. 26-53; and Brown 2000: pp.

Muigai 1993:

p. 26.
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harassed or jailed. Like the clergy, Kenya’s legal profession also
has international

which were used

to

draw the

attention of the international

community

ties,

to the

imprisonment of Kenyan lawyers. For instance, through periodicals such as the Nairobi

Law Monthly and

the

Kenyan

section of the International

that has consultative status with the

Commission of Jurists

(ICJ),

Economic and Social Council of the United Nations

and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

These organizational advantages provided Kenyan clergy and lawyers with

a semi-

protected space from which they were able to criticize the increasingly authoritarian
practices of the

Moi regime during

clergymen and lawyers

like Paul

the second half of the 1980s. For instance, various

Muite and Kiraitu Murungi

of the secret ballot with a queuing system
the Rev.

in 1986.

Timothy Njoya and Bishop Okullu^' were

Kenya’s return

criticized the replacement

Kenyan lawyers and clergymen
also

among

the

first to

like

demand

to a multiparty system.*^

During the year 1990 opposition against Moi’s government grew stronger and

became more broadly based. The

politically motivated assassination in

February 1990

of Kenya’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Dr. Robert Ouko,
a

Luo who was an outspoken

critic

of corruption within the Moi government, triggered

widespread protest against the government, especially among the Luo community and
students in Nairobi and the

Nyanza Province.

Protest songs

were recorded and people

started greeting each other with two-fingered “salutes”, the sign

of multi-partyism. The

1990 Bishop Okullu, “emboldened by the recent release of Nelson Mandela and the
ANC in South Africa, [..] publicly stated that only multi-party politics would
and transparency” (Throup / Hornsby 1998: p. 58).
accountability
full
guarantee
In late April

legalisation of the

430-440;
See Widner 1992a: pp. 214-218; Widner 1992b: pp. 187-192; Sabar-Friedman 1995: pp.
55-58.
Sabar-Friedman 1997: pp. 32- 50; and Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp.
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Moi government responded with
from the beginning of March.*^^

a violent crackdown and banned

In

May

demonstrations

1990 the former Kikuyu cabinet ministers,

Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia, demanded Kenya’s return
at

all

to multiparty

democracy

a press conference. During the following weeks they held talks with
leading

politicians

of other ethnic groups such as the Luhya Masinde Muliro and the Luo

Oginga Odinga

to get their support for their

demands. The Moi government

felt

threatened by the prospect of Kenya’s three largest ethnic groups joining forces against
it

and on 4 July 1990 arrested Matiba, Rubia and Odinga’ s son, Raila Odinga, who were

in the process

of organizing a pro-democracy

rally in Nairobi.

thousands of people gathered on 7 July 1990*^

at

Provoked by these

Nairobi’s Kamukunji grounds in

defiance of a government ban and demanded political reforms and respect for
rights. After police

the

and the paramilitary General Services Unit (GSU)

crowds with batons and

tear gas, riots

arrests

broke out

Central Province. During the following three days

in

human

tried to disperse

Nairobi and several cities of the

many were

killed or injured

and

oc

hundreds were arrested.
a

new

In

February 1991 Oginga Odinga announced the formation of

political party, the National

supported him in this

Kenya was

effort.

Democratic Party. Various lawyers and academics

However, the government refused

to register

since

it,

a de jure one-party state. Subsequently, in August 1991 six opposition

leaders, including Odinga,

announced the establishment of the Forum

Restoration of Democracy (FORD).

They

stressed that

FORD would

for the

not be a political

See Mair 1994: pp. 34/35; Widner 1992b: p.l93; and Thobhani 2000: pp. 6-7.
This day became

symbolic power

known

in

See Widner 1992b:

as '"Saba Saba, Kiswahili for ‘7/7’ (the date), and carries

Kenya” (Brown 2000:
p.

p.

much

political

218).

175-176; Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 179-181; and
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Brown 2000:

p.

218.

and

party but a pressure group for constitutional reforms and multiparty
democracy.

members of FORD

frequently pointed to the political events in

The

Zambia during 1990 and

1991 as an example for Kenya.*^’

As

a response to this internal political pressure

Review Committee

in

June 1990

people. During a conference of

KANU

established the

KANU

complaints voiced by the Kenyan

to investigate

KANU delegates in early December

queue voting system*^ and the 70 percent

to abolish the

readmit to

Moi

rule.

It

was

1990

it

was decided

also decided to

formerly expelled members. In another concession the government

decided to restore the tenure of judges. Moi hoped that these rather minor reforms

would

off enough steam and would enable him to avoid further going changes.

let

During several occasions he made
state

it

quite clear that

even so opposition parties had emerged

When

Kenya would remain

in other

a one-party

African countries like Zambia.

defending his rejection of multiparty politics Moi repeatedly argued that “the

legalization of opposition parties

unity”.^^

would usher

However, he was ultimately forced
•

international

In

donor community.

May

in tribal conflict

to

and destroy national

change his position on

this issue

by

the

89

1990 the U.S. Ambassador

in

Kenya, Smith Hempstone, made a

statement in which he linked foreign aid to political reform. In July of the same year he

**

See Ogot 1995:

p.

244; and Hartmann, Christof 1999:

p.

182 and 184.

“came as a result of a campaign headed by church leaders,
step towards the enhancement of unity in the
massive
who cited the abolition of this system as a
behind God, thus broadening their stmggle to
only
queue
can
country. In addition, they said that they
1995:
(Sabar-Friedman
p. 452, footnote 35).
opposition”
include the freedom of

The

cancellation of the queue voting system

Barkan 1993:

p. 90.

®^See Muigai 1995: pp. 180-181; and Hartmann, Christof 1999: pp. 180-181.
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expressed his distress

Odinga

at the

as well as other

detention of Kenneth Matiba, Charles Rubia and Raila

pro-democracy

Sweden and Finland were

the

first

Kenyan government continued

mid- 1990, Norway, Denmark,

of Kenya’s donors

to disrespect

of the editor-in-chief of the “Nairobi
States, the

activists. In

Law

to threaten to cut their aid if the

democratic

rights. In

response to the arrest

Monthly”, Gitobu Imanyara, the United

Nordic countries, Germany and Japan threatened further aid cuts

in

May

1991. Displeased with the worsening political situation in Kenya, the Nordic countries
threatened to cancel aid agreements worth $80 million in July 1991. In September 1991
the Danish government started to carry out this threat

Kenya. In November 1991 leaders of FORD

by suspending

tried to organize a

Nairobi. Despite the lack of governmental permission,

streets

all

new

aid to

pro-democracy

many people

rally in

gathered in the

of Nairobi on 16 November 1991 and demanded the reintroduction of multiparty

democracy. The Moi government detained twelve prominent members of FORD and

ended the gathering by using heavy
including the U.S., the

protests.

Germany and

force. In response,

many of Kenya’s

UK, Canada, Sweden and Denmark,
the

issued strong written or oral

UK recalled their Ambassadors.^® Against the background of

the continued unwillingness of the

Moi regime

to undertake democratic reforms

Kenya’s donors took bold action against Kenya

November 1991 Kenya’s

donors,

bilateral

in

November

1991.

donors met in Paris. During

On 25-26

this Consultative

Group

160 foreign correspondents,
including CNN. They facilitated that the rest of the world could get first hand information about the
authoritarian practices of the Moi regime (see Chege 1994: p. 60). This might have increased the

Michael Chege pointed out that Nairobi

is

home

pressure on Kenya’s bilateral donors to take

to approximately

some bold

1991.
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action at their meeting in Paris in

November

meeting*^' they decided “to suspend balance

of payments support and other rapid

disbursement aid for six month”'^^ pending the introduction of substantial

economic reforms. This decision caused immediate economic problems

for the

government, including a rapid depreciation of the Kenyan currency, the

shilling.

the

Kenyan government

less than a

Moi announced Kenya’s

President

week

to react to this decision.

On

2

and

political

Kenyan
It

took

December 1991

KANU

return to a multiparty system during a special

National Delegates’ Conference and on 10 December 1991 the Kenyan parliament
repealed Section 2(A) of Kenya’s constitution, which was added

de jure a one-party

1980s.

by the increasingly

Due

1982

to

make Kenya

state.

The period of political
triggered

in

liberalization in

Kenya

lasted for about six years.

authoritarian character of the

to their organizational advantages

Moi regime

It

was

since the mid-

Kenyan churches and lawyers played an

important role during the early phase of political liberalization. The deteriorating

economic

situation

and the increasing alienation of Kikuyu leaders with the Kalenjin-

dominated regime of President Moi were among the causes
politicians

in

Kenya

in

May

Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia of the need

a major push

by publicly demanding Kenya’s

1990. In this context Holmquist,

convinced the Kikuyu

to give political liberalization

return to multiparty

Weaver and Ford pointed

more competitive

leaders considered the return to a

that

political

democracy

out that Kikuyu

system “as the only

way

in

This meeting brought together representatives of Canada, Denmark, h inland, France, (iermany, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, the African
Development Bank, the European Union, the European Investment Bank, the IMF, and the United

Nations Development Programme. Belgium, Saudi Arabia and the

Throup

”

/

Hornsby 1998:

OECD sent observers.

p. 84.

See Ahluwalia 1993: p. 508; Throup
191; and Brown 2000: pp. 222-230.

/

Hornsby 1998: pp. 84-88; Hartmann, Christof 1999:
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pp. 186-

which

economic power could be

their

However,

internal actors alone

multiparty politics.

opposition

classes.

is

that

One of the

its

directly translated into political power”.^"'

were not strong enough

to bring about

Kenya’s return

to

reasons for the relative weakness of the internal

social base

was

limited mainly to the urban middle and upper

Organized peasant and trade union participation was almost entirely absent

during the period of political liberalization. Widner remarked that while the legal

community “could

facilitate the

flow of information between other social actors,

could not provide an organizational base.

It

it

could not supply cars to send

representatives to speak with farmers in rural areas, for example, or do

many of the

other things that a coherent opposition would have to do to coordinate economic actors

and

to use that collective leverage to force the president

and his party’s leadership

bargaining table”.^^ Therefore only the withholding of $350 million
the international donor

Kenyan opposition

community

in

November 1991 gave

for the establishment

to the

teeth to the

by

demand of the

of a multiparty democracy. The high degree of

aid dependability of the patronage-based regime left

concede

in foreign aid

to the

demands of the donors. He did so

Moi no

other choice than to

rather quickly to gain a strategic

advantage^^ over the opposition in the early stages of the democratization process as

will

be shown

Holmquist

/

in

chapter 4.3.^^

Weaver / Ford 1994;

Widner 1992b:

p. 98.

p. 189.

was
“By deciding to accede to international pressure for greater political pluralism before it
to [...] prepare the
KANU
enabling
FORD,
from
back
initiative
the
seized
President Moi had

ineviatble,

party electoral process to

KANU’s

advantage” (Throup
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/

Hornsby 1998:

p. 88).

multi-

Democratic Transition

/

Democratization

In chapter 4.3 the democratic transition

/

democratization

in

Kenya

will

be

analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties after
the end of the de jure
single-party state will be examined. Second, major developments
in the months leading

up

to the first multiparty elections during the

looked

at

and

their results will

1990s on 29 December 1992 will be

be analyzed. Third, major

political

developments prior

and the second multiparty elections during the 1990s on 29/30 December 1997
examined. Fourth, constitutional reform

4.3.1

The Formation

be looked

efforts will

will

to

be

at.

of Opposition Parties

During the course of 1992 various opposition

parties^*

were formed. However,

only three parties received a significant number of votes during the elections on 29

December

1992. Therefore the following remarks will focus on the formation of FORD-

Kenya, FORD-Asili and the Democratic Party (DP).
After the legalization of opposition parties on 10 December 1991 the Forum for
the Restoration of Democracy

political party

(FORD) was

the

first

party to be officially registered as a

on 31 December 1991. Since the interim leadership of FORD was

dominated by Oginga Odinga, a Luo, and Martin Shikuku, a Luhya, some powerful
functionaries of the former

interests

Kikuyu

ethnic welfare organization

might not be adequately represented within

Minister of Health in Moi’s government,

’’

See Holmquist

/

Mwai

FORD.

GEMA feared that their

Therefore they urged the

Kibaki, to leave the government and

Ford 1992: pp. 99-102; and Hartmann, Christof 1999: 194-195. For an excellent

overview of the social forces beyond opposition

politics in

40

Kenya

see

Chege 1994:

pp. 56-61.

KANU and to form an alternative political party.
substantive reforms within
circle

After his efforts to push for

KANU were increasingly frustrated by the Kalenjin

around President Moi, Kibaki

left

government

the

in late

December 1991 and

announced the formation of the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP),
which was
as a political party in January 1992. In contrast to

members of different
fairly

was mainly among

FORD, which

the northern

the

Kikuyu

elite.

Kikuyu and ideologically

the

registered

brought together

ethnic groups and different ideological orientations,

homogenous party comprising mainly

inner

The

DP was

a

ethnic base of the

DP was

DP

“the party of big

business, favouring economic liberalisation and the privatisation of inefficient
parastatals”.^^

The formation of the Democratic Party

Kikuyu opposition
While

to the

Moi regime by

100,000 people,

it

undermined a united

Kikuyu between

FORD received a lot of support in early

ability to organize a rally in Nairobi in

less like

splitting the

effectively

1992'°',

FORD

and DP.'°®

which was evident by

its

January 1992 that was attended by more than

ultimately failed to transform itself from a loose coalition of more or

minded individuals

mentioned three reasons

into a unified

and viable

for that. First, there

was

political party.

Githu Muigai

a generation gap within

coalition brought together young, enthusiastic and idealistic activists

rewrite the ground rules of Kenyan politics with older,

who

FORD. The
sought to

more experienced and more

These parties included the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the Labour Party Democracy (LPD), the
Kenyan National Congress (KNC), the Kenya National Democratic Alliance (KENDA), the Party of
Independent Candidates of Kenya (PICK), and the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK).

^

Throup

/

Hornsby 1998:

p. 98.

See Mair 1994: pp. 61-62; Wiseman 1996:

p. 135;

Oyugi 1997:

pp. 49-50; and

Throup

/

Hornsby

1998: pp. 94-100.
In early

1992 the

FORD

leadership “reflected a wide ethnic base including Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya,

Kamba, and Kisii, and a wide
(Wiseman 1996: p. 135).

regional base with only Moi’s heartland in the Rift Valley excluded”
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who were mainly

opportunistic politicians

president. Second, after

interested in

Kenneth Matiba’s return

to

becoming Kenya’s next

Kenya from

the

UK, where he was

receiving treatment for a stroke he had suffered while in detention, in
personality differences emerged between

May

1992 serious

him and FORD’s chairman, Oginga Odinga.

Third, the ethnic factor reinforced the personal differences

among FORD’s

leadership.’®^

As
electing

a result of the inability of its leadership to agree

FORD’s

factions in

vote by the

officials

and presidential candidate,

on the procedures

FORD

split into

two opposing

August 1992. Kenneth Matiba and Martin Shikuku, who favored a

members of the

party, led the Muthithi

Odinga, Paul Muite and Gitobu Imanyara,
delegates’ conference, led the

who

Agip House

House

faction of

two

different political parties.

FORD

direct

and Oginga

favored an indirect vote through a

faction.

A campaign by Kenyan churches to

unite the opposition remained fruitless and in mid-October 1992 the

registered as

for

The Muthithi House

two

faction

factions

were

became FORD-

and the Agip House faction became FORD-Kenya. FORD-Asili’s ethnic base

Asili’®^

was mainly among

Kikuyu including

the southern

the ethnic group of the Luhya.

FORD-Kenya’s

the urban and rural poor as well as

ethnic base

was mainly among

the

Luo

of the Nyanza province.

See Muigai 1995;
Asili

See

means

p. 182.

original in Kiswahili.

wa Mutua

1992c: pp. 35-36;

wa Mutua

1992d:

p. 58;

Africa Confidential, 9 October 1992:

p. 4;

1995:
Mair 1994: pp. 62-66; Holmquist / Ford 1994: p. 7; Ogot 1995: pp. 247-249; Sabar-Friedman
and
92-164;
Throup / Hornsby 1998: pp.
p. 446; Wiseman 1996: p. 135; Schmidt 1997; pp. 273-277;

Brown 2000:

pp. 242-246.
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4.3.2

The 1992

Elections

Prior to the elections on 29

measures

December 1992

to derail the democratization process

victorious from the elections.

and

The Moi regime used

resources to ensure that there

was no

the

Moi regime undertook

to increase its

chances of emerging

the state machinery and

between

level playing field

various

its

financial

KANU

and the

opposition parties prior to the elections.
After opposition parties had been officially registered in early 1992, the
service,

mainly the provincial administration and the

police, created

many

civil

obstacles for

the opposition parties to organize effectively. For instance, the provincial administration

frequently delayed the registration of their local branches.

As

a result they lost valuable

time in setting up an organizational structure throughout the country. Furthermore

in

granting permits for political meetings the district commissioners were clearly biased in

favor of KANU. While the government party frequently held political meetings without

having any permission, the issuing of permissions for
parties

was

political rallies

of opposition

frequently denied, delayed or canceled shortly before the meeting

was

to

take place. Another measure to hinder the opposition to organize effectively was the

“zoning” of parts of the country.
Eastern Province as

KANU declared parts of the Rift Valley and the North-

“KANU-only”

areas and refused the entry of

members of

the

opposition to these areas. During the voter registration period from 8 June to 20 July

1992 many
voters,

irregularities occurred. In delaying the issuing

who were

considered

potential

voters
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for

of identity cards

opposition

parties,

to

younger

the

local

administrations

made

impossible for an estimated one million young voters
to

it

register.'®^

Another strategy of the Moi regime
the use of the

parties.

KBC

to derail the democratization process

Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC)

s television

to opposition parties”.*®^ Until

two weeks

KANU

remain neutral

tried to

and negative news as related

prior to the elections

to the opposition parties.

and “Daily Nation”

to stigmatize the opposition

and radio coverage of the electoral campaign was clearly

biased in focusing “on positive news as related to

media was denied

was

any access

to broadcast

Only the two daily newspapers “Standard”
in giving

KANU

and the opposition parties

ample coverage. However, the balanced coverage of the

print

media could not

counterbalance the clearly biased coverage of the broadcast media in a country “where
the

overwhelming majority of the people

live in rural areas

and literacy levels are not

high”.'^^

The Moi regime

also boosted

its

chances to win the elections on 29 December

1992 by amending the Kenyan constitution

(Amendment) Act, which was adopted by

in its favor.

the

Kenyan parliament

stipulated that a presidential candidate could only

of the

total

vote and

at least

of the candidates was able

25%

to

of the vote

meet

win

in five

if

p. 31.
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August 1992,

he received a simple majority

this requirement, a run-off election

IRI 1993: p. 32.

in

of Kenya’s eight provinces.

See Barkan 1993: p. 93; wa Mutua 1992b: p.l4; Geekie 1993:
1993: pp. 19 and 29/30.

Muigai 1993:

The Constitution of Kenya

p. 15;

If

none

between the two

Muigai 1993: pp. 29/30; and IRl

candidates that received the highest number of votes
would take place.'"* Furthermore,
the

Act stipulated

members of

own

his
1

governments.

that the president

political

must form the government exclusively from among
party

and

forbade

the

formation

of coalition

no

In another

measure aimed

at

boosting

KANU’s

chances

to retain a parliamentary

majority after the elections on 29 December 1992, the Electoral
Commission did not
consider redrawing Kenya’s 188 constituencies

/

electoral districts that

were created

in

1987.”® As a result the sparsely populated North-Eastern
Province (141,000 registered
voters), a

KANU stronghold, contained ten

constituencies,

which

translated

on average

into 14,100 voters per seat, while Nairobi (674,000 registered voters)'”, an
opposition

stronghold, contained only eight constituencies, which translated into

more than 84,000

voters per seat. These flagrant inequalities concerning the degree of representation per

be considered

electoral district can

constitution,

which

the leading candidate did not

happen

(Foeken

/

III,

section 42(3) of Kenya’s

states that “all constituencies shall contain as nearly equal

Foeken and Dietz pointed out
to

to violate chapter

if after the

that the legislation did not specify for instance

meet

this

p. 130).

They

to

be done

if

requirement” but the one coming in second did or what “had

run-off elections, the two candidates

Dietz 2000:

what “had

numbers

still

did not muster the 25 percent clause”

also pointed out that despite these shortcomings “the bill sailed

smoothly through parliament without any amendments and with only one vote against” (Foeken /
Dietz 2000: p. 130). They further pointed out that there was complete silence from Kenya’s
opposition parties when this bill was passed prompting the Attorney-General to ask: “’Are [the
opposition] admitting that the current president can fulfill that 25 per cent requirement and that any
other presidential candidate cannot?”’ (quoted in Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 130 based on The Weekly
Review, 14 August 1992:

See Foeken

/

p. 15).

Dietz 2000: pp. 129-130; Fox 1996: pp. 605-607; and Kibwana 1998: pp. 225-226. In
Brown 2000: p. 235; and Foeken / Dietz 2000: p. 130,

contrast to Hartmann, Christof 1999: p. 197;

Kibwana pointed out that “Act No. 6 of 1992 did not bar coalition government even if that was the
intention of some legislators. The language of the clause in question does not foreclose coalition
government” (Kibwana 1998: p. 225).
In 1987,

30 constituencies were added

When 30 new
its

to the

158 constituencies that were created

constituencies were created in 1987 not a single one

population increased from 509,286 in 1969 to 1,324,570
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in

was created

1989 according

in

in 1966.

Nairobi although

to official statistics.

of inhabitants as appears

Moi

to the [Electoral]

Commission

also refused to reconstitute the Electoral

demanded by

to all parties as

wouldn’t work
western

Moi’s government
in

Kenya.

these

areas

encouraged members of Moi’

tried to

As

to include persons acceptable

s

show Kenyans and

the world that pluralism

ethnic violence in parts of the Rift Valley and

senior

government

officials

and

Kalenjin ethnic group to beat up the

Luo, Luhyia and Kikuyu ethnic groups,
opposition.

Commission

to legalizing opposition parties."^

Kenya by fomenting
In

be reasonably practicable”."^

the opposition, preferring instead to leave in place the

commissioners he had appointed prior
Finally,

to

who were

KANU

leaders

members of

the

believed to be supporters of the

a result of the ethnic violence in parts of the Rift Valley and in

western Kenya, thousands of people were displaced and had therefore no opportunity
register as voters. In response to the ethnic violence the

Kenya (CPK)
which

it

to

Church of the Province of

released a sixteen-page pastoral letter"^ to the press on 26 April 1992 in

outlined the history of the clashes and blamed the government for failing to

prevent them. Holmquist and Ford pointed out that “international criticism was muted

by

the rural and seemingly primordial ethnic character of the clashes, their episodic

occurrence, and the absence of a menacing government security force. The clashes

worked a

Quoted

political

after

See Foeken
'

/

miracle for the regime. They helped unite fractious Kalenjin

Fox 1996:

p.

Dietz 2000:

603.

p. 131;

Chege 1994:

p. 68;

and Fox 1996: pp. 597-604.

Galia Sabar-Friedman pointed out that the “clashes started as sporadic, local, and unorganized
the scale
attacks, involving small numbers of people. As time passed and no police action occurred,
killings
and
villages,
entire
down
of
burning
the
rape,
Looting,
and scope of the clashes increased.

became an everyday

reality in large parts

of the country.

and night with impunity” (Sabar-Friedman 1995:

Armed gangs of men

attacked villagers day

p. 444).

“the
22 April 1992, a pastoral letter was read in all Catholic churches of Kenya in which
endnote
9).
1994:
(Chege
p.
74,
atrocities”
these
in
complicity
with
state
the
bishops charged

Catholic

On
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subgroups while ‘opening up’ land

that

would be taken over by some Kalenjin and

driving likely opposition voters out of Rift Valley
constituencies”."^

of an opposition divided

In the light

measures of the Moi regime
hardly surprising that

into three

to influence the

Moi and

main

parties

outcome of the

and the various

elections in

KANU emerged victorious from

Kenya’s

presidential and parliamentary elections in twenty-seven years on
29

Moi won

the presidential elections with

candidate

who

received at least

25%

36.35% of the

in five

presidential candidate of FORD-Asili,

vote.

He was

19.45% of the

Kenya, Oginga Odinga,

who

Kenneth Matiba, came

As

first

it

is

multiparty

December 1 992.
also the only

in

second with 26.00% of

Mwai

Kibaki,

vote, just before the presidential candidate of FORD-

received 17.48% of the vote.'" The opposition candidates

together received approximately 3.3 million votes while
1.9 million votes.

favor,

of Kenya’s eight provinces. The

the vote, while the presidential candidate of the Democratic Party,

finished third with

its

the table in

Appendix B and

Moi

received approximately

Appendix

the figure in

C

show,

ethnic considerations were the single most important factor in determining voters’
choices. Moi’s support

Rift Valley Province,

was

strongest

among his own

ethnic group, the Kalenjin in the

and among various smaller ethnic groups

Province and the Coast Province.

of the Central Province and

in the North-Eastern

Matiba’ s support was strongest

in Nairobi.

He

among

also received a significant

the

Kikuyu

amount of votes

Holmquist / Ford 1995: p. 178. See also Africa Confidential, 8 May 1992, p. 2; wa Mutua 1992b: p.
14; Muigai 1993: p. 31/32; Human Rights Watch / Africa Watch 1993:pp. 1-97; Chege 1994: pp. 6970; and

Mair 1994: pp. 94-103.

These percentage figures have been calculated by the author based on
Daily Nation on 5 January 1993 (Appendix B).

the results as

announced

in the

of Vice Presidential appointments in case of his victory to the leaders of various
smaller ethnic groups like the Kisii, Mem and Kamba to gain their support.

Moi made

offers

47

from the Luhya

Western Provinee, since

in the

is

running mate, Shikuku, was from that

ethnic group. Kibaki also received support from the Kikuyu of the Central Province,

however,

As

to a lesser extend than Matiba.

the

GEMA

torchbearer Kibaki’s support

was

strongest

among

the

Mcru and Embu of the

was

strongest

among

the

Luo of the Nyan/a Province. The

the results of the parliamentary elections

in the

Eastern Province. Odinga’s support

by province.

table in

KANU

managed

most of its support

basis. This

in less

was

to the

advantage of

densely populated areas.

31 seats each and the Democratic Party

won

23

KANU,

since

it

scats

scats.

relationship between ethnicity and voting behavior.

won most of their

Three smaller parties won one

KANU

FORD-Asili and

scats in the Central Province,

FORD-Kcnya won most of its
won most of its

scats in the

received

FORD-Kcnya and FORD-Asili won

seat each. Like the presidential elections also the parliamentary elections

and

win 100

to

National Assembly mainly because of the fact that the electoral districts were not

drawn on an equitable

Party

D shows

Appendix

which

is

scats in the Rift Valley Province,

to the

is

which

a direct

the Democratic

home

Nyanza Province, which

show

home

is

Kikuyu.
to the Luo,

home

to the

Kalenjin."^

4.3.3

The 1997

Elections

While Kenya’s opposition

parties

became even more divided than they were

resilient civil
prior to the 1992 elections, different elements of Kenya’s vibrant and

reforms prior to
society joined forces to push for constitutional and administrative
1997.
Kenya’s second multiparty elections during the 1990s on 29 December

Mair 1994: pp. 109-1

16;

Muigai 1995: pp. 185-191; Oyugi 1997: pp. 57-66; and Foeken

2000: pp. 126-129.
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/

Dietz

The process of further fragmentation of Kenya’s opposition

started after the

death of the leader of FORD-Kenya, Oginga Odinga, on 20 January 1994. Thereafter
the

Second Vice-Chairman, the Luhya Kijana Wamalwa, assumed

FORD-Kenya. As

FORD-Kenya

the leadership of

a result of personal animosities and factional rivalries over tactics

experienced three high profile defections.

First, the

FORD-Kenya MPs

Paul Muite and Kiraitu Murungi together with the fonner director of Kenya’s Wildlife
Service, Richard Leaky, founded a

tried to

become

political party

new

party called Safina'^® on 13

a multiethnic platform for refomi. However,

was

curtailed

as a political party until a

political scientist

and

by

that fact that the

few weeks before the 1997

FORD-Kenya

1995. Safina

effectiveness as a

refused to register Safina

elections. Second, also in 1995 the

MP Peter Anyang Nyong’o joined the Social

Democratic Party (SDP) and became
party. Third, as a result

Moi regime

its

May

its

head.

By doing

so he raised the profile of this

of tensions between the head of FORD-Kenya, Kijana

Wamalwa, and Odinga’s

son, Raila Odinga, the latter left the party in

December 1996

and revitalized the National Development Party (NDP). Matiba’s FORD-Asili was

weakened by defections

to

KANU. As

a boycott of the 1997 elections Kimani

party called

FORD

a result of tensions surrounding Matiba’s call for

wa Nyoike

left

FORD-Asili

to

found a new

People. Out of the three main opposition parties that emerged during

1992 only the Democratic Party (DP) was not significantly weakened by defections
except for Chairty Ngilu’s defection to the

She actually became Kenya’s

Safina

means

first

SDP

to

become

its

presidential candidate.

female presidential candidate ever. However, DP’s

the ark in Swahili.
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presidential candidate, Kibaki,

was not

really

weakened by Ngilu’s

defection, since he

benefited from Matiba’s boycott of the elections.'^'

As has been shown

in chapter 4.3.2 there

KANU and the opposition parties prior to the
level playing field through constitutional

of Kenya’s

civil society

1994 and 1997 the
politically

and opposition

level playing field

between

1992 elections. The creation of such a

and other legal reforms became a major goal

parties prior to the

efforts to bring about

savvy coalition of various

was no

1997 elections. Between

major reforms were led

civil society groups.

first

As shown

and foremost by a

above, Kenya’s

opposition parties were not in a position to push for significant reforms, since jostling
for political advantages

1994 the Kenya

and

Human Rights Commission,

section of the International

for a

Model

strategies paralyzed

Law

Society of Kenya and the

Commission of Jurists joined

Kenya

forces to produce a “Proposal

Constitution”. Subsequently they launched “large-scale civic education

campaigns via the Citizens Coalition

model

the

and further divided them. In November

to the public

and

to

compare

it

for Constitutional

Change (CCCC)

to explain the

with the existing constitution”.'^^ The

grew rapidly and incorporated more than

CCCC

groups and had an estimated

fifty civil society

4 million members by the end of 1997. Subsequently a National Convention Planning

Committee (NCPC) was formed with

Assembly (NCA). The

first

the

of three such

aim

to

convene a National Constitutional

NCAs during

1997 took place from 4-6 April

and brought together about 600 participants from Kenya’s

economic

life.

During

this

political, social,

meeting agreement was reached

See Ahluwalia 1996: pp. 60-67; Throup
and Southall 1998: p. 106.

/

in principle

and

on how

to

Hornsby 1998: pp. 566-574; Barkan / Ng’ethe 1998:

Kiai 1998: p. 189.
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p.42;

proceed with reforms. Prior
at

ensuring free and

fair elections

comprehensive reforms

1997 elections a minimum agenda of reforms aimed

to the

should have been implemented and more

thereafter.

“The

National Convention Executive Council
these measures

Moi regime

(NCEC)

refused to talk to

its

movement

executive arm to implement

embarked on a

for constitutional

many different

to these

elections”,

strategy to divide

and legal reforms

that included

civil society groups.

During May,

MPs while he continued to

which were attended by many people. The Moi-

meetings with unprecedented terror and violence.

of increasing donor pressure'

Moi agreed

refuse to talk to the

possibility of some sort of compromise being

within

re-named

NCEC organized a series of unlicensed meetings to push its

message of “No reforms, no
regime responded

its

it

NCEC to bring about reforms, the

representatives and

various opposition politicians besides

June and July 1997 the

be

to

In response to the efforts of the

.

the until then broad based

result

NCA mandated NCPC which

to negotiate a

As

a

reform package with

NCEC. The NCEC

responded to the

worked out between moderate elements

KANU and opposition MPs with a continuation of its program of mass action,

demanded

that

comprehensive reforms be carried out before and not

and called for the creation of a Constituent Assembly and a
effort to prevent a further escalation

Murungi 2000:
“For example,

parallel

of an already very tense

after the elections

government. In an

situation,

members of

p. 76.

at a

May 3

1

Njoya led a prayer session, the police used tear
ensuing melee, riot police and paramilitaries engaged

rally in Nairobi, as Rev.

gas to disperse the gathered people. In the

reform supporters in running battles. At the subsequent July 7 (Saba Saba) demonstrations, held
cities and towns, an estimated 20-25 people died (Brown 2000: footnote 51 on page 253).

in
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$220 million Enhanced Stmctural Adjustment Facility program.
donors followed suit, bringing the total amount in suspended
“The World Bank and
than the total amount of aid suspended in 1991. [...] At the
more
million
aid to overU.S. $400
United States, publicly urged the government to enter into a
the
donors,
led
by
same time, bilateral
In July 1997 the

IMF suspended

its

other bilateral

dialogue with the opposition on the matter of constitutional reform” (Barkan 1998: 218).

51

Kenya’s religious community distanced themselves from the
Religious

facilitate

Community Mediation Team (RCMT). However,
any

talks

between the government and

outright refused such talks.

As

opposition

MPs

involved with

opposition

MPs

and moderate

(IPPG).

By early September

minimal reforms

NCEC

NCEC

RCMT was unable to

representatives, since the former

a result of the “radicalization” of

it

left

and formed the

NCEC many

the organization and formed together with other

KANU MPs the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group

1997 the IPPG had successfully negotiated a package of

way

to clear the

which was supported by Moi

upcoming

for the

elections. This reform package,

for tactical reasons, included such

measures as

“opposition representation on the Electoral Commission, rights to assemble without
police permits, curbs on the powers of chiefs, the possibility of a coalition government,

and equal access by the opposition
support this reform package

the

NCEC

and

and opponents
his

that

who

it

would

rejected

to the

Moi hoped

would take

that this

the

its

it

as not far reaching

elections, the elections

benefited from the fact that

Ford 1998:

sails

of

1

Moi

to create a

chances of

27

more

level playing

on 29/30 December 1997 were,

1992 elections, dominated by President Moi and

/

KANU’s

parliamentary majority in the upcoming elections.

upcoming

Holmquist

wind out of the

enough and consequently would boost

Even so the IPPG reform package was intended
field for the

deciding to

further divide the opposition in supporters of this package

chances of being reelected for another five year term and

holding on to

When

government-run media”.

KANU.

President

Moi and

like the

KANU

dissolved the National Assembly abruptly on 10

p. 236.
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November
result, the

1997, “barely one day after the

IPPG agreements could
on how

instance, legal edicts

the Electoral

to

all

to include

for the

the creation of new constituencies.*^^

fully

bills

The

For

and even so

it

had

fact that the

IPPG reforms were

fairly

implemented by the time the elections took place, together

40.12% of the

he had received 36.35% of the vote. Like

25%

in place

field.

a

1997 elections such as voter registration and

KANU once more the emerge victorious from the

received at least

As

law”.'^*

members of the opposition

with the fact that the opposition was even more divided than

a final five-year term with

became

implement the new laws were not

major tasks

minimal and not even

of the IPPG

not sufficiently level the electoral playing

Commission was enlarged

already completed

last

in five

in

1992 enabled Moi and

1997 elections. Moi was reelected

vote, a slightly better result than in 1992

in

when

1992 he was the only candidate who

of Kenya’s eight provinces. Mainly due

Matiba of FORD-Asili boycotted the

for

elections, Kibaki

to the fact that

of the Democratic Party finished

second with 31 .09% of the vote. Raila Odinga of the National Democratic Party
finished third with

10.92% of the

vote, Kijana

Wamalwa of Ford-Kenya

finished fourth

with 8.29% of the vote, and Charity Ngilu of the Social Democratic Party finished
with 7.71% of the vote.

In the parliamentary elections

KANU won

fifth

107 seats and

all

See Kiai 1998; pp. 189-192; Ndegwa 1998; pp. 195-197; Barkan 1998; pp. 217-222; Holmquist/
Ford 1998; pp. 234-239; Brown 2000; 250-255; Murungi 2000; pp. 72-81; Adar 2000; pp. 123-124;

and Schmitz 2001; pp. 160-165.

Ndegwa

When
new

1998; p. 205.

the Electoral

Commission created 22 new

constituencies in 1996

constituency in the opposition stronghold Nairobi for instance and

it

the already existing malapportionment that favored KANU (see Ndegwa

The

results are taken

from The Weekly Review, No.
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1

did not created a single

by doing so did not
1998; p. 208).

174, 9 January 1998, p. 20.

rectify

won

the opposition parties together

opposition parties did better
in all parts

1997 because

in

of the country as a

103'^' of

result

210
its

seats.

Compared with 1992

the

candidates could campaign more freely

of the IPPG-rcforms. As the tables

in

Appendix E

and Appendix F show ethnicity basically determined voter’s choices as was the case
the 1992 elections.

among

the

KANU did well

among

various smaller ethnic groups. Kibaki and

Kikuyu

Embu

Moi and

in the

and

Luo

among

the

the Kalenjin in the Rift Valley and

DP

got most of their support from the

Central Province, Nairobi and pockets of the Rift Valley as well as the

Mem of the

in the

in

Eastern Province. Odinga and

province of Nyanza while

Wamalwa

NDP did

very well only

and Ford-Kcnya did very well only

Luhya of the Western Province. The support of Ngilu and

mainly limited

to the ethnic

group of the

Kamba

among

the

in the Eastern Province.

SDP was
While only

about 5,000 domestic observers monitored the 1992 elections, the 1997 elections were

monitored by more than 28,000 domestic observers

who were

recruited, trained, and

posted to polling stations throughout the country by a coalition of the Catholic Justice

and Peace Commission (CJPC), the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK),

and the

Institute

of Education for Democracy (lED). This positive development

indicates a willingness of various elements of Kenya’s civil society to play a

constructive role in the political process, including the constitutional review process.

39 seats, NDP won 21 seats, FORD-Kenya won 17
seats, and four smaller parties altogether won six seats.

DP won
five

54

seats,

SDP won

15 seats, Safina

won

4.3.4

Constitutional

Reform

Successful negotiations of comprehensive constitutional reforms
involving

all

relevant segments of Kenyan society “could lay the foundation
for bringing the

democratic transition to a successful conclusion”.

which was adopted by

the National

Assembly

positive elements such as the recognition that

in

While the IPPG reform package,

November

1997, contained various

Kenya would remain

a multiparty

republic and the requirement that the president had to appoint the twelve
non-elected

members of parliament from

all

the parties represented on a proportional basis,

various issues of great importance untouched. For instance, the
did not reduce the

immense power of the

president.

Under

it

left

IPPG reform package

the current constitutional

framework the president appoints the attorney general and the chief justice without
external checks. This greatly diminishes the independence of the judiciary.

Furthermore, “the president
constitution

office.

makes

There

is

it

above the

law”.'^'^

impossible to bring criminal or

no mechanism

the president from office.

to strengthen

is literally

in place

civil

Section 14 of the current

charges against him while

in

by which parliament could question or remove

Comprehensive

constitutional reforms

Kenya’s parliament vis-a-vis the president and

must include measures

to increase the

independence and efficiency of the judiciary. Significant electoral reforms must be
another key component of the ongoing constitutional review process. In 1992 and

1997 Moi was elected while more voters voted against him than
current electoral system a simple majority

is

in

for him, since under the

sufficient as long as the top vote-getter

See Peters 1998: pp. 51-55; Ajulu 1998: pp. 275-285; Barkan 1998: pp. 223-225; Steeves 1999: pp.
75-81; and Foeken / Dietz 2000: pp. 141-146.

Barkan

/

Ng’ethe 1998:

p. 46.
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receives at least

25%

electoral laws the

in five

25%

of Kenya’s eight provinces. As a

result

of reforming the

rule should be eliminated, since the population size of Kenya’s

eight provinces varies greatly. Furthermore, an absolute majority (50%-plus) should be

required to elect the president. This would almost certainly result in a run-off election

between the two top

vote-getters,

which

in turn

would

facilitate the

formation of inter-

ethnic alliances. Regarding the parliamentary elections at the very least the severe

malapportionment'^^ of Kenya’s electoral
that

each electoral

Furthermore,

it

district contains

more

districts

needs to be rectified so as

or less the

to ensure

same number of registered

voters.

should be considered to replace the plurality system with single-member

constituencies with a system of proportional representation or a mixed system. This

would most

likely reduce the saliency of ethnicity in the electoral process. Finally, the

issue of decentralization and possibly the creation of a federal framework should be

addressed as well in the context of a comprehensive constitutional review.
In contrast to the period after the 1992 elections, the issue of constitutional

reform was not put on the back burner for some time
kept pretty

package

much on

that

the front burner

was adopted

by various

The IPPG reform

prior to the 1997 elections foresaw a comprehensive

fundamental differences on

p.

1997 elections but was

civil society groups.

constitutional reform process after the elections.

Brown 2000:

after the

how

to

However,

this

process got caught in

proceed between different stakeholders.

On

the one

381.

represented
from an electoral district with a high number of voters
After the 1992 elections an
voters. The
of
number
low
with
a
district
electoral
an
from
seven times more voters than an
imbalance (see Ndegwa 1998: pp.
of 22 new electoral districts in 1996 failed to address this

MP

MP

creation

206-208).

See Muigai 1995: pp. 194-195; Barkan
Ndegwa 1998: pp. 202-208.

/

Ng’ethe 1998: pp. 45-47; Southall 1998: pp.
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1

10-1

1

1;

and

side there

were the

possible and

who

KANU hardliners who wanted to make as little concessions as

therefore wanted to control the entire process.

over the process they wanted to keep

with

its

de facto coalition partner

were various

it

within the parliament where

their control

KANU together

NDP enjoyed a solid majority. On the other side there

and religious groups organized

civic

To ensure

in the

NCEC who were opposed to

a

government controlled process and who favored a broad based Constitutional Assembly
and a referendum. In 1998

was reached

it

looked like that a compromise was found when agreement

to establish a three-tired structure'

to undertake a

constitutional review. Regrettably, this agreement

announced

that parliament alone

December 1999
Reform

the National

to “collect

was

short lived. In

would review Kenya’s

Assembly created a

comprehensive

Select

May

1999 Moi

on 15

constitution and

Committee on Constitutional

views from the public and propose amendments

of Kenya Review Act”.'^^ In response representatives of the

to the Constitution

NCEC,

the

LSK,

the

NCCK and the National Council of NGOs launched a parallel people-driven
constitutional review process,

On

3

November 2000

which became known

as the

Ufungamano'^^

Initiative.

the chairman of the parliamentary Select Committee, Raila

Odinga, revealed the names of the 15 members of the Constitution of Kenya Review

Commission (CKRC). Professor Yash Pal Ghai was
However, he refused

Under

to

The

CKRC.

“be sworn in by the president without bringing together the

this structure besides the Constitutional

established.

selected to chair the

District Consultative

Review Commission two

Forum (DCF) was

other bodies were to be

to bring together representatives

of Kenya’s

Forum (NCCF) was

to bring

together a broad range of politically active domestic organizations (See Schmitz 2001;

p. 167).

sixty-five districts, while the National Constitutional Consultative

Murungi 2000:

p. 87.

Ufungamano means “coming

together” in Swahili.
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.

parliamentary and

Ufungamano

finally took the oath

of office

groups”."^®

after the

By the end of January

Ufungamano and

reached agreement in principle to merge.

On

21

that

its

NCEC,

the parliamentary group had

March 2001 Ufungamano

voted in favor of uniting with the CKRC."^’ This

of the

2001 Professor Ghai

move was

criticized

delegates

by Prof Kibwana

Paul Muite of Safina and Prof Anyang’ Nyong’o of SDP. They feared

CKRC was not sufficiently independent and that KANU and NDP would dominate

work. During the

rest

of the year 2001 and the

first

couple of month of the year 2002

CKRC has been conducting civic education programs throughout the country.

the

late

March 2002

the 4 October

it

became

clear that the

2002 deadline.

It is

CKRC would not be able to

not clear yet whether

its

mandate

finish its

will

have

In

work by

to

be

extended until December 2002 or June 2003 and whether the upcoming parliamentary

and presidential elections will take place before or
Before a

all

210

new

constitution

electoral districts.

is

adopted the

Then

after

Kenya has

new

constitution.

CKRC will collect the views of the public in

a National Constitutional Conference and possibly also

a referendum are expected to take place to approve Kenya’s

4.3.5

a

new

constitution.

Summary
While

it

appeared that

initially

did not materialize.

It

didn’t

Holmquist /Oendo 200 1

:

p.

FORD might easily win the

happen because the party

split

1992 elections,

this

along ethnic lines into

200 1

was agreed upon that as a result of the merger the Parliamentary Select Committee (PSC) would
have 15 members in the CKRC and the Ufungamano Initiative would have 12 members.
It

Holmquist
See Brown 2000: pp. 393-402; Adar 2000: pp. 124-127; Schmitz 2001: pp. 166-169; and
Nation
The
in
articles
various
also
2002
and
Oendo 2001: pp. 203-204. For the part covering 2001
consulted.
been
have
services
wire
from
and the East African as well as various articles
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/

FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya
Odinga and Matiba. Except

as a result of personal animosities

for Safina

main

political parties

from each

is

leaning than the other main parties, since

campaigns
voters.

As

in

role of the

it

very

little

that could

other. Ideological

programmatic differences are almost nonexistent. Only

economic reform and the

its

leaders

and SDP, Kenya’s parties were mainly formed

along the ethnic cleavage and besides ethnicity, there
distinguish Kenya’s

among

took a more

World Bank and

be used

to

and

SDP was somewhat more
critical position

left

towards

the IMF. During the electoral

1992 and 1997 ethnicity was the most important vehicle

to

mobilize

a result Kenya’s parties developed strong ethnoregional bases of support.

Neither the 1992 nor the 1997 elections can be considered to have been free and

has been shown in chapter 4.3.2 the

Moi regime

fair.

As

severely restricted the ability of the

opposition parties to operate freely prior to the 1992 elections.

As

a result of the

IPPG

reform package Kenya’s opposition parties were able to campaign somewhat more
freely during the last six

certain extent

best

weeks before

why they won more

summarized by saying

other on the break”.

Kenya’s opposition
elections and the

the 1997 elections. This might also explain to a

seats in

that they

1997 than

in 1992.

The

role

of donors can be

“have kept one foot on the accelerator and the

While donor pressure had a

catalytic effect

on the

efforts

to bring about a return to multiparty politics prior to the

IPPG reforms

of

1992

prior to the 1997 elections, Kenya’s donors also

prevented more substantive reforms from taking place. Fearing instability Kenya’s

donors resumed aid

after the

1

992 and the

1

997

elections, “in spite of the problematic

nature of the polls and the government’s demonstrably

Brown 2000:

pp. 284/285.
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weak commitment

to

democracy”.

By doing

so donors undermined the efforts of domestic actors
to bring

about more substantive changes. Kenya’s vibrant

played a crucial role

mid

in

civil society, especially the

churches,

bringing about Kenya’s constitutional review process, since
the

1990s."‘^

4.4

Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

The prospects
factors,

for democratic consolidation in

on the outcome of the ongoing

Kenya

will depend,

constitutional reform process.

among

other

A new

constitution that reduces the excessive powers of the president and that establishes an
electoral

system that will

facilitate

more

interethnic coalitions

would

create a

more

conducive environment for democratic consolidation. Such an electoral system would

make an important

contribution towards transforming Kenya’s current zero-sum

of ethnic politics “into a non-zero-sum game
tolerant political culture”.

The

that

many

game

players can join, guided by a

creation of more interethnic alliances could set in

motion a process of decreasing the saliency of the ethnic factor

in

Kenyan

politics

and

of increasing the likelihood of building more and more winning coalitions based on

programs and

ideas. Ultimately

it

could result in a situation

voters are no longer mainly determined

by

by

in

which the choices of

the ethnicity of the presidential candidate but

the policies and programs he or she stands for.

Brown, Stephen 2001:

p.

735.

See Brown 2000: pp. 281-286 and 402-411; Brown, Stephen 2001: pp. 734-736; and chapters
of this thesis.

to 4.3.4

Barkan

/

Ng’ethe 1998:

p. 45.
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4.3.1

The massive
well as rural

Kenya

considered as a

first

The existence of a

civic education

in the context

campaigns

that are

being carried out

in

urban as

of the ongoing constitutional reform process can be

step to develop a democratic political culture throughout Kenya.

number of civil

large

society organizations with the ability to

nurture, articulate and aggregate the pro-democracy public opinion that undoubtedly
exists in

Kenya

also increases the prospects for democratic consolidation.

involvement of civil society
areas during the

first

in the

democratic process was mainly limited to urban

half of the 1990s, the heavy involvement"*^ of various churches in

observing the 1997 elections resulted for the
across rural areas.

While the

first

time in a mobilization of civil society

A further positive development regarding the prospects for

democratic consolidation

is

MPs

the working together of opposition

representatives in the context of the

NCEC

and the Ufungamano

and

civil society

Initiative

on

constitutional reform.

Finally, for democratic consolidation to take place, the

become

less influenced

by neopatrimonialism.

Kenyan

state

needs to

In a neopatrimonalistic system politics

and elections do not revolve around competing ideas and ideologies and “most
parties can

distribute

instability

be viewed as ethnoregional attempts

its

benefits to their

of opposition

party. Decentralization

home

to gain control

of the

state

political

and

province and supporters”.'"*^ This contributes to the

parties, since its

members

are easily co-opted

by

the ruling

and the development of a stronger private sector could

contribute towards reducing the influence of neopatriomonialism on Kenya’s political

The churches provided over

Brown 2000;

p.

four-fifths

of the more than 28,000 local election observers.

411.
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system. Various political developments such as the ones described above that took place

in

Kenya during

consolidation.

the last twelve years have increased the prospects for democratic

However,

it

will

still

take

many

years before

Kenya can be

consolidated democracy.*"*^

See Barkan

/

1998: pp. 167-180.
Ng’ethe 1998: pp. 45-47; and Harbeson
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called a

CHAPTERS

MALAWI

The land-locked Republic of Malawi
covers a total area of

Malawi

that

shows

1

its

18,

484 sq

km

(45,

is

located in Southeastern Africa and

747 sq miles). Appendix

G contains a map of

three regions as well as major cities and towns.

Malawi

is

Africa’s third most densely populated country. According to a 1998 census Malawi has

a total population of 9,933,868.

Region,

41%

Malawi

is

live in the Central

home

who

of Malawi’s population

Region, and only

to various ethnic groups.

Region are Malawi’s
(13.8%),

47%

largest ethnic

12%

live in the

Northern Region.

live in the

The Chewa who mainly

group (50.2%). The

Lomwe (14.5%)

The Tumbuka (9.1%), who

live in the

Malawi’s fourth largest ethnic group. The other ethnic groups are
its

uniformity.

5.1

live in the Central

and the Yao

both live in the Southern Region, are Malawi’s second and third largest

ethnic groups respectively.

Despite

Southern

multiethnic character

75%

Malawi posses

Northern Region, are

all fairly

small.

a considerable ethno-linguistic

of Malawi’s population understand

its

national language, Chichewa.’^^

Historical Context

The period

prior to the onset of political liberalization in

Malawi

in the early

1990s was dominated by one person, namely the western-trained medical practitioner
Dr. Hastings

Kamuzu Banda. Banda returned

to

Malawi, which was then the British

See Decalo 1995: pp. xi-xvi; Kaspin 1995: pp. 598-602; Meinhardt 1997:
56; and Hutcheson 2001: p.590.
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p. 54;

Decalo 1998: pp. 50-

Protectorate Nyasaland, on 6 July 1958 after having spent

more than 40 years

abroad'^'

following an invitation of several young Malawians around Henry
Chipembere
the Nyasaland African Congress

mobilize the

still

(NAC). They were looking

to lead

for an older individual to

age-oriented people of the countryside for the struggle for

independence. They viewed him basically as an interim “front-man”, and hoped that
he

“would confine himself to a symbolic

role while they wielded real power”.

things did not quite turn out as they had envisaged, since they gave

power. Already his return, when thousands of people turned out
indicated that he soon

was

decades. In early 1959 the

to

to

to

However,

him too much

welcome him,

become Malawi’s most powerful man

for about three

NAC launched a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience

push for self-government and

to fight for the right to secede

Rhodesia and Nyasaland (FRN), which was formed

in

from the Federation of

1953 between Northern and

Southern RJiodesia as well as Nyasaland. In response, the British colonial
administration banned the

RJiodesia.

NAC and imprisoned Banda for more than a year in Southern

While Banda was imprisoned Orton Chirwa and Aleke Banda founded

Malawi Congress Party (MCP)

in

September 1959

to replace the

the

banned NAC. The

MCP had a broad base transcending ethnicity. After Banda was released from prison in
April 1960 he

him

was

elected head of the

MCP and given absolute powers. This enabled

to transform the party into his personal instrument

and

to

make

“Unity, Loyalty,

studied in the United States for several years. First, he studied at Wilberforce Academy in Ohio
from where he received a BA in History and Politics. Then he studied medicine at Meharry College
some further
in Tennessee and at the University of Chicago from where he received an MD. After
medicine
in
practiced
he
studies at the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons in Edinburgh
a
established
he
where
London
Liverpool, North Shields, and subsequently in Willesden, North
(Decalo
Ghana
in
medicine
practiced
had
Malawi
he
successful medical practice. Before returning to

He

1998: pp. 59-60; and

Cullen 1994:

Mchombo

1998: pp. 22-23).

p. 12.
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Obedience and Discipline” the sacred tenets of the MCP.
the use of intimidation against political opponents soon

of fear supporters of smaller

and

sell-outs to the British”.

parties'^^

became

were “regarded as

Consequently the

1961 elections to the Legislative Council. The

In the quest for political unity

the rule. In this climate

traitors to the nationalist

cause

MCP won a landslide victory in the

MCP received 99% of the vote of the

enfranchised Africans. This marked the beginning of de facto single-party

rule. In

February 1963 Nyasaland became self-governing with Banda as Prime Minister. As a
result

of the climate of fear created by Banda, Malawi’s smaller parties did not dare

nominate any candidates

for the pre-independence elections in April 1964.

Subsequently, the elections were cancelled, since

unopposed, and

all

to

all

smaller parties were disbanded.

MCP candidates would have run

Even before Nyasaland became

formally independent as Malawi on 6 July 1964 Banda had emerged as an autocratic

and

dictatorial ruler.

dissent

this

was echoed

in a

speech he said,

“.

now who

is

says that:

the

His determination to hold on

Malawi

after

the leader? That

Kamuzu

says

power and

to reject

a political rally in Blantyre in

May

where the leader says

somebody

this but

not the Malawi system.

is

it’s

any form of

just that,

and then

it’s

1964. In

else

The Malawi system,

fmished”.'^^

serious challenge to Bandas’s rule until the early 1990s arose just two

Malawi’s independence.

had originally invited him back

The two smaller

Brown 2000:

at

.This kind of thing

style is that

The only
months

.

speech he gave

to

parties

to

It

came from some of his

Malawi

cabinet ministers

to lead the struggle for independence.

were the United Federal Party and the Christian Liberation

who
They

Party.

p. 124.

10-13; Posner
p. 13. See also Kalipeni 1992: 33-34; Cullen 1994: pp.
Muluzi
1999:
pp. 68-77;
58-61;
Decalo
1998:
xvii-xix;
pp.
Decalo
1995:
pp.
1995: pp. 133-134;
Meinhardt 1999: p. 549; and Brown 2000: pp. 123-124.

Quoted

after

Cullen 1994:

65

seriously disagreed with

Banda on various programmatic and

well as his leadership style‘^\

As

and one Parliamentary Secretary'

a result

Banda dismissed

ideological issues'

as

three Cabinet ministers'^*

on 8 September 1964. Subsequently three other

Cabinet ministers resigned in protest. During an emergency session of parliament the
ex-ministers appealed for support to the people in their constituencies but without
success. Consequently, they

“cabinet crisis”

went

into exile to

a result of this

Banda remained forever suspicious of his Cabinet and turned Malawi

into a virtual police state in

which any

potential opposition

similar crisis. In 1966 Malawi’s parliament,

stamp

Zambia and Tanzania. As

was crushed

which by then had became

to prevent a

a

mere rubber

adopted a Republican Constitution with Banda as President and the

MCP as

the de jure sole party. In 1971 the parliament unanimously changed Malawi’s

constitution to

Banda had
Bill

make Banda

President for Life of the

MCP and the country. By then

established total control over the political system.

The Preventive Detention

of 1964 and the Public Safety Regulations Act of 1965 enabled him

detain anyone

whom he considered a threat to his highly personalistic

to arrest

and

and

South Africa,
For instance they disagreed with Banda’s policy to maintain friendly relations with
colonial rule.
Portuguese
under
still
was
which
Mozambique,
white ruled Southern Rhodesia and
Banda and they
than
service
civil
s
Malawi
of
Africanization
rapid
Furthermore they favored a more

were much more

left

leaning than the arch-conservative Banda.

ministers. He frequently
There was a significant age difference between Banda and most of his
decisions.
making
when
them
by-passed
and
“boys”
his
referred to them as

Bwanausi, Minister of Labor and
Orton Chirwa, Minister of Justice and Attorney General; Augustine
Affairs.
External
Social Development; and Kanyama Chiume, Minister of

Rose Chibambo, Parliamentary Secretary
All

MPs

to the Ministry

were basically hand picked by Banda.
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of Labor and Social Development.

neopatrimonial regime.

An

independent judiciary did not

exist.'^'

A major tool

of

Banda’s highly repressive regime was the Malawi Young Pioneers
(MYP). They acted
as

Its

eyes and ears, especially in rural areas, and assured Banda’s

Malawi’s

political life right

down

by Banda and by 1987

controlled

to the village level.

had about 60,000 members.

an effort to further bolster his political dominance, Banda
information.

who

Under

over

MYP were directly

The

this paramilitary force

total control

strictly controlled the

In

flow of

the Censorship and Control of Entertainment Bill of 1968 anyone

published “anything likely to undermine the authority

the govemment”'^^ could be punished with imprisonment.

Malawi Censorship Board (MCB) was
periodicals and 16 films

set up,

of, or public

confidence

To implement

in,

the Bill the

which had banned 849 books, 100

by 1975. Malawi’s two main newspapers “The Daily

Times’’

and “Malawi News” were owned by one of Banda’s companies and Malawi’s only
radio station, the

Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC), was run by

government. Foreign journalists were not allowed to work

Banda’s

rule. Finally,

in

the

Malawi during most of

freedom of speech and association did not

exist

and trade unions

and other independent organizations of any significance were non-existent’^^ under
Banda’s autocratic and personal rule

This

is

that lasted for three decades.’^'’

underlined by the following quote of Banda:

“No

matter what the Judges are saying

charge here, not the Judges” (quote taken from Decalo 1998:

Quoted

after

Cullen 1994:

[1

am]

in

p. 67).

p. 18.

Even Malawi’s churches came under

intense scrutiny and were under constant surveillance.

57-59
p. 3; Kalipeni 1992: pp. 34-36; Cullen 1994: pp. 13-22; Meldrum 1995: pp.
Mchombo
1998:
61-95;
pp.
Decalo
1998:
57-77;
pp.
Meinhardt
1997:
154-156;
pp.
Venter 1995: pp.
125-128.
Brown
2000:
and
203-205;
pp.
Newell
1999:
81-89;
pp.
Muluzi
1999:
23-28;
pp.

See Chipeta 1992:
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5.2

Political Liberalization

Until 1992 opposition to the

Banda regime was

such as the Socialist League of Malawi

(MAFREMO)
politicians

and the Congress

and

(LESOMA),

limited to various exile groups

Second Republic (CSR)

for a

owing

to long years

of exile,

armed

failed

of the Banda regime and the climate of fear

1992.

On

to the

that date eight

were

that

it

up by exiled
threat to the

suspicion, ethnic rivalry, and

As

by Malawian

a result of the repressive nature

had created throughout the country,

regime did not develop within Malawi

Roman

set

rebellion, harassment

security agents and lack of international support”.'^^

significant opposition'

that

However, they did not pose a serious

intellectual dissidents.

Banda regime, since they “had been plagued by mutual
inaction,

Malawi Freedom Movement

the

Catholic bishops issued a pastoral

until 8

March

letter entitled

“Living Our Faith” in which they inter alia condemned Malawi’s poor human rights
record and called for democratic reforms and greater political freedoms. Furthermore,

they expressed concern about the increasing inequality between the rich and the poor,
the spread of corruption, serious flaws within the educational system and cutbacks in

the area of health-care.'^^

Venter 1995;

The

pastoral letter

was read out

in all Catholic churches

and

p. 157.

June 1991 representatives of various exile groups, who were inspired by the formation of
for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) in Zambia, formed the United Front for Multiparty
Democracy (UFMD) with the aim of bringing together all the forces of democracy inside and outside
Malawi. Since November 1991 various anonymous letters and pamphlets critical of Kamuzu Banda,
were
John Tembo and Mama Kadzamira, who were known as Malawi s leadership triumvirate,
were
photocopiers
and
machines
circulating throughout the country. Modem technology such as fax

Already
the

in

Movement

used

to get opposition

documents of all

anonymously and widely within urban

The
in

entire 12

page

letter is

reproduced

Southern Africa Political

&

sorts into

Malawi and

to distributed

them

rapidly,

areas.

in

An edited version can be found
No. 8 (May 1992), pp. 20-22.

Cullen 1994; pp. 120-130.

Economic Monthly, Vol.
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5,

16,000 printed copies’^* were distributed. The multiparty elections

November

Zambia

in

1991, the international support for democracy after the end of the
Cold

and the growing realization

that issues

of justice and human rights were

message of the gospel’^^ were among the reasons
write this

in

letter.

Trevor Cullen pointed out

that

War

integral to the

prompted Malawi’s bishop’s

that the pastoral letter

to

can be considered “as

the turning point and catalyst in Malawi’s struggle for democracy’’ and that

it

“acted as

a decisive breakthrough in dismantling Banda’s dictatorship’’.'”^^

Galvanized by the pastoral

around the world met

in

Zambia’s

strategies for challenging

letter,

about 100 Malawian opposition activists from

capital,

Lusaka, from 20 to 23 March 1992 to discuss

Banda’s iron-fisted

rule.

Subsequently, the Interim Committee

for a

Democratic Alliance (ICDA) was formed as a pressure group, “whose objectives

were

to

campaign peacefully

The

Malawi”.

for the restoration

of basic human rights and democracy

secretary- general of the Southern Africa Trade

Union Coordination

Council (SATUCC), Chakufwa Chihana, was elected as ICDA’s chairman.
returned to

Malawi on 6 April 1992

inside Malawi, he

by the

fear

to build a

10,000

in

by

II

urged the Malawian bishops

issues during a visit to

Malawi

to

overcome

the criticism of the very

Malawi’s main language Chichewa, 5,000

Pope John Paul

the authorities. His refusal to be

many ordinary Malawians

the internal security apparatus. Inspired

to

When

he

broad based movement for democracy

was detained immediately by

of detention encouraged

in

in

Tumbuka and

cowed

their fear

of

low wages paid by

1,000 in English.

be more concerned with human rights and social

in 1989. Subsequently,

he called them to Rome,

continued silence. Thereafter they started to draft the pastoral

letter

irritated

(Brown 2000:

by

their

p. 145-146).

Cullen 1994: p.2. See also Cullen 1994: pp. 5-7 and 35-52; Newell 1995: pp. 246-251; and Muluzi
1999: pp. 137-141.

Venter 1995:

p. 157.
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the government and the business

community

in the pastoral letter

workers

at

a textile

factory in Blantyre started a strike on 6

May

of the country and included workers

urban as well as rural areas. The expression of

political discontent

emerged

in

1992, which quickly spread to other parts

as an important undercurrent of the strikes.

over 6,000 people demonstrated

in

On

7

May

1992

Lilongwe and demanded Chihana’s unconditional

release and the introduction of a multiparty system. In response, the

Banda regime

to crush the strikes

squads used tear

and demonstrations. Police and paramilitary

gas and batons to disperse the crowds. In the ensuing violence

riot

many were

tried

killed or

injured.

While Malawi’s Catholic bishops had basically
liberalization,

Malawi’s Protestant churches continued

Catholic bishops’ pastoral

the

letter,

started the process

it.

Synod and

the Blantyre

Soon

after the issuing

statement

which had been declared seditious by

was supported by

the

World Alliance

for

the

of the

the Livingstonia Synod'^^ of

Church of Central Africa Presbyterian (CCAP) issued a statement

pastoral letter,

of political

Banda

in

support of the

regime'^'*. Their

Reformed Churches (WARC).

In

August 1992 the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM), which represents various
Protestant churches, sent an open letter to the government in which

holding of a referendum on a multiparty system.

On

it

demanded

the

28 August 1992 the National

See Chipeta 1992: pp. 3-4; Venter 1995: pp. 157-159; Ihonvbere 1997: pp. 228-230; and Newell
1999: 214-216.

The Central Region’s Nkhoma Synod of the CCAP did not support the pastoral letter and instead
“continued to work with the MCP and portray Banda as ordained by God. In Dowa, the church
excommunicated suspected multiparty sympathizers” (Brown 2000: p. 144, footnote 30).
that
Subsequently, it was expelled from the CCAP and the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM)
represented various Christian churches.

The Banda regime threatened with imprisonment everyone found
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in

possession of the pastoral

letter.

Affairs

Committee was formed, which was

later

renamed Public Affairs Committee

(PAC), since the Banda regime expressed objections

PAC was
the

the Catholic church, the Anglican church as well as Malawi’s

Association,

politicians

Law

Society and

were part of PAC

body

to

Chamber of Commerce and

as well.

new democratic

letter to

structures

CCAP,

Muslim

Industry. Various opposition

PAC “was the very first entirely independent

be constituted publicly

system in 1966”.^^^ In a
for

of the term “national”.

a broad based coalition of opposition forces that brought
together the

CCM,

political

to the use

in

President

Malawi

Banda

since the imposition of the one-party

the

and respect for human

members of PAC
rights

stressed the need

and called for a dialogue

with the government on these issues.

During 1992 two important

become

political parties in

1993

political pressure

after

Malawi ceased

September 1992 the formation of the Alliance

Chihana

as

its

chairman was

of the Tumbuka

that live in

officially

AFORD’s

to

its

be a de jure one party

announced. Chihana belongs

leading

state. In

Democracy (AFORD) with Chakufwa

Malawi’s Northern Region.

northern town of Rumphi and

Many of them had

for

groups emerged that would

to the ethnic

group

AFORD had its roots in the

members were mainly northern

served lengthy prison terms for dissident political

intellectuals.

activities.

support was mainly limited to the Northern Region. “The emergence of

AFORD gave impetus to the surfacing [in October

1992] of another previously

clandestine opposition group based in the major commercial city of Blantyre in the

[Southern Region]. This was the United Democratic Front (UDF), most of whose

Newell 1999:

p. 221.

See Cullen 1994: 65-69; Ross 1995: pp. 101-105; Rwanda 1996: pp. 128-129; Meinhardt 1997:
141-142.
170; Muluzi 1999: pp. 143-146; Newell 1999: pp. 220-221; and Brown 2000: pp.
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p.

members were

successful businessmen and former

with Banda. The
south, as

its

UDF eventually elected

chairman

In short, the

.

MCP

leaders

Yao and

Bakili Muluzi, a

two main

political

who had
a

fallen out

Muslim from

the

groupings that emerged

during 1992 basically reflected the perceived ethnic and regional
divisions of Malawi’s
society.

Until 1989 Malawi’s bi- and multilateral donors turned a blind eye to
the grave

human

rights abuses that

were committed by the Banda regime.

Cold War, Malawi’s donors appreciated

its

context of the

In the

“staunch anti-communist foreign policy and

espousal of free market doctrines’’.'^’ However, Malawi’s favorable treatment by the
international

had come

donor community gradually changed

to an

communism

in

in the early

1990s

after the

Cold War

end and Malawi’s strategic importance as a bulwark against
Southern Africa ceased to

International and

Human

Rights Watch

/

exist.

“Where

rights

NGOs

such as Amnesty

Africa Watch played an important role

swaying donors’ perceptions of Malawi. For
issued a report entitled

Human

instance, in October 1990 Africa

Silence Rules:

The Suppression of Dissent

which detailed the systematic suppression of dissent by

the

in

Watch

in Malawi’’,

Banda regime and

in

February 1992 Amnesty International issued a report entitled “Malawi; Prison
conditions, cruel punishment and detention without

International informed the

Mchombo

In April 1992,

European Community (EC) and Malawi’s

about the attempt by senior
pastoral letter.

trial’’.

MCP officials to

kill

the bishops

During a Consultative Group meeting held

bilateral

who had

in Paris

Amnesty
donors

issued the

on 11-13

May

1992

1998: pp. 32-33.

See Cullen 1994: pp. 53-58; Venter 1995: pp. 163-164; Posner 1995: pp. 138-139; Muluzi 1999: pp.
141-143; and Newell 1999: pp. 221-222.
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Malawi’s government requested nearly $800 million

However, “the donors not only refused

amount of $74

aid [in the

to

in

balance-of-payments support.

renew such support, but also suspended new

million] until significant political reform had been

implemented”,

As

a result of Malawi’s high dependency on foreign aid’*', the suspension of

non-humanitarian aid had a very negative impact on Malawi’s economy and Banda
realized that without external support his regime

made some concessions

Therefore, he

established the Presidential

members, the

PCD was to

in

would not be able

October 1992.

retain the

that “a

engage

state or

of the

the referendum took place between

for the referendum,

its

On

to decide

18 October 1992 Banda

whether the people wanted

embrace a multiparty democracy”.'*^

to legitimize the one-party rule

the referendum process in

Banda

in a dialogue with the various opposition groups

referendum would be held

one - party

3 October 1992

Committee on Dialogue (PCD). Comprised mainly of MCP

organized in the Public Affairs Committee (PAC).

announced

On

to survive.

MCP. The

PCD

In

to

doing so he hoped

negotiations about the modalities of

and PAC. The Banda regime

tried to influence

favor by announcing a fairly early date (15 March

which would have given the opposition very

and by proposing the use of two separate ballot boxes, one

little

1

993)

time to campaign,

for votes for and

one

for

votes against the multiparty system. The opposition threatened to boycott the

Cullen 1994;

p. 62.

Brown 2000:

p. 165.

pp. 84-86;

See also Cullen 1994: pp. 62-64; Venter 1995; pp. 159-161; Meinhardt 1997:

and Brown 2000:

pp. 160-171.

amounted to 31.5% of Malawi’s Gross National Product (GNP) which was
Sub-Saharan African average of 11.1%.

In 1992 foreign aid

almost

Quoted

triple the

after

Mchombo

1998: p. 33.
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referendum,
used.

As

if

it

was not held

at a later

date and if two separate ballot boxes would
be

a result of pressure from the United Nations (UN),
which was involved in the

preparations,

Banda

finally agreed to

postpone the referendum

to 14

June 1993 and

to

use only one ballot box and two different ballot papers. While
making these concessions
the

Banda regime

the voters

still

undertook various measures'^^

would favor

to try to ensure that a majority

the continuation of the one-party system. However,

when

of

the

referendum took place on 14 June 1993 63.2% of the voters favored the introduction
of
a multiparty system, while

system.

34.5% of the

2.3% of the votes were

Appendix

I

show

invalid.

voters favored the continuation of the one-party

The

table in

Appendix

H

and the figure

clearly that voting took place along ethnoregional lines.

and the Southern Region, which are home
respectively, voted

the Central Region,

overwhelmingly

which

is

home

to the

Tumbuka and Yao

for the introduction

to the

Article 4 of the Constitution clearing the

The Northern

ethnic groups

of the multiparty system while

Chewa, Banda’s ethnic group, favored

On

continuation of the one-party system.

in

the

29 June 1993 Malawi’s parliament repealed

way

for the introduction

of a multiparty

system.

Malawi’s churches played a leading role

The

pastoral letter of 8

Permissions for

When

rallies

March 1992 was

the

in the political liberalization process.

first

public criticism of the

Banda regime

of supporters of a multiparty system were frequently denied by the

they took place they were often disturbed by the Malawi

Young

in

police.

Pioneers. Supporters of a

multiparty system were intimidated and the state controlled media called openly for the continuation

of the one-party system.

The very low support
partly

due

to the

for the multiparty

system

in the electoral districts

massive intimidation of voters by the

of Dedza and

Dowa

is

a least

MCP and the MYP who in some cases

prevented voters from voting for the multiparty system. There have also been reports of instances
where plantation workers were threatened with salary cuts or even the loss of their job if they voted
for the multiparty system.

See Cullen 1994: pp. 70-80; Venter 1995: pp. 164-167; and Meinhardt 1997: 185-201.
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more than two decades. Encouraged by
to

Malawi of the opposition

strikes

and took

the issues addressed in the letter and the
return

politician Chihana, thousands of workers defied
the ban on

to the streets

demanding higher wages,

better

working conditions and

ultimately also political reforms. However, these politically
motivated strikes were

undertaken on an ad hoc basis, since independent trade unions did not exist
authoritarian and repressive

regime made

it

external actors

liberalization.

Banda regime. The highly

impossible for an independent

were able

Only

to force the

after the

to

embark on

letter.

The

encouraged by the World Alliance of Reformed Churches
pastoral letter and the Public Affairs

1993 referendum. While the churches existed
the regime after they

were encouraged by

all

civil society

Banda regime, only
depend regime

to

See Cullen 1994:

was

p. 74;

to support the

assistance of the

ill-prepared for the

felt

international actors to

do

all until

so.

critize

Independent

1992. Since an

basically non-existent as a result of the highly repressive

the suspension of aid

embark on

critical

along they were only willing to

trade unions and professional association did not exist at

independent

(WARC)

it

me more

Protestant churches were

Committee (PAC) sought the

Council of Churches for Britain and Ireland (CCBI), since

only

political

the Catholic bishops to

towards the Banda regime they wrote the pastoral

highly

repressive character of the

civil society to develop. Therefore,

Banda regime

Pope encouraged

in the

by

the donors could force the highly aid

political liberalization.

and Pindani 1999:

p. 67.
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Democratic Transition

/

Democratization

In chapter 5.3 the democratic transition

/

democratization

in

Malawi

will be

analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties
will be analyzed. Second, the
legal

and constitutional changes

/

reforms that took place prior to the 1994 elections will

be examined. Third, the role of the military

May

multiparty elections on 19

will

be explored. Fourth, Malawi’s

1994 will be examined and

their results will

first

be

analyzed. Fifth, the activities of the Muluzi government after the elections
and the

second multiparty elections on 15 June 1999 will be considered.

5.3.1

The Formation
After the

had emerged

of Opposition Parties

993 referendum the two main pressure groups

1

in the early

1990s transformed themselves into

AFORD

and

political parties.

UDF that

AFORD

portrayed itself as an intellectual party and a party with a clean record, since most of its
leading

members

did not hold any posts in the

Chakufwa Chihana, hoped
preferred to form their

leadership style,

its

parties.

As

experienced numerous leadership quarrels, which hampered

especially outside the Northern Region.

people

who were

and

to establish an efficient party structure,

The party made various unsuccessful attempts

not from the north.

As

support in the Central and Southern regions in the

AFORD, many of UDF’s

leader,

a result of Chihana’s fairly authoritarian

ability to establish a coherent leadership

to recruit

its

would join AFORD. However, they

that returning exiles

own

AFORD

Banda regime. Therefore

a result

1

senior officials, including

76

994
its

AFORD received very little

elections. In contrast to

leader Bakili Muluzi, were

senior

During the

left.

the

MCP officials until they were expelled

UDF “MCP-B”.

The markedly

fell

out with Banda and

AFORD tried to take advantage of that by calling

campaign

electoral

from the party or

different past

of their party leadership lead

to an

increasing polarization between the two parties prior to the 1994 elections and

merger between the two

was

it

was somewhat more

successful than

AFORD

mobilizing support in the other two regions partly due to the fact that
at its disposal, since

many of its

excluded from the ruling

between

AFORD

supporters were successful businessmen that were

programs

started

by Banda.

In the case of

AFORD this was

surprising given the trade-unionist background of its leader Chihana. Not

SAPs he

also “refused to ‘address social and

this affected his ability to build a

5.3.2

had more money

MCP elite. Programmatically there was little difference

only did Chihana support

and

it

in

and UDF. For instance, both supported the continuation of the

structural adjustment

somewhat

broad national base”.

Legal and Constitutional Changes

/

1

economic

Reforms
initially called for the

resignation of Banda and the formation of an interim government. However,

on remaining president

until the elections. Subsequently, in

a meeting of representatives of the Public Affairs

Committee on Dialogue (PCD)

it

was agreed

issues’

88

After the 1993 referendum various opposition leaders

insisted

a

While UDF’s main support basis

parties next to impossible.

in the Southern Region,

made

to

Banda

August 1993 during

Committee (PAC) and

the Presidential

form the National Consultative Council

formed by returning exiles were the United Front for Multiparty Democracy
Republic of Malawi
(UFMD), the Malawi Democratic Union (MDU), the Congress for the Second
(CSR) and the Malawi Democratic Party (MDP).

Among

the parties

77

(NCC). The

NCC was composed of seven representatives each of Malawi’s registered

political parties including the smaller ones. Civil
society organizations like the churches

were not part of the NCC. The
for the transitional period

mandated
that dealt

new

NCC was to

and the holding of the multiparty

constitution.

The

NCC

with various issues such as

new

electoral laws

to draft a

boundaries and the drafting of a
formation of the

much more

legislature

government

also

and procedures, constituency

As

a result of the

to detain

someone without

was

deleted. In

trial.

representatives of

Commission, which was bound

NCC recommended to

more accurately

to follow

increase the

reflect population densities.**^ In

NCC convened a constitutional drafting conference in Blantyre.

During the following ten weeks the members of the

Ihonvbere 1997:

largely rubber-stamp

December 1993 Banda appointed

so seats in parliament so as to

course of the

Furthermore the provision making Banda

parties to an independent Electoral

February 1994 the

still

it

laws such as the one enabling the

recommendations of the NCC. For instance, the

number

was

civil society to influence the

November 1993 Malawi’s

to repeal various oppressive

President for Life

all political

It

formed a number of sub-committees

constitution before the elections.

Malawi’s emerging

difficult for

met

new

elections.

NCC the broader based PAC declined in importance, which made

democratization process. In

the

formulate policy and legislative measures

See also wa Mutua 1994: p.
Brown 2000: pp. 334-338.

p. 234.

1997: pp. 202-212; and

NCC drafted an interim

50; van

Donge 1995a:

pp. 243-249; Meinhardt

“Early in February 1994, members of the [Electoral] Commission toured the country to examine the
existing boundaries and numbers of constituencies. In undertaking their examination, the
Commissioners weighed the importance of population distribution, geographical features, means of

communication and administrative boundaries, etc. Taking all these factors into account, the
Commission created 36 more constituencies, increasing the total number from 141 to 177 [33 in the
Northern Region and 68 and 76 in the Central and Southern Regions respectively]” (Commonwealth
Secretariat 1994: p. 11).
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constitution

1994,

its

.

Since the constitution was to be adopted before the
elections on

drafting

“was

political parties, not

hurried, not particularly

1

May

7

open and dominated by the various

independent constitutional experts or civic organizations”.'^'

Furthermore, issues related to constitutional reform were hardly addressed
by the
political parties in their

constitution

was a

campaigns prior

significant

to the

1994

elections.

While the new

improvement compared with the old one,

radical a departure

from the old one as

been dominated by

politicians.

it

could have been

Most of the

if the drafting

politicians in the

modest rather than substantive changes, such

it

was not

as

process had not

NCC wanted to make

as the introduction

of a system of

proportional representation or a significant reduction of presidential powers, since this

was not

5.3.3

in their interest.

The Role of the
Under

the

Military

Banda regime considerable

tensions developed between the police

and the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) on the one hand and the military

on the other hand. Especially

after

appoint his close confident John

Thereafter

Tembo made

1983 when the military blocked Banda’s attempt

Tembo

to the position

of interim vice president.

every effort possible to expand the

MYP and the police with

the aim of creating an alternative military force to rival the military. This

military very suspicious of the

Tembo

the

MYP and the police, the

A constitutional committee of the new multiparty parliament was to
p.

made

MYP and the police, which were used by Banda and

to carry out repressive measures. In contrast to the

Brown 2000:

to

289.
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finalize the interim constitution.

military

was not used by Banda

Consequently,

it

managed

to carry out repressive

measures against his opponents.

to stay outside politics, retained a high degree

of

professionalism and was fairly free of corruption. Besides the churches Malawi’s
military

was

the only national institution that operated to a large extend independently

from the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). This enabled the military
constructive role during the democratization process. In

protested in

Zomba “junior army officers

to play a

March 1992 when

students

stationed nearby offered the students

encouragement and protected them from police violence

[...].

The following month,

senior and middle-ranking

army

they would not be used for

MCP partisan purposes and repress Malawians calling for

officials

met with

multipartyism”.'^^ In September 1993 the

the

MYP, which was under the

Tembo was

the president and

Banda regime and

direct control

the

of Tembo. Once

it

made

clear that

NCC agreed to disarm
became

clear that

not willing to honor this agreement, junior military officers launched

“Operation Bwezani” in early December 1993 after two unarmed soldiers were killed

by

the

MYP.

In this operation soldiers attacked and destroyed

country and seized large caches of weapons.

made

clear that they felt

not willing to allow the

dismantling of the

that there

more

loyal to the

By doing

MYP offices all over the

so the junior military officers

NCC than the government and that they were

MYP and the police to block the democratization process. The

MYP that functioned as the military wing of the MCP also ensured

was somewhat more of a

level playing field prior to the

1994

elections.

267-268; Banda
See Ng’Ong’Ola 1996; pp. 98-104; Lwanda 1996: pp. 190-197; Meinhardt 1997; pp.
1998: pp. 321-324; and Brown 2000: pp. 182-184 and pp. 289-291.

Brown 2000:

p. 156.

86-91; Newell 1999:
See Meinhardt 1997: pp. 243-244; Mchombo 1998: pp. 35-36; Decalo 1998: pp.
186-189.
and
156
Brown 2000: pp.
pp. 216-218; Muluzi 1999: pp. 172-174; and
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The 1994

5.3.4

Elections

While the dismantling of the
and the

M YP by the military deprived the Banda regime

MCP of a tool they would most likely have used to boost their chances at

winning

in the

upcoming

elections, they

still

had other means

influence the outcome of the elections in their favor.
to bolster its

vote

split

power base

KANU

police and

in

Kenya

‘strategists’

Consequently

in

December 1992.

“who had come

was mainly

it

to

to

hope

members of the Nyau

strategy of the

could hold on to power like

as election monitors”.'’^

Region where the Banda regime used the

secret cult to intimidate opposition supporters and to

By and

complied with the guidelines'^^

for

independent Electoral Commission. The

large the

government owned radio

media coverage

that

despite the watchful eye of the Electoral

instance,

on 14

May

Ihonvbere 1997:

p.

1994,

MBC played an important role in

when

guidelines

censorship, to the campaigns
to the close

of the poll

Commonwealth

Commission

there

was

still

However,

a certain tendency

MCP and its presidential candidate Banda.

For

the celebrations of Banda’s birthday took place in

235.

The purpose of these
up

to the

station,

were issued by the

disseminating various kinds information about the upcoming elections.

of MBC to give more attention

MCP was

with the opposition

that,

it

disposal to

MCP officials actually sought the advise of

Malawi posing

in the Central

prevent or disrupt their campaigns.

MBC,

The main

between the Northern and the Southern Region,

Moi had done
six

Region and

in the Central

at their

was

“to ensure that full

and

fair

coverage

is

given without

of all registered political parties during the period of

in the

parliamentary and

campaigning and

presidential elections” (quoted after

Secretariat 1994: p. 14).

Commission
For instance, MBC organized phone-in programs on which members of the Electoral
Campaign
like
programs
produced
also
MBC
process.
electoral
answered questions about the
News” and “Know Your Candidate” which featured candidates from all the contesting parties.
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Blantyre,

MBC devoted much airtime to this event, while a large UDF rally on the same

day received no coverage. As already mentioned above the

main

parties

MCP, UDF

and

AFORD

it

won

the elections.

Convinced

that

to provide free

and universal primary education

he could win on his

own AFORD’s

candidate Chihana ignored various public calls to work with the

Banda regime. For

campaign of the

focused on personalities rather than on issues.'’*

The only exception was UDF’s promise
if

electoral

presidential

UDF to topple the

instance, in the parliamentary elections three-quarters of Malawi’s

177 constituencies were three-way contests, since neither

AFORD nor UDF was willing

not to nominate a candidate in favor of the other party. This raised the specter of a

Kenyan-type scenario

influence of regionalism on

Malawi’s

first

upcoming

in the

Malawian

politics this did not

May

1994.

The

emerged as the winner of the

(47.16 %). The presidential candidate of the
in

However,

as a result of the strong

happen.'”

multiparty presidential and parliamentary elections since

independence took place on 17
Bakili Muluzi,

elections.

presidential candidate of the

UDF,

presidential elections with 1,404, 754 votes

MCP,

Dr. Hastings

Kamuzu Banda, came

second with 996,363 votes (33.45%); while the presidential candidate of AFORD,

Chakufwa Chihana,

finished a distant third with 552, 862 votes (18.90%).^”

electoral participation

was

fairly

high with 80.5% of all registered voters and

The

68%

of

Venter and Ihonvbere pointed out that the poorly focused, opportunistic and superficial campaigns of
AFORD and UDF discouraged and frustrated many Malawians. As a consequence only 3.8 million
voters registered for the 1994 elections compared with 4.7 million for the 1993 referendum (See
Venter 1995: p. 176; and Ihonvbere 1997: p. 236). For a comparison of the 1994 election manifestos

of MCP,

UDF and AFORD

see

Kaunda 1998:

pp. 59-61.

See Commonwealth Secretariat 1994: pp. 14-20; Venter 1995: pp. 171-177; Ihonvbere 1997: pp.
231-236; and Patel 2000: pp. 174-175.

The

presidential candidate of the

paltry 15,

Malawi Democratic Party (MDP), Kamlepo Kalua, mustered

624 votes (0.52%).
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a

eligible voters.

The

table in

Appendix

J

and the figures

in

Appendices

K-M show

quite

clearly that voting took place mainly along regional lines^®' with the Northern
Region

voting overwhelmingly for Chihana, the Central Region for Banda and the Southern

Region

for Muluzi.

ensured that the

The

fact that the

Southern Region

UDF candidate emerged victorious.

relevance as well, regionalism plays a

much more

is

Malawi’s most populous region

While ethnicity

Tumbuka, only accounts

for

two of the

five districts

from his ethnic group, the Yao, only accounts

of some

important role as a source of identity

than ethnicity in Malawi. For instance, Chihana’ s support from his
the

is

for three

he

own

won and

of the ten

ethnic group,

Muluzi’s support

districts

he won.

Furthermore non-Tumbuka and non-Yao ethnic groups supported different opposition
candidates depending in which region they lived. However, ethnicity can be used to
explain Banda’s strong support

who belong to Banda’s own
win the

largest

among

especially the rural voters in the Central Region

ethnic group the

number of seats

in

Chewa. Muluzi’s

AFORD 36 seats.

Appendices P-R show

all

managed

to

tables in

Appendices

it

MCP received 56 seats and

N and O and the figures in

that regionalism also determined voters’ preferences in the

parliamentary elections.

won

The

also

Malawi’s parliament with 85 out of 177. However,

did not achieve an absolute majority of the seats. Banda’s

Chihana’ s

UDF

AFORD won all of the 33

seats of the Northern Region,

but five of the 76 seats of the Southern Region and

MCP won 5

1

UDF

of the 68 seats

of the Central Region.

regional
Deborah Kaspin pointed out that while voting took place mainly along
612).
1995:
p.
Kaspin
(See
variations intra-regionally and intra-ethnically
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lines, there

have been

5.3.5

The 1999
Since

tried to

Elections

UDF

did not receive a parliamentary majority in the 1994
elections,

form a coalition with

AFORD. However, AFORD’s

it

leader, Chihana, initially

declined to form such a coalition, since President Muluzi was unwilling
to meet his

demand

for an executive vice-presidency

and eight ministries. To strengthen his

bargaining power towards Muluzi, Chilhana signed a

Understanding” with the

shocked by

move by

this

MCP on 20 June

1994.

“Memorandum of Common

Many AFORD

supporters were

Chilhana, which underlined his aversion to consultative

decision-making and his hunger for power. The formation of this opportunistic alliance

MCP, which in turn helped AFORD

rejuvenated the

difficulties.

disliked

by

However

the

AFORD/MCP

to

overcome

its

financial

alliance did not last very long, since

certain elements within both parties for different reasons.

On 26

1994 Muluzi appointed Chihana as second Vice President and offered
cabinet positions

by

The

September

AFORD

four

further increasing his already bloated cabinet to 35 in an effort to

break the governmental paralysis that resulted from the
parliament.

was

it

resulting

MCP/ AFORD

control of

AFORD/UDF coalition government provided Muluzi

with a

stable majority in parliament to carry out his legislative agenda. In June 1996 Chihana

pulled his party out of the coalition government and courted the

accusing the

UDF of massive corruption, nepotism and bribery.

MCP once more while
However, the

AFORD

ministers remained with the government assuring Muluzi a parliamentary majority.

AFORD demanded that by-elections be held claiming that the AFORD ministers had

152-

Chirwa 1994: pp. 17-20; Venter 1995: p. 177; Kaspin 1995: pp. 611-620; Kalipeni 1997: pp.
Reynolds 1999: pp. 147-149; and
167; Meinhardt 1997: pp. 274-294; Chirwa 1998: pp. 65-69;

Brown 2000:

pp. 320-334.

84

crossed the floor to

and

MCP

UDF.

In response to Muluzi’s refusal to hold
by-elections,

AFORD

accused Muluzi of poaching their members and manipulating
parliament

in

order to preserve his majority”^®^ and boycotted the parliament
for about 10 months. In
April 1997 the impasse

and

was broken with

the help of the Catholic church and the

AFORD MPs returned to parliament and

MCP

formed once more a parliamentary

alliance.^^'^

Right before the 1994 elections parliament adopted Malawi’s new constitution

on an interim basis with the provision

that

it

had

to

be finalized within a year’s time.

In

February 1995 a constitutional review conference took place, which was attended by

274 delegates from

political parties

and different

churches, trade unions and Malawi’s law society.

institutions

of civil society such as the

Many of the

delegates were not very

well prepared and there was hardly any input from the rural population prior to the
conference. Furthermore, since the decisions of the conference were not binding, the

new

were made by parliament. The

final decisions

regarding Malawi’s

UDF/AFORD

coalition ignored the conference decisions,

constitution

which

it

did not agree with

such as the abolition of the position of a second vice president, which was created
convince Chihana to join the government.

On

10

Malawi’s new constitution, which was not much
In sum, the process of drafting Malawi’s

Rake 2001:

new

May

to

1995 parliament adopted

different

constitution

from the interim

constitution.

was dominated by political

p. 316.

and Rake 2001:
See Venter 1995: pp. 178-180; Banda 1998: pp. 61-62; Brown 2000: pp. 339-342;
315-316.
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p.

parties with

little

input by civil society.

“The

constitution thus lacks popular legitimacy,

especially in a society with virtually no experience in democracy”.^®^

While the Muluzi government
after the

tried to bring

1994 elections, which was evident

notorious for

human

rights abuses under

about a break with the past right

in the closing

of three prisons

Banda, the establishment of a

commission and the introduction of free primary education, over time
to

democratic principles such as the rule of law and

its

that

were

truth

its

commitment

respect for the constitution

eroded significantly. Between 1995 and the 1999 elections the Muluzi government

undertook various measures to increase

1995
the

all local

its

executive powers. For instance, in December

government bodies were dissolved. Even so the new

government

to hold local elections in 1995, they

constitution required

were repeatedly postponed while

the central government controlled Malawi’s 27 districts. Like in this case, the executive

frequently ignored constitutional and legal obligations that did not suit
the Muluzi government has been slow in establishing

Commission, the

Human

mandated by the

constitution.

towards the ruling party.

new

it.

Furthermore,

institutions such as the

Rights Commission and the Office of the

Ombudsman

Law

as

established they were often inefficient and biased

Once

206

Prior to the elections on 15 June 1999 the Muluzi government undertook various

measures

to

improve

its

chances

at

winning especially

to present a joint presidential ticket,

UDF.

In July

after

which posed a serious

MCP and AFORD agreed

threat to

Muluzi and his

the
1998 Muluzi appointed an entirely new Electoral Commission. While

Brown 2000:

p. 290.

See also Meinhardt 1997: 352-354.

See Brown 2000: pp. 303-3 14.

86

Commission

also included

members from

the opposition parties,

William Hanjahanja, was leaning strongly towards the UDF.
Electoral

Commission proposed

to the National

parliamentary constituencies, of which 42 (or

Assembly

60%) were

In

its

January 1999 the

to create

in the

chairman, Justice

70 new

UDF dominated

Southern Region. As a result of fierce protests from the opposition parties and
international donors a

were created

compromise was reached whereby only 1 6 new

(5 in the Central

registration process

Region and

was biased towards

registration proving far

more

local

it

NGOs, and

the

difficult in the

Southern Region”.^®^ Again, only

after

international donors

in the

1 1

UDF

constituencies

Southern Region). Also the voter

at least in its initial stages,

“with

Northern and Central Regions than

combined pressure by

was brought

to bear

in the

the opposition parties,

on the Electoral Commission

agreed to extend the voter registration period by two weeks. The Electoral

Commission

also tried to block the joint ticket of the opposition parties in the

which Gwanda Chakuamba of the

presidential election under

president and

Chakufwa Chihana of AFORD

High Court ruled

that the joint ticket

government heavily

utilized

was

MCP would stand for

for vice-president.

legitimate.

However, Malawi’s

During the campaign the Muluzi

government finances and

state property for party purposes.

For instance, government four-wheel drive vehicles “were extensively used by
candidates, giving

them a

rural constituencies.

and

significant advantage in

When

addressing

gifts to local dignitaries

Wiseman 2000:

p.

rallies,

moving around

87

the vast sprawling

candidates are expected to provide cash

and community projects;

639.

UDF

UDF candidates were best able to

meet such expectations generously”.^®*
Catholic bishops, Malawian
fair

NGO’s

access to radio broadcasting for

Finally, despite calls

and the international donor community

which led some observers

to call

it

(MBC)

for

its

the ruling

made

The

92%

little

its

to provide

purposes throughout

the Muluzi Broadcasting Cooperation.

Less than a week before the elections Malawi’s High Court ruled

of the campaign did not comply with

Roman

the Muluzi government unrepentantly

all parties,

manipulated the Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation
the campaign,

from Malawi’s

that

MBC’s

coverage

duty to be impartial, however, coming that

late

difference.^®^

15 June 1999 elections in

of registered voters. Muluzi

won

Malawi saw an extremely high turnout with over
the presidential race with 2,442,685 votes

(51.37%), while his challenger Chakuamba received 2,106,790 votes (44.30%). “In the
parliamentary elections Muluzi’s

to

92 while the

UDF

increased

its

seats in the

new

parliament from 84

MCP won 66 seats and AFORD 29 giving the opposition alliance 95

seats, a theoretical majority in the legislature.

There were also four independent

candidates”.^'® Nationally, the voting patterns in 1999 where quite similar to those in

1994 as

is

evident from the tables in Appendices S and T. In the presidential elections

Muluzi dominated the Southern Region where he gained 78.3% of the vote while

Chakuamba dominated
62.4%

in the Northern

and Central Regions where he gained 88.6% and

respectively. In the parliamentary elections “each of the three major parties

dominated one region but elsewhere enjoyed limited support except

Wiseman 2000:

p.

in a

few specific

642.

Kadzamira
See Wiseman 2000: pp. 638-642; Patel 2000a: pp. 175-181; Patel 2000b: pp. 25-38;
6.
No.
p.
Vol.
13,
Confidential,
40,
2000: p. 58; and Africa

Rake 2001:

p.

316.
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areas

211

?9
.

While sporadic violence did occur during the campaign

as well,

it

was

nothing compared with the violence that erupted after
the results where announced on
18 June 1999. Opposition leaders declared that they would
not recognize Muluzi’s
victory and accused

him of cheating. This provoked

serious violence especially in the

Northern Region, where party-related religious tensions erupted as
a
seventeen mosques were burned, since Mulizi

is

a Muslim.

Due

result

of which

to the efforts

of the

churches and various individuals the situation was soon contained. Subsequently
the
opposition tried to challenge the election results unsuccessfully in Malawi’s
High
Court.^’^

5.3.6

Summary
Julius Dionvbere pointed out that the humiliation of the

1993 referendum contributed significantly to
opposition prior to the 1994 elections.^

its

willingness to

Banda regime

in the

make concessions

Furthermore, Malawi’s high degree of aid

dependability also limited the ability of the Banda regime to take measures aimed

ensuring

to

it

would win

the 1994 elections.

to the

at

Such measures would have been unacceptable

Malawi’s donors and would have further delayed the resumption of aid, which was

critical for the

functioning of Malawi’s economy. Therefore, the Banda regime went

along with the recommendations of the National Consultative Council (NCC) by and

large.

For instance,

it

established a fairly independent Electoral Commission, which

able to ensure that the

Wiseman 2000:

Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation more or

less

was

complied with

p. 645.

See Meinhardt 1999b: pp. 8 and 10-11; Wiseman 2000: pp. 642-645; Patel 2000b: pp. 40-45; and
Brown, Richard 2001: p. 593.
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its

guidelines for media coverage during the campaign for
the 1994 elections. Also the
military played an important role in leveling the playing
field prior to the 1994 elections

when

it

disarmed the paramilitary Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). This
deprived the

MCP of an important tool to intimidate the opposition throughout the country. As a
result the intimidation

Central Region.

of the opposition was mainly limited

The formation of the two main opposition

lines jeopardized the ability

However, due

of the opposition

to the fact that the

to

to

parties

win the 1994

Southern Region, which

MCP's

is

stronghold, the

mainly along regional

elections somewhat.

UDF’s

stronghold,

Malawi’s most populous region Muluzi replaced Banda as Malawi’s president
result

of the 1994 elections, which were considered

international observers.

finalized

it

constitution

much

was not

influence

by

was dominated by

civil society.

as radical a departure

presidential powers, as

it

could have been,

bring about a break with the past,
provisions that were not in

its

its

by various

constitution in 1994 and

the three

This also explains

if the drafting

initially

and

its

main

political

why the new

process would have been

undertook some measures

to

commitment

attempts to influence the 1999 elections

to basic

democratic principles and don’t

increase the prospects for democratic consolidation.^'"*

234.

See chapters 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 of this

as a

tendency to ignore constitutional and legal

interests

in its favor call into question its

p.

fair

also

from the old one, especially regarding the

broader based. Even so the Muluzi government

See Ihonvbere 1997:

and

While Malawi adopted a new interim

in 1995, the drafting process

parties without

free

is

thesis.
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Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

5.4

So

far

democracy has more or

democratic consolidation has not yet

less survived in

started.

The

Malawi, however the process of

relative

independence of Malawi’s

judiciary has contributed to the survival of democracy in Malawi.
especially Malawi’s

evident

by

High Court,

the fact that

is

The judiciary,

highly professional and hardly politicized. This

“High Court decisions have repudiated

is

presidential orders

dismissing municipal officials, nullified executive efforts to handpick traditional
authorities,

and even given jail terms

to

governing party municipal

officials

ignored court injunctions’’.^’^ The High Court also played an important role
the playing field prior to the 1999 elections. For instance,

joint ticket

was

comply with

its

legitimate and

it

ruled that

MBC’s

it

ruled that the

who have
in leveling

MCP/AFORD

coverage of the campaign did not

duty to be impartial. The relative independence of Malawi’s judiciary

enabled the opposition to address

its

grievances within and not outside

(i.e.

through

violence) the political system. This ensured political stability and played a major role in

ensuring democratic survival so

far. If

the independence of Malawi’s judiciary

continues, this will undoubtedly increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in

Malawi.^’^

As

a result of the highly authoritarian

independent and vibrant

by the

civil society to

Banda regime

emerge

fact that the Catholic bishops only

it

was impossible

until the early 1990’s.

wrote their pastoral

letter in

This

is

for an

evident

March 1992

they had been encouraged to do so by the Pope. Throughout the 1990s Malawi’s

von Doepp 2001

:

p.

232.

See von Doepp 2001 pp. 235-237.
:
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after

churches kept a fairly high political

For instance, they conducted various civic

profile.

education campaigns and they criticized the Muluzi government
on various occasions.

By doing

so they contributed to the survival of democracy in Malawi.
Except for the

churches,

Malawi

s civil

society

is still

no presence outside major urban
rather small financial and

“briefcase”

weak and

areas. Furthermore,

human

NGOs. Malawi’s

rather

organizations have

its

Malawi’s

NGO’s

often have only a

resource base. In other words they are

civil society

or

little

little

more than

needs to be strengthened through sustained

donor support and the building of networks with

NGO’s

in other countries to increase

the prospects for democratic consolidation in Malawi. Only then they will be able to

make an

important contribution to the establishment of a democratic political culture,

which

one of the building blocs of consolidated democracies.^'^

is

During the 1990’s a
three parties

(AFORD,

system emerged

fairly stable party

in

Malawi consisting of

MCP and UDF). Their political support is mainly determined by

regionalism while ethnicity plays only a minor role. There are hardly any ideological or
policy differences between them which explains

regionalism and on personalities.

politics the political parties

where they had

little

must

influence

developing clear ideologies

Malawian society such

/

/

To overcome
find

ways

support

is

mainly based on

the regional fragmentation of Malawian

to appeal to voters in regions

of the country

following in the past. This could be best achieved by

policies that

would

attract the votes

of different groups of

as peasants, the business community, workers,

youth on a national basis. Clear policies
as land reforms, social

why their

and economic

/

programmes could be developed

issues, the protection

See Ott 2000: pp. 154-155; Chirwa 2000: pp.

women

1

16

;

92

Brown 2000:

p.

and
such

in areas

of the environment and

351; and von

Doepp 2001:

p. 233.

foreign relations. Besides developing clear ideologies

need

to

process

policies Malawi’s parlies also

develop democratic decision making structures within
themselves. Currently a

under

is

way

in

Malawi

political parties prior to the

lead

/

by John Tembo and

that

2004

likely will lead to the

elections.

the other

autocratic leadership style

most

emergence of new

MCP is divided into two

by Gwanda Chakuamba. As a

AFORD could split as well.

factions.

result

One

is

of Chihana’s

Finally, the former

UDF

Education Minister Brown Mpinganjira formed an opposition pressure group
called the
National Democratic Alliance
into a political party as well.

result

(NDA)

2001, which most likely will be transformed

in

These new

political parties are basically

of personal animosities and not as a

result

emerging as a

of significant ideological

/

policy

differences. This does not augur too well for the prospects of democratic consolidation

in

Malawi.^'^

As explained above

among

the

respect for the rule of law and the constitution are not

comer stones of the Muluzi government. Malawi’s

current constitution only

allows the same president to be in office for two consecutive terms. However, rather
than stepping

down

after his current

the constitution so as to be able to

to

do

this.

term ends

mn

2004, Muluzi

for a third term.

is

considering to

amend

There are basically two options

Either a referendum and a simple majority in the National Assembly or no

referendum and a two-thirds majority

managed

in

to lure

enough opposition

in the

MPs

National Assembly. Muluzi seems to have

into his

camp

to

have a two-thirds majority and

thus does not have to bring this issue before the people in a referendum, which would

See Phiri 2000: pp. 84-85; Patel 2000b: 45-50; Brown 2000: pp. 375-377; and Economist
Intelligence Unit, Malawi Country Report, March 2002, pp. 1-2.
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1

be the more democratic option.^’’ Church

leaders,

prominent lawyers and university

students are against such a constitutional amendment.

once revered as a national hero as the biggest

threat to

In response to criticism of his third term ambitions he

issue in

May 2002

They now view Muluzi who was
Malawi’s fledgling democracy.

banned

all

saying he feared they might degenerate into

Since in power the Muluzi government has failed to

demonstrations on

this

street fights.^^®

make any progress

in

reducing poverty and the gap between rich and poor has widened. In 2001 Malawian
officials sold the country’s 167,000-ton

emergency grain reserve and have not

accounted for the proceeds. This further aggravated the negative impact of one of the
worst droughts ever, which the country

is

currently experiencing. In rural

Malawi many

people are so desperate for food that they have no other option than eating the roots of

banana

trees, tree

stems and wild leaves, which have

little

nutritional value. This

underpins very clearly that without significant progress in reducing the appalling

poverty of many Malawians democratic consolidation will continue

remote

to

remain a very

22

possibility.

amendment bill that
July 2002 Malawi’s National Assembly narrowly rejected a constitutional
necessary to pass
been
have
would
votes
128
would have enabled Muluzi to stand for a third term.

On 4
the

bill.

125 lawmakers voted

in favor,

59 against and five abstained.

Crackdown in Malawi.
See Chitsulo 2001 pp. 3-4 and 6; and the article entitled “A Surprising
Rachel
L. Swams in The
by
Rules”
the
of
Some
Changes
Democracy
Leader Who Symbolized
A4.
June
2002,
York Times of Sunday, 30
:

New

Sweeps Southern Africa. Millions
See Kaunda 1998: pp. 61-63; and the articles entitled “Famine
by Jon Jeter in The Washington Post o^
Suffering in Crisis Created by Nature, Exacerbated by Man”
in Africa Leave Millions at the Edge of
Friday, 10 May 2002, A1 and A34; and “Meager Harvests
June 2002, A1 and A8.
by Rachel L. Swams in The New York Times of Sunday, 23
Starvation”
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CHAPTER 6
ZAMBIA

The Republic of Zambia
covers a total area of 752,614 sq

Zambia

that

shows

its

is

a land-locked country in South-Central Africa.

km

(290,586 sq miles). Appendix

U

contains a

It

map of

nine provinces as well as major cities and towns. According to

UN estimates Zambia’s population was 9,169,000 in mid 2000, which is equivalent to
1

2.2 inhabitants per sq

“Zambia

is

km. This

is

low figure by African standards, however,

a rather

most urbanized country

the third

of its population of 5,661,801
than 5,000 inhabitants

[...].

the 10 largest urban areas,

at the

in

September 1980 census residing

Some 78% of the
situated

all

mainland sub-Saharan Africa, with

urban population was,

in

41%

towns of more

in fact, located in

on the Tine of rail’, extending south from

the

Copperbelt, through Lusaka, to the Victoria Falls, forming the major focus of Zambia’s

economic

No

activity”.

fewer than 73 different ethnic groups

speak more than 80 languages and they
ethnic

/

language groups are the

who

Copperbelt; the Nyanja

live in the

all

Williams 2001:

p.

belong to the Bantu group.

Bemba who mainly

who

See Williams 2001:

p.

1

105; and Southall 2001: p. 555.
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and

in

Among the
and

major

in the

Lusaka; the Tonga

live in the west.

1105.

Zambia. They

live in the north-east

live in the Eastern Province

Southern Province; and the Lozi

live in

223

who

6.1

Historical Context
Starting in the 1930s the British developed a copper
mining industry in their

colony Northern Rhodesia. This “led

made Zambia

the

to

massive labour migration from

most urbanized country

rural areas

and

in Africa. Urbanization, labour migration

and

education provided the background to early assertions of African identity,
which led
increasingly to opposition to colonial author! ty”.^^^ Since workers were initially

prohibited

by

the colonial authorities to form trade unions, they formed “welfare

societies” instead.

The

political organization especially

of mine workers fostered the

development of a working-class consciousness among them and
the working-class involvement in politics,

Zambian

politics. In

was formed under

which became one of the comer stones of

1951 the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC)

the leadership of Harry

Central African Federation

(CAF) by

Nkumbula to oppose

the establishment of the

federating Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia

and Nyasaland. The establishment of the
in

laid the foundation for

CAF in

1953, which enabled the white settlers

Southern Rhodesia to exploit Northern Rhodesia’s mineral wealth, lead

to an

intensification of the anti-colonial stmggle in Northern Rhodesia. During the second

half of the 1950s differences arose within the

ANC on what course the anti-colonial

stmggle should take. As a result Kenneth Kaunda and Simon Kapwepwe, who favored a

more

radical approach than

Nkumbula,

left

the

ANC and formed the United National

Independence Party (UNIP). Under the leadership of Kaunda
force in the stmggle for independence,

van Donge 2000:

UNIP became

the driving

which was attained on 24 October 1964.

225

p. xxii.

See Meyns 1993: p. 479; van Donge 1995b: p. 195; Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 48-50; van Donge 2000:
xxiv; Mthembu-Salter 2001: p. 1 106; and Southall 2001: p. 556.
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p.

6

.

1.1

The

First Republic: 1964-1972

Even so President Kaunda favored

a one-party system, from 1964 to 1972

Zambia remained a multiparty system. Kaunda

initially

hoped

that

he could achieve his

goal of a one-party system through the ballot box and consensual
techniques.

Consequently, during the

first

years of independence

of coercion and positive inducement

economic

interest could

to

convince

be better served through

belong to UNIP’”.^^^ However, the

“UNIP

Mundia

UNIP - hence

result

the slogan;

late

1960s

UNIP was

was formed by Nalumino

Lozi-dominated Western Province and subsequently gained strength as a

of the factionalism within UNIP, which led various
group to join the UP.

to the Lozi ethnic

UP was banned

in

UNIP members
August 1968

that

UP

did fairly well

leaders directed their followers to join the

in the parliamentary

and presidential elections

Factionalism along ethnoregional lines within

as the

dominant

belonged

to the

political party. In 1971

Bemba

ethnic group,

Progressive Party (UPP).
well as non-Bemba,

Chikulo 1979:

p.

who

UPP was
left

UNIP

ANC. As

UNIP

belonged

after its ability

to mobilize political support in the Copperbelt led to violent clashes within

Subsequently

pays to

‘It

ANC did not dissolve itself and continued to be

factionalism. In 1966 the United Party (UP)

in the

tactics

ANC supporters that their political and

supported by the Tonga of the Southern Province. In the

weakened by

upon

relied heavily

UNIP.

a result the

ANC

m

1968.

that took place

continued to undermine

its

position

former Vice-President Simon Kapwepwe,

left

UNIP and formed

his

own

party, the United

supported mainly by disgruntled groups,
since they

202.
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felt that

they were

at

who

Bemba

as

a disadvantage in

the competition for limited national resources that
took place within

transformation of a major faction within

major threat

to

UNIP’s dominant

difficulties as a result

the

UPP

UNIP

and detained

its

prices. In

leaders and on 13

of a “one-party participatory democracy”.
remaining opposition party, the
•

•

•

opposition parties.

6.1.2

into an opposition party

role, especially in the light

of declining copper

ANC,

UNIP, The
(UPP) posed

of emerging economic

February 1972 Kaunda outlawed

December 1972 he announced

By doing

a

the formation

so he outlawed not only the sole

but also any future initiatives to establish

278

The Second Republic: 1973-1990
In

Zambia

August

1

973 a new constitution entered

officially a one-party state.

supremacy over

The 1973

all political activities

UNIP’s Central Committee was

the

into force. This constitution

constitution gave the sole party,

as well as the

made
UNIP,

government and recognized

main policy-making

UNIP’s supremacy Zambia’s parliament was reduced

authority.

to a

As

that

a result of

“rubber stamp” that merely

endorsed decisions taken by the Central Committee of UNIP. Between 1973 and 1990
parliamentary elections took place on a regular basis. They can be characterized as
semi-competitive, since voters could basically choose between up to three
candidates. Kenneth

Kaunda was

ANC received 2

president of the state and the party.

UNIP

The 1 973

.9% of the votes in the parliamentary elections and its presidential candidate,
Harry Nkumbula, received 18.2% of the votes in the presidential elections (see Krennerich 1999; p.

The

1

953).

See Tordoff/ Scott 1974: pp. 107-1 1 1; Chikulo 1979: pp. 201-204; Burdette 1988: pp. 64-94;
Tordoff 1988: pp. 10-12; Bratton 1992: pp. 82-83; Meyns 1993: pp. 479-480; Burnell 1994; p. 20;
Nkanza 1994: pp. 196-197; von Donge 1995b: p. 195; Mthembu-Salter 2001; p. 1 106; and Southall
2001:

p.

556-557.
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constitution gave

him

vast powers such as the

power

to detain

someone without

However, he did not use these powers too excessively mainly because of his
beliefs

and his rootedness

In this context

in the

trial.

Christian

concept of Zambian Humanism, which he developed.

Gordon White pointed out

that

“Kaunda’s version of mono-partyism was

a relatively ‘soft’ one, in which attempts to repress, harass or co-opt opposition were

combined with

efforts at

appeasement and accommodation”.^^^ As long as

government’s authority was not directly challenged criticism was tolerated
extent.

It

his

to a certain

mainly came from the press, churches and trade unions.

Between 1964 and 1972 a

fairly critical press

emerged

in

Zambia. While the

government exercised more control over Zambia’s two main newspapers the “Times of

Zambia” and

the

“Zambia Daily Mail”

since the early 1970’s

them, they maintained their ability to be
the praise-blame approach

and

critical

by gradually

nationalizing

of certain government policies by using

satire to a certain extent. In

1972 the Chnstian

Council of Zambia (CCZ) and the Zambia Episcopal Conference (ZEC) founded a
fortnightly paper called the “National Mirror”. This paper

was often

quite critical of the

government and uncovered various corruption scandals. Towards the end of the 1980s
the “National Mirror” enabled “those trade unionists, business leaders, professionals,

intellectuals

and clergymen

White 1995:

who had

little

or no access to the state-owned Times and

p. 67.

See Tordoff 1988: pp. 12-27; Bratton 1992: pp. 83-84; Bates
2000: p. xxxii; and Southall 2001: p. 557.
2^'

/

Collier 1995: pp.

1

16-1 18; van

Donge

writer will praise the president
“In this approach used mainly by the press in their editorials, the [..]
taking to task some government
seriously
time
for his supposed exemplary behaviour and at the same
official for failing to follow a policy directive issued

99

by him” (Lungu 1986:

p. 392).

Mail

9)232

to criticize the

government

government. Zambia’s churches were quite

critical

population control and education policies. Regarding the

s

of the

latter

they

objected quite strongly to the intention of the government to introduce
“scientific
socialism’’ or

result

Marxism

into the curriculum

of all Zambian educational

institutions.

As

a

of its large and labor-intensive copper-mining industry Zambia developed one of

Africa’s largest and most sophisticated trade union movements.^^^ In 1965 the

Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) was formed as an umbrella organization

Among the unions

affiliated unions.

(MUZ)

of Zambia

is

of Teachers (ZNUT)

the largest and

for 18

under the roof of ZCTU the Mineworker’s Union

most powerful one. The Zambian National Union

also quite influential. In 1974 Frederick Chiluba

is

Zambia

was

elected as

president of ZCTU. Despite efforts of the government to bring the trade unions under
control, they

managed

to maintain a high degree

its

of autonomy^^'^ and were one of the

most vocal

critics

Chiluba

frequently criticized government programs and policies, especially economic

policies, in

newspapers

up

like the

“Times of Zambia”

as well as protest rallies and

backed

with a number of strikes. During the 1970’s the organized labor

their criticism

movement grew

of the Zambian government. Trade union leaders such as Frederick

steadily

and by 1980

ZCTU had

380,000 members, which was almost

double UNIP’s paid membership. Besides the press, the churches and the trade unions

Banda 1997:

More

than

p. 13.

80%

of Zambia’s formal sector workers are organized

For instance, the
leaders

who

ZCTU

asserted

its

status as

an independent

in trade unions.

interest

group through the election of

declined to accept patronage posts offered by UNIP.

Chiluba was imprisoned for several month for resisting government attempts to control the
repeatedly
unions. He was released after a court ordered to government to do so. “Subsequently he
neutralize
to
attempted
Kaunda
President
rejected offers of a place on UNIP’s central committee as
In 198

1

him by co-optation” (Wiseman 1996:

pp. 44-45).
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also the students at the University of Zambia and
Zambia’s

Economics Club were
1984 Zambia

Law

Association and

quite critical of the government. For instance,
between 1971 and

students organized four large demonstrations against
government

s

corruption.^^^

6.2

Political Liberalization

While Zambia’s per capita income dropped from

by the end of the 1980s,
than

US

$7 billion

its

in 1990,

external debt rose from

US

US

$700

in

$623 million

1964
in

to

1970

US
to

$290

more

which made Zambia one of the world’s most heavily

indebted countries on a per capita basis.

A number of factors were responsible for these

negative economic developments such as the falling world market price for copper,

Zambia’s main source of export earnings, increasing

skewed against

government policies

agriculture, unrealistic exchange-rate policies, and the maintenance of

As

inefficient parastatals.

situation

oil prices,

had reached

a result of these developments

crisis

To

structural adjustment

policies Zambia’s

“economic

proportions [by the end of the 1980s] as the country

experienced massive food shortages,
social services”.

/

obtain

new

1

00 percent annual

loans President

programme (SAP)

of price controls and subsidies

,

in 1985.

inflation

Kaunda

and deteriorating

started to

“The programme

as well as the devaluation of the

Kwacha”.^^^ The removal of subsidies for Zambia’s main

staple,

implement an IMF

entailed the removal

Zambian currency
maize meal,

-

the

led to

See Gertzel 1984: pp. 79-117; Lungu 1986: pp. 389-409; Burdette 1988: pp. 95-132; Bratton 1992:
Bourgault 1995: p. 215; Wiseman
pp. 84-85; Bratton 1994: pp. 112-116; Wolbert 1994: pp. 30-32;
1996: pp. 44-45; Banda 1997: pp. 9-14; and Southall 2001:

White 1995:
Chikulo

/

p. 65.

Sichone 1996:

p. 3.
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p.

559.

food

riots

and labor unrest

government abandoned the
called the

in late

SAP

1986 and early 1987. Subsequently, the Zambian

in

May

1987

in

“New Economic Recovery Program”

favor of an indigenous alternative

under which subsidies and price

controls were restored. However, this program ran aground soon and

other choice than to return to the implementation of another
the context for a

dimension

new round of popular

protests in

in contrast to the foot riots in late

mid 1990

SAP

in

Kaunda had no

mid 1989. This

that took

on a

set

political

1986 and early 1987, which had been

focused basically on the price of maize meal.^^^

On

19 June 1990 the

Zambian government doubled

meet the IMF demand of subsidy cuts
riots

and looting

in

for basic food products. This led to three days of

Lusaka and nearby regional towns

Many protestors blamed Kaunda and UNIP
Zambia’s economic

crisis.

Mwamba Luchembe

On 30

the prize of maize meal to

which 26 people were

in

as well as the one-party system for

June 1990 a group of army officers around

Luchembe

Kaunda government had

burst into a radio station in Lusaka and announced that the

been overthrown. Minutes

underlined

Even so

later

thousands of Zambians were

of Lusaka

in the streets

the coup attempt quickly fizzled the reaction to

it

by

the public

how unpopular the Kaunda government was.^"^°

Influenced by the events in Eastern Europe in 1989 the

ZCTU

General Council

decided to spearhead a campaign for the restoration of the multiparty system

See

Lt.

attempted, unsuccessfully, to carry out a coup d’etat to protest

against the drastic food price increase. In the course of the attempted coup

celebrating.

killed.

Moma

1991: pp. 32-33; White 1995:

See Joseph 1992:

p. 199;

p. 67;

and Chikulo

/

Sichone 1996: pp. 2-3.

Bratton 1992: pp. 85-86; and Chikulo
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/

Sichone 1996:

p. 3.

in

Zambia

and

in early

Kaunda

to

1990 the chairman of ZCTU, Frederick Chiluba, called
upon President

hold a referendum on the reintroduction of the multiparty
system.

In July

1990 various opposition groups held a national conference and
formed the National
Interim Committee for Multiparty Democracy, which later on
for Multiparty

Democracy (MMD). The Committee was

became

the

Movement

a broad-based coalition

bringing together a wide variety of groups such as the trade unions, Zambia’s
business

community and
groups.

its

churches.

Its

members came from

The Committee was chaired by Arthur Wina,

Kaunda government. He was supported by two

Mwanga, who had served
was

in

all

charge of organization and operation and the

its

/

language

a former Finance Minister of the

deputies, Frederick Chiluba and

as Foreign Minister in the

During the months following

of Zambia’s ethnic

Vernon

Kaunda government. The former
latter

was

in charge

of publicity.

establishment the Committee organized several

opposition rallies in Lusaka and other major cities that brought together huge crowds

chanting the opposition slogan “The hour has come!”.^"*'
In April

1990 Kaunda gave his consent

to the opposition

demand

for holding a

referendum on the reintroduction of the multiparty system. However, as the year went

on

it

became

quite obvious from the

huge crowds

that turned

up

opposition rallies that such a referendum was not necessary as
quite clear. Consequently, leading

members of UNIP,

and Catholic bishops urged Kaunda

for the various

its

outcome was already

the National Interim

to introduce the multiparty

Committee

system without holding

a referendum and on 24 September 1990 he agreed to do so during a meeting of UNIP’s

See Bratton 1992:

p. 86;

and Chiluba 1995:

p. 63.
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National Council.
constitution

On

making

4 December 1990 Zambia’s parliament repealed
Article 4 of the

the reintroduction of the multiparty system possible.

The dramatic economic

decline during the 1980s together with the political

changes in Eastern Europe that were relatively well covered by the Zambian
media
played an important role in bringing about

hoping that the world market price
earnings,

would recover

the country one of the

the

eligible for

new

of maize meal, those in June

1

lot

of money making

capita basis. This

other choice than to implement various

staple,

1986 and in June 1990. While the

of the events

government borrowed a

loans from the IMF.

main

Zambia. While

Zambia’s main source of export

most heavily indebted countries on a per

cut subsidies for Zambia’s

result

for copper,

again, Zambia’s

Kaunda government with no

become

political liberalization in

Under

these

SAPs

maize meal, which led

riots in

December 1986 mainly focused on

The

to

government had

to foot riots in

990 took on a political dimension

in Eastern Europe.

the

SAPs

left

to

December
the price

at least partly as a

rioters identified the single-party

system as

the source for their and Zambia’s economic problems. Furthermore, because of the

economic decline the Kaunda government
groups.

As

a result

The opposition

many of them

to the

turned to the opposition in the hope for a better deal.

Kaunda government was spearheaded by the

are the core of Zambian civil society.

urbanization (just over

employment

in the

50%

in

Due

to

trade unions,

which

Zambia’s comparatively high degree of

1990) and the large concentration of formal industrial

Copperbelt Zambia has one of Africa’s strongest trade union

movements, which was able

See Bratton 1992:

lost its ability to dispense resources to client

p. 86;

to maintain a high degree

of autonomy during the 1970s

van Donge 1995b: pp. 200-201; and Chikulo

104

/

Sichone 1996:

p.4.

and 1980s. The large number of formal sector workers

that

were organized

trade unions could fairly easily be mobilized for political
action.

ones that were particularly negatively impacted by the subsidy
leaders of the

the

Zambia’s

also the

This enabled the

cuts.

MMD to organize various large rallies against the Kaunda government in

Lusaka and other urban centers forcing
system.

They were

in

The existence of a

to allow the reintroduction

it

strong trade union

movement

Kaunda regime enabled Zambia’s opposition

that could

of the multiparty

be mobilized against

to bring about political liberalization

without Zambia’s donors having to impose explicit political conditionalities. However,
the

economic conditionalities they imposed

delegitimatization of the

in the context

Kaunda government and enabled

of S APs contributed

to the

opposition leaders to

mobilize the urban population against the one-party system.^'^^

6.3

Democratic Transition

/

Democratization

In chapter 6.3 the democratic transition

/

democratization in Zambia will be

analyzed. First, the formation of major opposition parties will be analyzed. Second, the
constitutional changes that took place prior to the 1991 elections will be examined.

Third, the 1991 elections will be looked

to

at.

and the 1996 elections will be analyzed.

Fourth, major political developments prior

Fifth,

major

political

and the 2001 elections will be examined.

See Baylies

/

Szeftel 1992: pp. 79-81; and

White 1995: pp. 66-69.
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developments prior

to

6.3.1

The Formation

On
was

of Opposition Parties

4 January 1991 the National Interim Committee

officially registered as a political party

Democracy (MMD). Subsequently

for Multiparty

under the name Movement for Multiparty

other political

parties^'''^

were registered

MMD posed a significant challenge to UNIP in the 1991

However, only

Therefore the following remarks will be limited to
Prior to the 1991 elections the

Democracy

as well.

elections.

MMD.

MMD could be viewed as a broad “temporary

coalition of trade unionists, ex-politicians, professionals, students, intellectuals,

businessmen, commercial farmers and religious

namely, to replace the Kaunda government. In early 1991 various
resigned from their posts and joined the

common

had one

leaders’’^'^^ that

UNIP

goal,

politicians

MMD. At the same time the Zambian Congress

of Trade Unions (ZCTU) as well as Zambia’s largest single union, the Mineworkers

Union of Zambia (MUZ), declared
unions enabled

their support for the

established party and towns “served

by

Zambia became

MMD’s

first

March 1991. During
was

convention

district capitals,

became major organizing

Among the

newly

and

all

centers for the

for the

upcoming

four candidates Frederick Chiluba received 683 votes.

Alliance

p. 68.

Ihonvbere 1996:

over the country. For

MMD’s presidential candidate

Some of them were the National Democratic
(NDP) and the Democratic Party (DP).
White 1995:

and

trade

national convention took place in Lusaka from 27 February to 2

this

elected.

all

recruiting centers for the

railroads, provincial

public institutions with trade-union branches

elections

The support of the

MMD to quickly establish a party infrastructure

instance, trade union offices throughout

MMO”.^"*^

MMD.

p. 117.
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(NAD A),

the National Party for

Democracy

while

MMD’s

interim chairman, Arthur Wina, only received
208 votes.^""

MMD were not too happy with the fact that a trade unionist was

people within the
elected as

MMD

MMD could
for

The business

s presidential

split.

candidate and there was an immanent danger that the

However, Wina himself stressed the need

winning the upcoming

elections.

By doing

for unity as a precondition

so he helped to prevent a split of MMD.

Besides the party’s presidential candidate the national convention also elected
a
National Executive and a shadow cabinet. Except for the Eastern Province, which
was a

UNIP

stronghold, individuals from

election indicated the

support”, “it

6.3.2

MMD’s determination to

Patrick

look beyond

its elite

as an organisation led

by

core for national

the relatively

garnered broad-based support out of broad-based discontent”.^"**

Constitutional and Electoral Reforms
In early 1991 the

draft a

other provinces were elected. While “Chiluba’s

was not so much a mass party

who

privileged,

all

new

Kaunda government appointed

constitution for the Third Republic.

The Commission was chaired by

Mvunga. “Members of the Mvunga commission

soliciting advice

seats

to the strongly

on the commission, refused

pro-UNIP character of the

June 1991 the Constitutional Commission submitted

Dr.

travelled throughout Zambia,

from business, community and government

was offered two of the 23
and objected

a Constitutional Commission to

leaders.

The

MMD, which

to participate in this process

individuals consulted”.^"*^ In

its

report.

Among its

The other two candidates were Edward Jack Shamwana and Humphrey Mulemba. Shamwana
received a dismal 24 votes, while

Baylies
pp. 5-6;

/

Mulemba

got 168.

Szeftel 1992: p. 85 and p. 86. See also Africa Confidential, Vol. 32, No. 5 (8

and Wolbert 1994:

p. 49.

National Democratic Institute

/

Carter Center 1992: p. 28.
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March

1991),

recommendations were the creation of the post of vice-president,
the expansion of the
National Assembly from 135 to 150 seats, the establishment
of a constitutional court,

and the establishment of a bicameral system of parliament.
The
constitution proposed

by the Commission and threatened

elections if the National

Assembly

to boycott the

little

the draft constitution the president

was

upcoming

recommendations of the Commission.

ratified the

MMD opposed the draft constitution of the Commission, since
authority in the president and too

MM D rejected the draft

in the National

it

much

vested too

Assembly. For instance, under

able to choose cabinet ministers from outside the

National Assembly and he could unilaterally dissolve the National Assembly as well
as
veto

its

legislation.

Anglican church

As
a

a result of mediation efforts

compromise was reached on

by university
3

1

.luly

1991.

only members of the National Assembly could be appointed
presidential

state

power of declaring

material law

of emergency beyond seven days was

students^^® and the

Under

this

compromise

to the cabinet, the

was abandoned, and “any imposition of a

to

be approved by the National

“In an effort to promote compromise during debate over the proposed constitution, university
students organized a one-day convention in Lusaka on July 19, 1991. Representatives of nine
political parties, including President

Kaunda and

MMD President Chiluba, attended the convention.

in Kaunda’s agreement to meet with
opponents of the proposed constitution during the following weekend before parliament reconvened”
(National Democratic Institute / Carter Center 1992: p. 28).

Although the atmosphere was

“On Tuesday,

July 23,

strained, the

meeting resulted

Kaunda and Chiluba met one-on-one,

election as leader of the

MMD,

for the first time since Chiluba’s

to discuss constitutional issues. In the meeting,

which was held

Anglican Cathedral and chaired by Bishop Stephan Mumba, Kaunda and Chiluba agreed
the National

Assembly would continue

to consider the constitution,

consultations with other parties about possible amendments.

The

more time would be allowed

108

for

meeting substantially eased tensions

and made possible a compromise on the constitution” (National Democratic
1992: p. 29).

at the

that while

Institute

/

Carter Center

Assembly
1991

The National Assembly adopted

.

the

new

constitution

on 24 August

253

On 24 August
Under

this

Act the

1991 the National Assembly also adopted a

size

revised and re-drawn”.^^^ This

new

Electoral Act.

of the National Assembly was increased from 125

order to take into account the resultant 25

the 25

new

electoral districts

new

was done by

was biased

seats, constituency

the Electoral

in favor

to 150^^'*. “In

boundaries had to be

Commission. The creation of

of rural constituencies where UNIP’s

support was thought to be strongest. Furthermore the number of registered voters
per
constituency varied between 6,376 and 70,379. These variations again favored voters
rural constituencies. After

observers. President

he

Kaunda

opposed neutral external and

initially

finally agreed to

international bodies

and emerging

were scheduled

October 1991.^^*

for 31

Ihonvbere 1996:

in

internal electoral

such observers from established

local civic groups

prior to the elections that

p. 118.

See Bratton 1992: pp. 87-88; National Democratic Institute / Carter Center 1992: pp. 28-29; van
pp. 201-202; Mbao 1996: pp. 9-23; and Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 118-1 19.

Donge 1995b:

In addition to 150 constituency

member
by

members

that

were elected on

a first-past-the-post basis in single-

constituencies with a simple majority (plurality), the National Assembly was supplemented

eight nominated members.

Chikulo 1996:p. 26.
International observers were sent

Commonwealth and
25^

by

the Carter Center and the National Democratic Institute, the

the Organization of African Unity

(OAU).

were established locally to conduct pollwatching: the Zambia Independent
an association of professionals; and the Zambia Election Monitoring
Coordinating Committee (ZEMCC), a broad coalition of organizations representing churches,
students, women, layers, journalists and nongovernmental development agencies” (Bratton 1992: p.

“Two new

civic groups

Monitoring

Team (ZIMT),

94, footnote 9).

See Bratton 1992: pp. 88-89; Bjomlund

/

Bratton

/

25-26.
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Gibson 1992: pp. 413-417; and Chikulo 1996:

pp.

6.3.3

The 1991

Elections

One of the most

striking features of the electoral

campaign prior

on 31 October 1991 was the almost complete absence of
issue-based
debates

among

the

economic

they intended to solve Zambia’s severe socio-

crisis if elected. “Surprisingly, not

promote workers’
a panacea for

and

how

all

interest

by influencing

problems, or

issue-oriented

MMD and UNIP. None of them provided the

two main contenders,

voters with a clear perspective on

/

at least as

even the

ZCTU

showed any need

to

MMD policy. The defeat of UNIP was seen as

a

step towards their solution’’.^^^ Chiluba

first

MMD blamed the Kaunda government for the bad shape of Zambia’s economy^^®

without offering any substantive ideas on what policies were necessary

economy

their party cohorts

mainly used inflammatory rhetoric and exchanged

wild accusations while on the campaign
plotting an

armed

trail.

For instance, Kaunda claimed

revolt with the support of army officers and the

leader Jonas Savimbi in case of defeat, while Chiluba claimed that

harboring a secret

commando

peacekeeping force

While
attended

to turn the

around. Rather than focusing on key issues the two main contenders Chiluba

and Kaunda and

was

to the elections

Malawi and

unit in

to supervise elections

MMD’s campaign

and the

UNIP’s campaign focused mainly on

Angolan

rebel

“UNIP was

called for an international

transition”.

mainly focused on urban areas where

by huge crowds of people who were

MMD

that

fed up with the

its rallies

were

Kaunda government,

rural areas. In an attempt to increase its support in

Chikulo 1996:p. 26.

For instance,

in its

media campaign

the

MMD drew attention to the decline of the public service and

the bad shape of the country’s infrastmcture by showing pictures ofpotholed highways.

Bratton 1994:

p. 120.

See also Wolbert 1994:

p. 50;

no

and van Donge 1995b: pp. 204-208.

rural areas

UNIP

tried to please

Zambia’s 280 hereditary chiefs

various ways. For

in

were included among UNIP’s parliamentary candidates
and they were

instance, they

offered positions in the government and the party.
Furthermore, the salaries of
traditional rulers

were increased and

wheel drive vehicles

in 1991 the

UNIP government

to senior chiefs, notably in the Eastern Province.
In another

attempt to gain an advantage in the 1991 elections Kaunda
waited
until

he

finally

embarked on

which was

institutions,

distributed four-

a process of “de-linking”

September 1991

until

UNIP from government

carried out quite halfheartedly. This enabled

UNIP

candidates to

continue to take advantage of the blurred distinction between their party and the
Kaunda

government

to aid their

campaigns. For instance, “government offices were used as

campaign headquarters and were often plastered with UNIP campaign

materials, and

both government and party officials running for parliamentary seats were seen driving

government vehicles on the campaign

trail”.^^^

While the

print

media provided a

fairly

balanced coverage of the campaign, the reporting of the government-controlled

Zambian National Broadcasting Company (ZNBC) was biased
UNIP. However, during

the

campaign

ZNBC’s news
was forced

of Kaunda and

MMD won various court cases that helped to

level the playing field to a certain extent.

the director-general of ZNBC,

in favor

For instance, they

who was biased

won

an injunction barring

towards UNIP, from supervising

reporting until after the elections and in another court injunction

to air

MMD campaign spots.

Bjomlund / Bratton / Gibson 1992:

p.

ZNBC

263

418.

1991: pp. 45-48; Novicki 1992: pp. 13-17; Bjomlund / Bratton / Gibson 1992: pp. 413-420;
Bratton 1992: pp. 89-91; Bratton 1994: pp. 117-122; Bourgault 1995: pp. 217-218; van Donge
1995b: pp. 202-208; and Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 120-124.

See

Ham

Ill

The parliamentary and
overwhelming victory

for the

presidential elections

MMD and

its

75.8% of the votes

only received 24.2%. In the parliamentary elections
while

UNEP won

UNIP
25.

received 24.7%. In seats

The

tables in

high in

all

since

was Kaunda’ s home

it

Appendices

in

cast,

while Kaunda

MMD received 74.3% of the votes

MMD won 125, more than two thirds, while

V

and

W show that MMD’s support was quite

provinces except the Eastern Province, which remained a
base. Chiluba’ s and

MMD’s

Copperbelt, which reflects Chiluba’ s strong support

UNIP

stronghold,

support was strongest in the

among

mine workers who were

the

most severely effected by the economic

decline. Except for the Eastern Province,

“MMD’s

and urban, and did

was widespread,

support

Many Zambians,

rural

cut across ethnic groups’’.^^'*

regardless where they lived or what etlinic group they belonged

wanted change. They hoped

that

an

presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba.

In the presidential elections Chiluba received

cast,

on 31 October 1991 resulted

removing Kaunda from

office

would remove

problems. However, they soon found out that this was not the case as will be

to,

all their

illustrated

below.^^^

6.3.4

The 1996

Elections

Chiluba’s cabinet appointments after the 1991 election gave proof of the

dominant position of businessmen within the

member

cabinet were businessmen, only two

Furthermore,

at least

Ihonvbere 1996:

half of his ministers

MMD.

While

came from

came from

his

at least thirteen

the trade union

own

movement.

ethnic group, the

p. 125.

951 and 958.
See Ihonvbere 1996: pp. 124-125; and Krennerich 1999: pp.

112

of the 24-

Bemba.

The dominant
soon led

position of Bemba-speaking businessmen within the
Chiluba government

to tensions within the

intellectuals

MMD.

In April

1992 a group of politicians and

mainly from the Southern and Western provinces formed the Caucus

National Unity

(CNU)

within the

MMD to protest against the dominant position of

businessmen from the Luapula and Northern provinces within the government.

March 1993 Chiluba declared

In early

a state of emergency following the discovery of UNIP

documents detailing an alleged conspiracy
civil

for

to destabilize the

government by

inciting

disobedience and unrest capitalizing on the rapidly deteriorating economic

situation,

which was caused mainly by the government’s rigorous implementation of

SAPs.

Subsequently a number of prominent

three sons,

MPs were

were arrested and detained without
opposed

overreaction

by

to the declaration

of a

state

UNIP members,

including Kaunda’s

charges.^^^ Various ministers and

MMD

of emergency, which they viewed as an

the government and a threat to Zambia’s fledgling democracy. In

response to the declaration of a state of emergency and allegations of corruption and

drug trafficking against members of the Chiluba government various high ranking
politicians left the

their

own

government and the

political parties.

MMD in 1993 and subsequent years and formed

For instance, the

first

Minister of Legal Affairs of the

MMD

government, Rodger Chongwe, formed the Liberal Progressive Front (LPF). Guy

who had been
Party

Scott,

Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries founded the National Lima

(NLP) together with

the head of the

Zambia National Farmers Union, Ben

Kapita.

The head of the National Party (NP), Humphrey Mulemba, had been Minister of Mines

induced subsidy cuts the price for basic food staples such as maize meal increased
workers unemployed.
drastically. Public sector retrenchment and privatization left thousands of

As

a result of

SAP

113

and Mineral Development, while the head of the
Agenda

for

Zambia (AZ),

Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, had been Minister of
Science, Technology
Education and Vocational Training in the Chiluba
government. Finally, the leaders of
the

Zambia Democratic Congress (ZDC), Dean Mung’omba and
Derick

an important role in the founding of the

Chitala, played

MMD and had been Deputy Ministers in the

Chiluba govemment.^^^

On

9

December 1993 Chiluba appointed

a

25-member

Constitutional

Review

Commission, which was chaired by John Mwanakatwe. The Mwanakatwe
Commission
received and reviewed submissions from individuals, civic organizations
and political
parties

from

released

powers

its

all

over the country.^^^ In June 1995 the Mwanakatwe Commission

report and a draft constitution.

in the

presidency and

still

“The

draft constitution

still

vested executive

provided for the election of the president by direct

popular vote. But Article 82 (1) stated that a person would qualify to be a presidential
candidate

if (a)

were Zambian
person

who

he or she was a citizen of Zambia
citizens

bom

in

Zambia;

[...].

bom

in

Zambia;

(b) his or her parents

Secondly, Article 82 (2) stated that a

has been elected twice previously would not qualify as a presidential

candidate”.^^®

The main motivation beyond

these provisions, which were submitted to

For a detailed account of this conspiracy, which became known as “Zero Option” see Ihonvbere
1996: pp. 224-245.

See Ham 1993: pp. 31-33; Baylies / Szeftel 1997: pp.
Mthembu-Salter 2001: pp. 1108-1109.
269

Commission agreed

that in order to reach as

1

15-1 16; Bartlett 2000: pp. 441-443; and

many people

as possible,

it

should cover provincial

The
Commission travelled extensively throughout Zambia between March and September 1994, and
conducted 46 public sittings in all nine provinces which attracted a total of 996 petitioners” (CCC
centers and selected districts as well as other areas with a concentration of population.

1996: p. 16).

Mphaisha 1996:

p. 69.
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the

Mwanakalwc Commission by

Kaunda

the

MMD,

was

to bar

former President Kenneth

whose parents were from Malawi and who already had been

president for 27

years from beeoming UNIP’s presidential eandidate for the 1996 elections.

Furthermore,

in the draft constitution the

Mwanakatwe Commission removed

the

requirement for police permits for the holding of meetings and included provisions

enhanced the freedom of the

recommended
that

its

report the

Mwanakatwe Commission

that the draft constitution should be adopted

would be more representative than

the

constitution

was not

by a Constituent Assembly

MMD-dominated

of this recommendation the Zambian public expected

light

this

press. In

National Assembly. In the

Television to cancel scheduled discussions of the draft constitution

Mwanakatwe
enhancements

Report. In

in the

it

the

proposed

Bill

virtually rejected all

new

rights

and

presidential candidates. Furthermore, the Chiluba

that the

Constituent Assembly and a national referendum.

October 1994 Kaunda announced
for the

at short noticc.^^^ In

of Rights, while accepting the controversial

government rejected the recommendation

Kebby Musokotwana

ZNBC-

White Paper on the

finally released its

government

recommendations regarding the

On 29

debate. However,

of the Chiluba government, which instructed the

September 1995 the Chiluba government

of the new

that the adoption

would be preceded by broad-based public discussion and
in the interest

that

UNIP

new
It

constitution be adopted

a

argued that the new constitution

his return to active politics

presidency.

by

Many of his

rallies

and

drew

in

May

1995 he defeated

large crowds.

newspapers, some non“The procrastination of the government did not deter privately owned
draft constitution. The Law
the
on
commenting
governmental organisations and civic leaders from
Legal Resources
the
and
Association
Education
Association of Zambia, the Zambia Civic
debate and went ahead
public
stifie
to
attempts
government
Foundation, for example, defied subtle
1996: p. 70). In
(Mphaisha
constitution”
new
on
the
workshops
with holding public seminars and
a document
in a ten-day Citizen’s Convention produced

March 1996, members of the civil society
known as the Green Paper, which was a reaction

Government White Paper and represented
Unfortunately the Government chose to ignore

to the

the citizens’ contributions to the Constitution debate.
the Green Paper” (CCC 1996: pp. 17-18).

should be adopted by the National Assembly. The reason behind

wanted

to avoid the option

this

was

that

“Chiluba

of a Constituent Assembly, coupled with the holding of a

national referendum, to ensure that constitutional clauses were retained
that restricted
qualifications for presidential candidates.

He

believed that

UNIP

stood no chance of

regaining power without Kaunda.

As

promoted only

did not jeopardise his presidency”.^"^^ Consequently,

on 28

May

to the extent that

1996 the National Assembly,

adopted a Constitution
preventing

Kaunda and

from standing

announced

in the

that they

The
gave

rise to

issue

was

Electoral

it

such, he

Amendment

in

which the

Bill that

democratisation should be

felt that

MMD had a two-thirds majority,

mainly contained provisions aimed

at

his vice presidential running mate. Senior Chief Inyambo Yeta,

1996

elections. In response

would boycott

constitutional

UNIP

and

six smaller parties

the 1996 elections.^^"^

amendments described above were not

controversy prior to the elections on 18

November

the only issue that

1996. Another such

the voter registration process. Rather than providing appropriate funds to the

Commission

Computers

the

MMD government contracted an Israeli company (Nikuv

Ltd.) to carry out the voter registration.

By the end of the

voter registration

period only 2.3 million voters had been registered out of approximately 3.8 million

eligible voters.

among

Cumbersome

procedural requirements and inadequate publicity were

the reasons for this disappointing result. Furthermore, the process itself was

of problems. For instance, thousands of names were omitted from the
the

same time thousands of other

Mphaisha 1996:

full

register while at

individuals received duplicate registration cards. This

p. 71.

See Mphaisha 1996: pp. 68-72; Bratton
Mphaisha 2000: pp. 134-135.

/

Posner 1999: pp. 392-395; Reynolds 1999:

116

p. 154;

and

led various opposition parties to

demand

that “the entire registration exercise
be

scrapped and that citizens over the age of 18 be permitted to vote
with

However, the government refused these demands.”^

registration cards”.^”^^

Just about four

sworn

in.

All

its

five

compromised the

their national

weeks

prior to the elections a

members were

ability

either

new

Electoral

Commission was

MMD members or pro MMD. This seriously

of the Commission

to ensure that there

would be a

level

playing field prior to the elections. The campaign coverage of the governmentcontrolled

media was

clearly biased in favor of the

MMD.

“Times of Zambia” allocated 88.15% of its news coverage
opposition parties combined shared the rest

newspapers such as “The Posf’
the election exercise

to the

MMD, while

four

themselves. In addition, independent

that “published articles or editorials critical of the

was being conducted faced harassment by

way

MMD supporters or the

Besides taking advantage of its control over the Zambia National Broadcast

police”.

Cooperation

(ZNBC) and two major newspapers

vehicles and equipment of the

Furthermore,

it

distributed

support in urban areas.

/

CCC

Bratton

/

Posner 1999:

On top

p.

of this

p.

for

it

campaign purposes.
fertilizer to attract

sold council houses at bargain prices to win

MMD campaigners threatened the withdrawal of
that

would

elect opposition candidates to the

395.

1996: pp. 45-52; Bratton

Posner 1999:

MMD also used government

development funds, maize meal and

development funding from constituencies

Bratton

the

Zambia Information Service

supporters in rural constituencies, while

See

among

For instance the newspaper

/

Posner 1999: pp. 394-395; and Mphaisha 2000: pp.132-133.

397.
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National Assembly. Finally, like in 1991 policy issues were almost
completely absent

from the campaign.^^*
Despite the fact that various local monitoring organizations^^*^ as well as

donors

expressed serious concerns about deficiencies and irregularities

registration, the constitutional provisions limiting participation,

the Electoral

Commission

presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba,

challenger.

MMD and

emerged victorious from

(87%)

AZ two

Appendices

the 1996 elections.

vote. In the

MMD received 61.0% of the vote, while ZDC received 13.8%

in the National

five seats (3%),

its

Chiluba received 72.6% of the vote, while his main

of the vote. However, because of the first-past-the-post

tables in

1991

in

Dean Mung’omba of the ZDC, received 12.7% of the

parliamentary elections

seats

and the inadequacies of

the Chiluba government went ahead and held parliamentary

and presidential elections on 18 November 1996. Like

In the presidential contest

in voter

X

Assembly, while

ZDC

only

electoral system

won two

seats (1%).

(1%) and independent candidates won 10
and

Y show that support

for Chiluba

MMD won

NP won

seats (7%).^*'

and the

The

MMD varied

considerably across Zambia’s nine provinces. While support for Chiluba and the

was

strongest in the Copperbelt and Chiluba’s

home

province, Luapula,

Western and North-Western provinces.

less strong in the

131

it

MMD

was much

Among the major opposition

Donge
1996; pp. 32-33 and 41-44; Banda 1997; pp. 24-63; Phiri 1999; pp. 58-60; van
Bartlett 2001; pp. 87-89.
and
396-397;
Posner
1999;
Bratton
/
pp.
97-99;
and
84
1998; pp.

See

CCC

were the Forum for a Democratic Process (FODEP), the
Campaign (CCC).
Zambia Independent Monitoring Team (ZIMT) and the Committee for a Clean

These

By

the

local monitoring organizations

end of March

their actions to
relief,

1

996 Norway and

the

UK suspended balance of payments support. They linked

withheld debt
concerns about constitutional changes. Subsequently also Denmark

Germany

froze a portion of its aid to

Zambia and

the

US

announced

a

10%

cut in aid.

MMD members who were not adopted by their party

“The majority of successful independents were
and former UNIP members who defied their party’s

118

call for a

boycott” (Reynolds 1999;

p. 158).

parties only

ZDC

mainly limited

did relatively well countrywide. The support of the other parties was

to certain provinces.

the North-Western Province, while

Province.

the

Compared with

Zambian party system

it

AZ’s support was mainly

limited to the Western

to

become

less

dominated by just one

Assembly

in the National

party.

only received 61.0% of the vote

in

of parliamentary candidates

of voter decision-making as party

1996 compared with 74.3%

Zambian

58%

in

affiliation”.^*^ Finally,

1996 compared with about

45%

in 1991,

may have been

voters to

still

only

•

The 2001

On

as

much

a part

while voter turnout reached

voting age population had participated in the 1996 elections.

6.3.5

MMD

vote between the presidential and the parliamentary contest, which suggests

that “the individual qualities

about

While

as a result of the first-past-the-

in 1991 in the parliamentary elections. This reveals a tendency of

split their

to

the 1991 elections, the 1996 elections revealed a tendency for

became even more dominant
post electoral system,

For instance, NP’s support was limited mainly

33%

of Zambia’s

283

Elections

28 October 1997 rebel

officers, led

by Capt. Stephen Lungu, captured

the

national television and radio station in Lusaka from where they announced the

formation of a military regime. The officers

Redemption Council claimed
the country in

that they

who

called themselves the National

“had been motivated by the chaotic situation of

which crime and corruption were rampant’

suppressed within a few hours by loyal military units

Bratton

/

Posner 1999;

p.

who

The attempted coup was
dislodged the insurgents from

398.

75-78; Branon /
See Burnell 1997: pp. 409-41 1; von Donge 1998: pp.
and Burnell 2001; pp. 248-249.
946-958;
1999:
pp.
Krennerich
Reynolds 1999: pp. 158-159;
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the broadcast station and the State House. In response to the failed coup the Chiluba

government declared a
detain people without

state

trial for

people, mostly soldiers

among

the arrested

of emergency on 29 October 1997, which enabled

it

was

Upon his

to

28 days. Subsequently the government arrested 84

suspected to be involved with the failed coup. However,

also the leader of the opposition

(ZDC), Dean Mung’omba, who was tortured while
accounts.

it

Zambian Democratic Congress

in detention

according the credible

return from South Africa also the leader of UNIP and former

President,

Kenneth Kaunda, was

in central

Zambia on 25 December 1997. He was accused of having helped

arrested and imprisoned in a maximum-security goal

to plan

and

finance the attempted coup. In response to international criticism and an intervention by
the former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere,

home where he was

Kaunda was

placed under house arrest in January 1998. Following donor

pressure Chiluba lifted the state of emergency on 17

charges against
In

(UPND).

Kaunda were dropped due

to a lack

March 1998. On

political party, called the

1

June 1998 the

of evidence.

December 1998 businessman and former MMD

founded a new

transferred to his Lusaka

official,

Anderson Mazoka,

United Party for National Development

UPND managed to win 30 seats during local government elections on 30

December 1998. On

3

May

1999

it

was announced

pressure group^^^ would merge and form a

Cornwell 1997:

p.

new

that six opposition parties

political party, called the

and a

Zambia

224.

Vol. 39, No. 6 (20 March 1998),
See Cornwell 1997: pp. 224-225; Africa Confidential,
1110.
2001: pp. 561-562; and Mthembu-Salter 2001: p.

p. 3; Southall

the Liberal Progressive
were the Agenda for Zambia (AZ), the Labour Party,
National Citizen’s Coalition and the Zambia
Front (LPF), the National Lima Party (NLP), the
Masebo’s National Pressure Group.
Democratic Congress (ZDC). The press group was Sylvia

The opposition

parties
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Alliance for Progress (ZAP). Both parties were mainly
supported by

MMD dissidents

but failed to agree on a merger mainly due to personal differences.^*”^
In

2000 and 2001 various high ranking

expelled as a result of a struggle over

MMD politicians

who would become MMD’s

candidate for the 2001 elections. Subsequently they formed their
In July

the party or were

left

presidential

own

political parties.

2000 the former Minister of Energy and Water Development, Benjamin Y.

Mwaila, was expelled from the

MMD after he had declared his intention to contest the

presidency in 2001 Later on more than 1,000
.

Mwaila,

who

in

ZAP, becoming

August 2000 founded the Republican
the

Party,

which

Zambia Republican Party (ZRP). Towards

increasing numbers of

Constitution,

MMD members resigned in support of
later

on merged with

the end of

2000

MMD cadres began calling for an amendment to the 1996

which limited the time

in office

of Zambia’s president

to

two terms,

to

allow Chiluba to stand for a third term in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections.

However,

in early

2001 various prominent

including the trade unions, the churches, the

many

Law

civil society organizations,

Association of Zambia (LAZ) and

smaller bodies, joined forces in opposing a third term for Chiluba and established

the anti-third term Oasis

Forum, which organized protest

rallies in

every major town.

Scores of people wore green ribbons to show that they were against a third term of

Chiluba and every Friday

at

around 5 p.m. motorists,

hooted and blew whistles for several minutes
aspirations. In

mid April 2001 50

and pedestrians honked,

to protest against Chiluba’ s third term

MMD deputies, including 21 ministers, signed a

petition opposing Chiluba’ s bid for a third term.

See Africa Confidential, Vol. 40, No.

No. 8(14 April 2000), pp.

cyclists

1 1

(28

May

On

2

May 2001

Chiluba dismissed

all

1999), pp. 3-4; and Africa Confidential, Vol. 41,

5-6.
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those

members from

his cabinet

who had

signed the petition, including Vice-President

Christon Tembo, and had them expelled from the
the

Forum

for

May 2002

5

left

open the

Subsequently

Tembo founded

Democracy and Development (FDD), while former Education

Godfrey Miyanda, established another

On

MMD.

Chiluba announced on

possibility

Minister,

political party, called the Heritage Party (HP).

TV that he would not seek a third term, but he

of holding a referendum on amending the constitution

allow

to

presidents to run for a third term. In late August 2001 Chiluba announced
that Levy

Mwanawasa would be his
subsequently

as

MMD’s

to

37-member National Executive Committee (NEC) nominated him

MMD’s presidential

Sata, resigned out

form his

On
Zambia.

favored candidate for the upcoming elections and

candidate. In response

Secretary, Michael

of protest against Mwanawasa’ s nomination and

own political

later left the

27 December 2001 presidential and parliamentary elections took place

No

less than eleven parties

nominated candidates

digit results.

29.15% of the vote and was

majority was sufficient for

that.

The

The

UNIP’s

in

for the presidential elections.

MMD candidate. Levy Mwanawasa,

elected as Zambia’s

new

President, since a simple

UPND candidate, Anderson Mazoka,

second with 27.2% of the vote. FDD’s candidate, Christon Tembo, came

finished

in third

with

candidate, Tilyenji Kaunda, finished fourth with

13.17% of the

vote, while

10.12% of the

vote. In the parliamentary elections

150.

MMD

party, called Patriotic Front (PF).^^*

Out of them four received double
received

MMD’s National

UPND won 49 seats (32.67%), UNIP won

MMD won 69 seats (46%) out of

13 seats (8.67%),

FDD won

12 seats

Analysis,
See Chisupa 2001: pp. 5-8; Kunda 2001: pp. 14-16; Mthembu-Salter 2001: p. \\\1\ Africa
3-4;
September
2001),
pp.
No.
(14
Vol.
18
Confidential,
42,
No. 367 (9 March 2001), p.l3; Africa
4-6.
October
p.
2001),
and Africa Confidential, Vol. 42, No. 21 (26
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(8%) and

HP won 4

PF and ZRP won one

seats (2.67%).

seat

(0.67%) each and one

independent candidate was elected to the National Assembly as
well. With more than

70% the

voter turnout

the voters had voted.

In contrast to the

2001 elections

in

1996 when only about

elections

were monitored by

of

local observers, the

international observers as

were monitored by the Carter Center

entities

59%

55% of eligible Zambians were registered to vote.

1996 elections, which were only monitored by

Union (EU). Both
prior,

However, only

like the 1991 elections

The 2001

well.

was considerably higher than

as well as the

European

expressed serious concerns about irregularities that occurred

EU Electoral

during and after the elections. The

Observation Mission^*^ pointed

out that the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ) failed to enforce a level playing
field

during the electoral campaign. For instance, the state-owned print and broadcast

media

clearly favored the

MMD in their campaign reporting.^^° Furthermore, state

resources such as government vehicles were used in

MMD campaigns. The EU

observers also noted numerous logistical problems during the polling period. For

instance, ballot

boxes and papers arrived

late at

various polling stations and the

ECZ

assigned the same number of polling staff to each polling station regardless of whether

it

had

to

cope with 400 or 4,000 voters, which caused long delays mainly

polling stations and as a result not

the

all

voters

EU observes pointed out that the official

on 16 January 2002, “cannot be

The

EU

relied

upon

who wanted
results,

to vote could

do

at

urban

so. Finally,

which were published by the

as an accurate record of the voting

ECZ

on 27-31

sent sixteen long term observers and eighty-six short term observers to Zambia.

live debate
This was most evident when ZNBC cancelled a long planned and carefully organized
long interview with
hour
an
transmit
order
to
poll
in
the
of
eve
on
the
candidates
presidential
with the
and its
of the
President Chiluba, which was an obvious campaign broadcast on behalf

MMD

presidential candidate.

By doing

so

ZNBC

disobeyed a High Court order instructing

debate.
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it

to transmit the

December

2001”.^^' According to the final
statement of the

EU

observer mission

twenty-two constituencies showed a difference of 900 votes
or more regarding the votes
that

were

cast in the presidential and in the parliamentary
elections and in 83 of the 150

constituencies no invalid ballots were recorded at

outcome of the

presidential contest between

all.

Mwanawasa and Mazoka,

shortcomings on polling day and the serious flaws
procedures the

EU

in the

the logistical

counting and tabulation

observers concluded that they were “not confident that the declared

results represent the

6.3.6

Considering the extremely close

wishes of the Zambian electors on polling day”.^’^

Summary
The

clear victory of Chiluba and the

MMD in the

attributed at least partly to the following factors.

Many

economic decline and the high unemployment upon
that voting

him out of office would be

a

first

decline. Furthermore, because of the copper

1991 elections can be

voters

the

blamed Zambia’s

Kaunda government and hoped

step towards reversing the

mines Zambia has one of Africa’s highest

degrees of urbanization which facilitated the development of a

movement

that

managed

to

economic

fairly large trade

union

maintain a high degree of autonomy prior to the onset of the

democratization process. The support of the trade unions enabled the

MMD to use their

well-established organizational framework to quickly establish an efficient and effective

infrastructure throughout the country. Finally,

MMD was an inclusive coalition that

brought together urban and rural dwellers, mine workers, the unemployed, businessmen,

Elections Observation Mission, Final Statement on the Zambian Elections 2001, 5 February
2002, p. 3 (This statement is available at: http://www.eueu-Zambia.org).

EU
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academics, students and

MMD’s
1991.

ability to

MMD’s

all

of Zambia’s regions and ethnic groups.

to the fact that

in

its

MMD brought together so many different groups

predominant position eroded slowly during the course of the

was already evident

to a certain extent in the

1996 parliamentary elections

MMD received 61.0% of the votes compared with 1991

of the votes. Chiluba’s intention
catalytic effect

leading

overwhelming victory

to its

large victory in 1991 led to the creation of a
predominant party system.

with different interests

when

from

remain united significantly contributed

However, mainly due

1990s. This

civil servants

when

to stand for a third term in the

on the erosion of MMD’s dominant

position. In

it

received

74.3%

2001 elections had a

2000 and 2001 various

MMD politicians opposed Chiluba’s bid for a third term some out of principle

and some out of self-interest, since they wanted
a result most of them were expelled from the

established their

own

parties.

managed

to

president.

As

MMD by Chiluba and subsequently they

established the Heritage Party (HP) and the

Democracy and Development (FDD)
its

become Zambia’s next

For instance, the two former Vice-Presidents, Godfrey

Miyanda and Christon Tembo,

MMD lost

to

respectively.

As

at least

for

a result of the 2001 elections

predominant position completely. However,

win with 29.15% of the vote

Forum

its

presidential candidate

according the official

still

results, the

accuracy of which has been called into question by local and international observers,

mainly because the opposition was too fragmented and could not agree on a common
candiddate.

EU

The fragmentation of the opposition can mainly be

Elections Observation Mission, Final Statement on the

attributed to personal

Zambian Elections 2001,

5

Febmary

of the Electoral
2002, p.4. The official results of the 2001 Elections are available on the web site
26-28.
Lee
2002:
also
See
pp.
(http://www.elections.org.zm).
Commission of Zambia
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animosities

among

various opposition politicians

who

all

believed that their support was

strong enough to win the presidency themselves.^^^

Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

6.4

While the

initial transition

for other African countries, the

from Kaunda

way things

to

unfolded after 1991 was

exemplary and significantly reduced the prospects
constitutional reform efforts

Chiluba was regarded as exemplary

However,

between 1993 and 1995

are a case in point.

in

soon became obvious

The

The

initial

December 1993 and

conduct public hearings across the country were steps
it

less

for democratic consolidation.

appointment of the Constitutional Review Commission
efforts to

much

its

into the right direction.

Chiluba was not really interested

that President

broad-based constitutional review process. His primary

interest

was

in a

to secure his

reelection in 1996 in the light of the growing popularity of his predecessor Kenneth

Kaunda. This

Commission
as

its

is

evident

that

by

the fact that he rejected

would have improved

proposal that the

new

all

the proposals of the

the civil and political rights of Zambians as well

constitution be adopted

by a Constituent Assembly and

national referendum, while he only agreed with the proposals that barred

running in the 1996

The

efforts

privatize state

Mwanakatwe

a

Kaunda from

elections.^^"*

of the Chiluba government

owned companies such

to

implement various SAPs and

as the copper

to

mines also did not increase the

prospects for democratic consolidation. The actions taken by the Chiluba government to

See Bratton 1994: pp. 122-125; Graham 1997:
to 6.3.5 of this thesis.

p. 99;

Brunell 2001: pp. 246-247; and chapters 6.3.1

See Mphaisa 1996: pp. 68-72; and chapter 6.3.4 of this
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thesis.

liberalize the

Zambian economy

basically “have

hierarchy, extremely rich and brought in

They have

also

and health

care”.^^^

per capita

fell

made

a narrow elite, close to the

some US $350

million in foreign investment.

have made urban Zambians much poorer, unable

from

to

pay

fees for school

Between 1991 and 1996 Zambia’s gross domestic product (GDP)

US

$463

to

US

$401 and over 85 per cent of the population

live in

poverty. Empirical studies such as the one

by David Simon have shown

of poverty have a negative impact on

of political participation. Based on his

research in

MMD

rates

Zambia Simon pointed out

that high rates

that “the propensity to participate increases with

household expenditure and decreases with negative assessments of recent changes

economic

status. [...] [P]overty is

democratic consolidation”.

It

an obstacle to electoral participation, and thus to

can also be argued that Zambia’s economic decline

during the 1990s contributed to the coup attempt on 28 October 1997. While

successful,

it

it

was not

provided the pretext under which the Chiluba government cracked down

on the opposition and severely
imposing a

in

state

curtailed the civil and political liberties of Zambians

of emergency, which was only

While Zambia’s donors
which undoubtedly contributed

lifted as

a result of donor pressure.

are not responsible for corruption and

to its

297

mismanagement,

economic decline during the 1990s, they made

next to impossible for the Chiluba government to prove to

its

by

it

supporters that democracy

be
can go hand in hand with reducing poverty. Poverty reduction simply cannot
or through the
achieved through drastic cuts of public expenditure on social welfare
the poor to benefit from that
large-scale privatization of national assets without enabling

Africa Confidential, Vol. 37, No. 13 (21 June 1996),

Simon 2002:

p. 39.
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p. 1.

through micro-credit programs for instance. Through

government implement

fairly drastic

undoubtedly contributed
the exact

same course

their insistence that the

and politically disruptive SAPs Zambia’s donors

of Kaunda, but by pushing Chiluba

to the fall

Zambian

his predecessor

to continue

on

had reluctantly embarked upon, they did not

increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Zambia. In this context Burnell

pointed out that “the narrowing of Zambia’s economic and social policy options by the
international financial institutions

makes

it

difficult for

[Zambia’s opposition] parties to

offer the electorate radically different solutions to the country’s serious financial,

economic and

social problems.

They can compete

power, but have only very limited scope
that the

implementation of SAPs made

it

to contest

in the sense

of opposing the people

government

policy”.^^* This

less likely that political parties,

mainly by ideology or programmatic concerns rather than by

ethnoregional

criteria, will

in

Zambia

means

which can be

differentiated

emerge

in

in the foreseeable future. In short, the

implementation of neo-liberal SAPs during the

1

990s did not increase the prospects

for

democratic consolidation in Zambia.^^^

Even so
great, there are

the prospects for democratic consolidation in

some

positive signs as well.

Among them

Zambia

are not

all that

are Zambia’s high rate of

urbanization and the existence of a relatively large middle class. Furthermore, Zambia

has a fairly vibrant and diverse

civil society,

which played a

Chiluba’s third term ambitions in 2001. Finally, Zambia’s

Mwanawasa, might be more

p.

new

President,

Levy

P.

willing to fight corruption and carry out substantive

See Simon 2002: pp. 23-42; and chapter 5.3.4 of this
Burnell 2001:

crucial role in thwarting

259.

128

thesis.

reforms than Chiluba. Even so, his coming to power as the result of a seriously
Hawed
election highlights once

See White 1995:

p.

70;

more

the need for substantive reforms.^”*’

Mkandawire 1999:

See chapter 6.3.5 of this

259-260.
pp. 125-133; and Burnell 2001: pp.

thesis.
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CHAPTER 7

COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES

The main purpose of this chapter
independent variables

may explain

is to

lay the

groundwork

for identifying

which

the different trajectories the democratization
process

has taken in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the 1990s.
This will be done by

comparing the

historical context, political liberalization, democratic
transition

democratization and the prospects for democratic consolidation

Zambia.

Among the

in

/

Kenya, Malawi and

issues to be addressed in this context are the nature of the
ancien

regime, the role of donors, the structure of civil society, the formation of political
parties, the multiparty elections

and the constitutional reform process.

Historical Context

7.1

In

Malawi

as well as in Zambia, opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and

Nyasaland (FRN) was an important element of the struggle
facilitated the

differences

for

independence and

formation of political movements.^°* In the years prior to independence

emerged between the

colonial struggle in Kenya,

political leaders

Malawi and Zambia.

who were

In

Kenya

involved in the anti-

these differences led to the

formation of two political parties, namely, the Kenya African National Union

(KANU)

and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). The former brought together the
larger,

more educated, more

while the

latter

urbanized, and

brought together the

more

politically mobilized ethnic groups,

less educated, less urbanized

These political movements were the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC)
Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC) in Zambia.

130

and

in

less

mobilized

Malawi and

the Northern

ethnic groups

interests. In

who

feared that

Zambia

a

new

KANU would not give adequate consideration to their

political party

(UNIP) emerged out of the Northern Rhodesia

African National Congress (ANC), which was founded

formation of a political party in Zambia had

due

to the establishment

its

in

The

relatively early

roots in the high degree of urbanization

of copper mines by the British and the resulting

of the mine-workers. UNIP’s leadership favored a more
colonial struggle than the

ANC.

In contrast to

parties with a considerable following did not

mainly due

1951.

to the fact that the fairly

young

radical approach to the anti-

Kenya and Zambia,

emerge

in

Malawi

the returning medical doctor and political leader, Hastings Banda, too

from

politics,

Banda used

his

powers

different

prior to independence. This

leaders of the independence

While they were hoping Banda would lead the

politicization

was

movement gave

much power.

struggle for independence and then retire

to transform the

Malawi Congress Party (MCP),

which was supported by various ethnic groups across Malawi’s

three regions, into his

personal instrument and to crush any kind of opposition. Shortly after Malawi had

gained

its

independence in 1964 Banda dismissed various cabinet ministers who

disagreed with him on a wide range of programmatic and ideological issues.

Banda had already

By then

established a highly authoritarian regime. Therefore the dismissed

cabinet ministers were no longer able to form an opposition party and were forced into
302

exile instead.

As former

British colonies Kenya,

under parliamentary systems

democracy. However,

See chapters

4.

1

;

5.

1

;

all

and

that

Malawi and Zambia gained independence

were designed

after the

Westminster model of

three countries changed their constitutions soon after they had

6.

1

of this

thesis.
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gained independence. They

all

replaced their parliamentary systems with
presidential

systems and their multiparty systems with one-party
systems. Malawi, which already

had a de facto one-party system prior
establish a

dejure one-party system

stamp whose

to join

then

its

first

country to

parliament was a mere rubber

Banda. Kenya became a de facto one-party
in

persuading

led to tensions

KANU between moderate and more radical politicians. As a result Kenya’s first

in 1966.

could be clearly distinguished from

left

KANU and founded a new political party,

However,

his attempt to establish a party that

KANU on the basis of a different ideological and

programmatic orientation and not on the basis of being supported by a
group, failed. In subsequent by-elections out of the 29

KPU only nine, mainly members of the
retained their National

political party besides

Assembly

Luo

1969

KPU was banned

political party

obvious be the

would not have been

fact that

Moi changed

and

state until

tolerated after

different ethnic

left

KANU to join

Nyanza Province,

Kenyatta was not willing

seats.

KANU and in

MPs that had

ethnic group from the

Even so Kenya did not become a de jure one-party

is

However, the

KADU politicians such as Daniel arap Moi

Kenya People’s Union (KPU)

new

state

members

literally all

KANU by using a combination of carrots and sticks.

Vice-President, Jaramogi Oginga Odinga,

the

By

1964 when Kenyatta succeeded

influx of fairly conservative

within

independence^°\ was the

in 1966.

MPs were hand picked by

for the first time in

of KADU

to

its

to tolerate another

leaders detained.

1982 the formation of a

KPU was banned

to constitution to

make Kenya

in

1

969. This

a dejure one-

party state in response to another attempt by Odinga to form an opposition party.

MCP received 99% of the vote of enfranchised Africans in the
The

fact that

only nine out of 29 former

attributed to ethnic pressure

1961 Legislative Council elections.

KANU MPs retained their seats can at least partly be

and rigging.

132

Among the

three countries

compared

much

functioning multiparty system
until 1972.

the

Unlike Kenyatta

members of the

Tonga

in

in this thesis

Zambia

retained a fairly well

longer than Malawi and Kenya, namely, from
1964

Kenya, Kaunda

in

Zambia did not succeed

in

convincing

ANC to join UNIP. ANC managed to maintain its support from the

ethnic group in Zambia’s Southern Province. In 1966 politicians from
the Lozi

ethnic group in the Western Province formed a

(UP). After

it

was banned

August 1968

in

its

new

political party, the

leaders joined the

ANC

United Party

and as a

result

it

did fairly well during the parliamentary and presidential elections in 1968. In 1971

UNIP’s dominant

position within the multiparty system

was

seriously threatened

Zambia’s former Vice-President, Simon Kapwepwe, who belonged

Bemba

ethnic group, founded a

In response

new

political party, the

Kaunda, who had originally hopped

to the

when

populous

United Progressive Party (UPP).

to achieve his goal

of a one-party

system through the ballot box and consensual techniques, announced the formation of a
“one-party participatory democracy” in December 1972 and in August 1973 Zambia’s

new

making Zambia

constitution entered into force

Among the

three countries

authoritarian. Just a

few years

compared

after

in this study

Malawi was

the

most

independence Banda had established complete

control over Malawi’s political system.

the country’s political life

a de jure one-party state.^®^

An important tool

in controlling every aspect

were the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). By 1987

paramilitary force had about 60,000

members who served

regime, especially in rural areas. Besides the

of

this

as the eyes and ears of the

MYP the Banda regime adopted highly

under
repressive laws to suppress any form of opposition in the country. For instance,

See chapters

4.

1

;

5.

1

;

and

6.

1

of this

thesis.
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the Censorship and Control of Entertainment Bill
of 1968 anyone

anything likely to undermine the authority

of, or public

who

confidence

published

in,

the

govemment”^^^ could be punished with imprisonment. Malawi’s
two newspapers and
its

radio station were

owned and run by

the

government and foreign journalists were

barred from working in Malawi. Independent civil society
organizations did not exist

and even the church was scrutinized by the Banda regime.^^^

While Kenyatta

in

Kenya suppressed competition between

allowed a certain degree of competition within

he

political parties,

KANU as long as this did not directly

challenge his authority. For instance, under the system of semi-competitive elections
established

by him more than one

for a seat in the National

KANU member could compete in each constituency

Assembly, which led

to a relatively high turn-over

and

reshuffling of personnel within Kenya’s clientelist structures. Furthermore, under

Kenyatta Kenya’s political system had a professionally run and
judiciary, relatively free print

media

and a

,

interest

independent

fairly vibrant civil society.

society included professional associations such as the

economic

fairly

Law

Kenya’s

civil

Society of Kenya (LSK),

groups such as trade unions and business associations as well as

church organizations of various denominations and ethnic welfare associations. Under

Moi’s presidency the Kenyan
since the mid-1980s.

political

Moi banned

all

system became more authoritarian especially

ethnic welfare associations, introduced the de jure

one-party system and replaced the secret ballot in the party primaries with a queuing
system.

As

Quoted

a result of the introduction of the queuing system the National Assembly

after

See chapter

Cullen 1994:

5.1

of this

p. 18.

thesis.
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was deprived of its watchdog
independence of Kenya’s

role vis-a-vis the executive.

civil society

Unions (COTU) and Kenya’s

which was increasingly used

largest

by forcing

women’s

to control

also

countries.

print

also reduced the

the Central Organization of Trade

organization to affiliate with

Kenya’s

Besides maintaining a multiparty system

Zambia

Moi

political life.^®’

much

had the most vibrant and independent

longer than Kenya and Malawi,

civil society

among

During Zambia’s Second Republic (1973-1990) even the

media retained

their ability to criticize the

KANU,

government

-

the three

state controlled

at least to a certain extent.

The church run newspaper, “National Mirror”, played an important

role in uncovering

various corruption scandals. Also Zambia’s students were quite active during the

Second Republic. For

instance,

between 1971 and 1984 they organized four

large

demonstrations against government corruption. In contrast to Malawi and Kenya,

Zambia

is

much more

urbanized and

its

working class

is

highly organized. For instance,

by 1980 Zambia’s Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) had 380,000 members, which

was almost twice

as high as that of UNIP. Despite

unions under his control he failed to do

under the leadership of Chiluba

to

so^'^,

Kaunda’s

which enabled the

remain one of the most vocal

government during the Second Republic.

In

and

trade unions and

critics

of the Zambian

KANU in Kenya, Zambia

still

was

to control political life like

the least authoritarian regime

Unlike Malawi,

many

foreign correspondents were based in Kenya’s capital Nairobi.

See chapter

of this

thesis.

4.

1

ZCTU

sum, while also Zambia’s National

Assembly was merely a rubber stamp and UNIP was used

MCP in Malawi

efforts to bring the trade

well funded as a
possible explanation for this could be that the trade unions were relatively
to ZCTU s leaders
positions
government
paid
well
of
offers
therefore
result of membership fees and

One

were not

all that attractive.
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pnor

to the onset

partly explained

of the democratization process

by

Banda did

extensively as

Kaunda

the fact that

in

and his rootedness

7.2

Political Liberalization

liberalization

system.

It

Moi nor Banda

Kaunda were

in

Kenya because of his

willing to

embark on

political

external pressure that brought about

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia.

Kenya, churches and lawyers played an important

increasingly authoritarian character of the

Moi regime

role in criticizing the

since the mid-1980s.

uniquely positioned to do so because of the following reasons.

entire political

Christian

three leaders argued against the return to a multiparty

was a combination of internal and

“political space

at least

concept of Zambian Humanism.^"

or

by themselves. All

political liberalization in

In

in the

This can be

did not use his presidential powers as

Malawi and Moi did

beliefs

Neither

in the early 1990s.

which government could not

First,

They were

they occupied a

interfere with without dragging

and ideological facade of constitutionalism and legalism”.

down

the

Second,

they possessed organizational advantages they could use to protect themselves and

others.

For instance, church sermons were

less subject to state controls

and bans. This

enabled especially younger clergy to preach the Gospel against

state oppression.

Furthermore, Kenya’s churches and lawyers had various

churches and lawyers

other countries, which

much

311

312

pressure, since

See chapter

6.

Muigai 1993:

1

it

of this

made

it

less likely that the

ties to

Moi regime would

put them under too

did not want to draw the attention of the international

thesis.

p. 26.
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in

community on
economic

its

authoritarian practices and

human

dominated Moi regime were among the causes

Kikuyu

in 1990.

During

politicians in their

However,

this

was

still

for a

that year the churches

demands

for

It’s

broadening of opposition

Kenya’s return

not sufficient to put the

a fairly limited social base.

Moi regime under enough
all,

Kenya’s

KANU.

multiparty system in

Kenya and

initiative

wrote the pastoral
so.

to

had

mobilize massive opposition

Therefore only considerable donor pressure

December
in

political liberalization.

own

internal opposition

support was confined mainly to the urban middle and

political conditionalities forced the highly aid

their

pressure to

regime, since they did not posses an independent organizational

structure outside

In

to the

to the multiparty system.

upper classes, while peasants and workers were not able

Moi

deteriorating

and lawyers were joined by leading

bring about a return to the multiparty system. After

against the

The

and the increasing alienation of Kikuyu
leaders with the Kalenjin-

situation

Moi regime

rights abuses.

Malawi

dependent Moi regime

letter

form of

to return to the

1991.^'^

the churches played an important role in bringing about

However, unlike Kenya where various church

when

in

criticizing the

Moi

of 8 March 1992

leaders acted

on

regime, Malawi’s Catholic bishops only

after they

were encouraged by the Pope

This underlines the highly repressive character of the Banda regime

do

to

that did not

allow any form a dissent and that created a climate of fear throughout the country.

However, once the

ice

was broken by the Catholic bishops Malawi’s

churches also began to criticize the Banda regime and demanded
instance, in

Protestant

political changes.

For

August 1992 the Christian Council of Malawi (CCM), which represents

See chapter 4.2 of this

thesis.
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various Protestant churches, sent an open

letter to the

government demanding the

holding of a referendum to enable the people to decide
whether they want a multiparty
system. However, like in

Kenya

the churches and other civil society
groups alone were

not able to bring about multiparty politics. Only donor
pressure forced the highly aid

dependent Banda regime to agree

Banda was convinced

to the opposition

demand

that the majority of Malawians

the one-party system. This perception demonstrates

to hold a referendum.^

would favor

how

the continuation of

detached he was from the

majority of Malawians. Regarding the procedural details of the referendum
the international

Banda

community

in

form of the United Nations

to agree to the opposition

demands

to

that

was

hold the referendum

at

it

was again

able to convince

a later date and to

use one instead of two ballot boxes.^'^

Like Kenya, Zambia experienced economic decline during the 1980s. However,
unlike Kenya, where the economic decline helped to broaden the already existing

opposition to the

Moi

regime, Zambia’s dramatic economic decline basically brought

about political liberalization. The economic decline deprived the Kaunda government of
the financial resources needed to maintain

new

its

extensive patronage networks.

To

obtain

loans the government had to implement various SAPs. The social costs that

resulted from their implementation,

main food

stable,

which required

maize meal, galvanized Zambia’s urban poor

Kaunda government, which they blamed
workers engaged

drastic subsidy cuts for

in

thesis.
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Malawi, where

protests against the

can be argued that the positive effect of suspending aid to Kenya
donors to apply similar measures towards Malawi in May 1992.
It

See chapter 5.2 of this

into action against the

for their misery. Unlike

some spontaneous and uncoordinated

Zambia’s

in

Banda

November 1991 encouraged

regime, in Zambia the trade unions were able to organize
massive protests against the

Kaunda government. Zambia’s
autonomy during

trade unions,

which maintained a high degree of

the 1970s and 1980s, were at the forefront of the opposition
against

Kaunda and formed

the core of Zambia’s civil society. Unlike Kenya, where the

opposition base was limited to the middle and upper class, in Zambia the opposition

movement

also included the significant portion of the urban working class that

organized in the trade unions. This gave the opposition movement
to mobilize

many more people

the opposition

movement

in

against the

Kenya was

Kaunda government on

Kaunda regime enabled Zambia’s opposition

impose

on

its

own. In contrast

to

that could

Zambia

the ability

a sustained basis than

able to mobilize against the

sum, the existence of a strong trade union movement

basically

in

was

Moi government.

In

be mobilized against the

to bring about political liberalization

Kenya and Malawi, Zambia’s donors

did not have to

political conditionalities to bring about political liberalization because of the

existence of a strong trade union movement. However, the economic conditionalities

they imposed in the context of SAPs contributed to the delegitimatization of the Kaunda

government and enabled opposition leaders

to

mobilize the urban population against the

one-party system.^

7.3

Democratic Transition

/

Democratization

The comparative remarks on democratic
Malawi and Zambia

'

will

be analyzed as follows.

transition

First, the

/

democratization in Kenya,

process of party formation in

I

Second, the period
the three countries will be looked at from a comparative perspective.
j

I

I

See chapter 6.2 of this

thesis.

I

I

i

1

I

I

1

1
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prior to and the results of the multiparty elections
in

(1994 and 1999), and

in

Kenya (1992 and

Zambia (1991, 1996 and 2001)

comparative perspective. In

this context the question to

playing field prior the elections will be addressed
constitutional reform process in Kenya,

will

1997), in Malawi

be considered from a

which extent there was a

among

level

other issues. Third, the

Malawi and Zambia during

the 1990s will be

analyzed.

7.3.1

Formation of Political

Parties^*^

After the dejure one-party system ceased to exist in Kenya, Malawi and

Zambia, various new

political parties

emerged. In Kenya the Forum for the Restoration

of Democracy (FORD), which was formed

in

August 1991

as a broad based pressure

group for constitutional reforms and multiparty democracy, became the
party to be registered on 31

been repealed.

It

December 1991

was soon followed by

after Section

first political

2(A) of the constitution had

the Democratic Party (DP) of Mwai Kibaki.

Ethnic considerations were the driving force behind the formation of DP. Since the
leading figures of FORD Odinga and Shikuku belonged to the ethnic groups of the Luo

and the Luhya respectively, members of Kenya’s
feared that their interests

Mwai

the Kikuyu,

attract a lot

would not be adequately represented within

Kibaki, to found his

of support

in early 1992,

it

own

political party.

it

split into

The focus

will

be on

two

parties,

While

FORD

FORD

and urged

managed

to

ultimately failed to transform itself from a

pressure group into a unified and viable party.

elections

largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu,

A couple of months prior to the

1992

FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya. The main reason

political parties that gained a significant
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amount of votes during

for

the elections.

FORD’S
the

was

split

that its

two most

influential leaders, the

Luo Oginga Odinga, both wanted

elections

new

political parties

defections from

to

become Kenya’s next

emerged mainly

FORD-Kenya. While

Kikuyu Kenneth Matiba and

as a result of three high profile

ethnicity

was

the driving force behind the

of the National Development Party (NDP) as a

revitalization

president. After the 1992

defection, the revitalization of the Social Democratic Party

result

of Raila Odinga’s

(SDP) and

the founding of

Safina were not motivated primarily by ethnic considerations. The Luo
Raila Odinga
basically left

FORD-Kenya,

since he

was not

able to take over the party’s leadership

from the Luhya Kijana Wamalwa. Paul Muite and Kiraitu Murungi

left

FORD-Kenya

to

establish Safina as a multiethnic platform for reform together with Richard Leaky. Peter

Anyang Nyong’o

left

FORD-Kenya and joined

the

SDP

in the

hope of establishing a

party that focused on the social costs of SAPs.^'^

While

in

Kenya only one

pressure group for multiparty democracy emerged

during the period of political liberalization. In Malawi, two such pressure groups

emerged. One was the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), which was led by the trade
unionist

Chakufwa Chihana from Malawi’s Northern Region.

mainly by northern

intellectuals

dissident political activities.

many of whom had

The other one was

AFORD was supported

served lengthy prison terms for

the United Democratic Front (UDF),

which was led by the businessman Bakili Muluzi from Malawi’s Southern Region.

was supported mainly by businessmen of the southern
commercial
the

center.

Many of UDF’s members

Malawi Congress Party (MCP) who had

See chapters 4.3.1; and 4.3.3 of this

like

city
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of Blantyre, Malawi’s

Muluzi himself had been members of

fallen out with

thesis.

UDF

Banda. After a clear

majority had voted for the multiparty system in the 1993
referendum

transformed themselves into

fairly stable political parties.

As

AFORD

and

UDF

Kenya, the leaders of

in

both parties wanted to become Malawi’s next president. However,
unlike Kenya one of

them, Muluzi, was able to do so, since the opposition vote was

major parties and not between three
the elections

was more

level in

Between the 1994 and the 1999
Malawi. However,

Kenya and

Malawi than
elections

likely that

it is

like in

new

in

Kenya

no new

split

only between two

since the playing field prior to

as will

parties

be shown

in chapter 7.3.2.

of any significance emerged

political parties will

emerge

prior to the

in

2004

elections.^'^

As

in

Kenya and Malawi,

Zambia

the

Movement

for Multiparty

Democracy

(MMD) was

formed

in

Unlike

FORD in Kenya, MMD managed to maintain enough cohesion prior to the first

as a pressure group during the period of political liberalization.

multiparty elections to avoid breaking apart even so there was a danger of that

happening during the

MMD convention in early 1991 when a number of powerful

businessmen expressed
Frederick Chiluba as

elections,

their displeasure with the election of the trade unionist

MMD’s presidential

candidate. However, soon after the 1991

which were won overwhelmingly by

the

MMD,

it

became obvious

that the

MMD had “failed to transform itself from a loose coalition of elites opposed to Kaunda
to

an integrated political party committed to well articulated ideological goals of

development”.
interests within

The main reason

for this

was

that only thing that kept the diverse

MMD under one roof was their opposition to Kaunda. After MMD had

See chapters 5.2; 5.3.1; and 5.4 of this

Osei-Hwedie 1998:

p.

thesis.

233.
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won

the elections there

various

new

elections.

It

parties

was nothing

emerged

in

left to

keep them under one

two waves. The

started as a response to the

wave occurred

first

As

roof.

a result

prior to the 1996

dominant position of Bemba-speaking

businessmen from Zambia’s Luapula and Northern provinces within
the Chiluba
government, which led

to the marginalization

ethnic groups. Subsequently they

left

the

of politicians from other regions and

MMD and formed their own political parties.

For instance, the former Minister of Mines and Mineral Development, Humphrey

Mulemga, who was from Zambia’s North-Western Province

left

the

MMD and founded

the National Party (NP), while the former Minister of Science, Technology Education

and Vocational Training, Akashambatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika, who was from Zambia’s

Western Province,

left

MMD and established another party with the name Agenda for

Zambia (AZ). However,
force

like in

Kenya

beyond the formation of all new

National

ethnicity and regionalism

political parties.

Lima Party (NLP) was formed with

all

its

result

all

of

founders hoped to appeal to

of a struggle over who would become

The formation of the Zambia Republican

Democracy and Development (FDD),
(PF) can be attributed to

that.

Forum

for

the Heritage Party (HP), and the Patriotic Front

either left the

Chiluba.^^'

6.3.1, 6.3.4,

MMD’s presidential

Party (ZRP), the

All these parties were founded

of the Chiluba government who had

See chapters

Like Safina in Kenya, Zambia’s

of Zambia’s nine provinces. The second wave occurred before the

2001 elections as a
candidate.

the driving

the intention to appeal to voters from

Zambia’s regions and ethnic groups. In NLP’s case
farmers from

was not

and 6.3.5 of this

thesis.

143

by high-ranking members

MMD or were dismissed by

Most of the

political parties that

Malawi and Zambia did so along

was

emerged since the early 1990s

ethnic and

/

or regional lines.

in

Kenya

The main reason

for this

the absence of ideological or programmatic
differences between them. In other

words, “the lack of emphasis on
politics, leave

in politics

by

[..]

political issues

and the negligible role of class

in

and regional] attachments as the force most readily
mobilized

[ethnic

the competing elites”.^^^ Furthermore, the actions of
most politicians in

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the past ten years have been
guided predominantly

by personal opportunism.
driving forces

beyond

Political careerism

politicians

programs. This also explains

and competition over spoils were the main

action and not serious disagreements over ideology
or

why most

of them

felt

no strong commitment

to

any one

party and crossed freely between them. Finally, the main motivation behind the

formation of new political parties often was to provide a means for
realize their presidential aspirations as

was

the case in

Zambia

their leaders to

prior to the 2001

•1

elections.

7.3.2

The Multiparty
In

Elections

Kenya, Malawi and

in

Zambia

the incumbents applied a variety of measures

prior to the each multiparty election to influence

there

was considerable

in a playing field that

prior to the 1992

p.

outcome

in their favor.

However,

variation concerning the extent to which these measures resulted

was not

level. In

Kenya President Moi used

and the 1997 elections

Osei-Hwedie 1998:

its

to ensure that there

was no

231.

See Osei-Hwedie 1998: pp. 231-244; and Burnell 2001: pp. 244 and 253.
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a variety of measures

level playing field.

For instance, prior

to the

1992 elections the Moi regime made

it

next to impossible for

the opposition parties to run effective campaigns
throughout the country. Provincial

administrations frequently delayed the registration of local
branches of opposition
parties

and permissions

for the holding

frequently denied, while

permit.

of political

KANU held many rallies without even having to obtain a

Even worse, the Moi government declared

the entire North-Eastern Province as

politicians

of opposition parties were

rallies

parts of the Rift Valley Province and

“KANU-only”

areas and denied opposition

any kind of access. Also Kenya’s Electoral Commission was everything but

independent.

Moi refused

acceptable to

all parties.

to reconstitute the

He

Commission

to include

preferred to stick to the commissioners he had appointed

prior to the reintroduction of the multiparty system. Therefore

that the

Commission

boundaries that clearly favored

controlled

KANU.

coverage by

fairly

KBC

came

as

no surprise

in

to

place constituency

tandem with the

local

the voter registration process leaving thousands of

to register. Finally, the

campaign coverage of the government
clearly biased in favor of

independent print media could not counterbalance the biased

in the face

marked contrast

to

of low

literacy levels especially in rural areas.^^'’

Kenya, the playing

prior to the 1994 elections. Unlike Moi,

parties to

left in

Kenya Broadcasting Cooperation (KBC) was

Kenya’s

In

it

KANU. The Commission

mismanaged

young Kenyan’s unable

it

redraw the boundaries of Kenya’s 188 constituencies

failed to

ensure the principle of one person one vote. Instead

administrations also

commissioners

field

was much more

Banda appointed

thesis.
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Malawi

representatives of all political

Malawi’s Electoral.Commission. Malawi’s Commission

See chapter 4.3.2 of this

level in

set

up committees

to

deal with a wide range of issues such as civic education, the
media, election
administration, and violence and intimidation.

Malawi’s Commission was underlined by the
reservation

“when

The high degree of independence of
fact that

it

tried to intimidate voters or to use

it

campaign and propaganda”.^^^ Furthermore, Malawi’s

managed

some

to quite

Cooperation

(MCP)

extent to prevent

in its favor

guidelines. In short, while the

1994 elections in
field

by

was considerably more

MCP without

government resources
Electoral

Commission

Banada regime

level in

its

for its

also

from using the Malawi Broadcasting

issuing and enforcing compliance with

favor especially in

its

MCP

censured the

also tried to influence the

its

media

outcome of the

stronghold, the Central Region, the playing

Malawi than

it

was

in

Kenya prior

to the first

multiparty elections. This seems to be quite surprising considering the fact that the

Banada regime was more

authoritarian than the

democratization process.

Among the possible

Moi regime

prior to the onset of the

explanations for this striking difference

could be that the humiliation of the Banda regime in the 1993 referendum contributed

its

willingness to

make concessions

prior to the 1994 elections. Furthermore Malawi’s

who was

high aid dependency and the old age of Banda,
the people,

made

it

favor to the extent

As

in

less likely that

Moi

outcome of the

first

p.

the political process in his

326

the government in

multiparty elections in

its

Zambia

tried to influence the

favor. Similar to

Malawi, Zambia’s Electoral Commission was biased

M’Inoti 1998:

quite sick and detached from

Banda would manipulate

did in Kenya.

Kenya and Malawi,

to

in favor

Kenya but

of the government. For

634.

See M’Inoti 1998: pp. 631-637; and chapters

5.3.2;
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and

5.3.4;

of this

unlike

thesis.

instance,

when

drew 25 new

it

UNIP’s support was thought
support

its

electoral districts

to

be strongest. Furthermore,

clearly biased in favor of

considering the broad-based support
efforts to influence the

Compared with
multiparty elections

in

used state resources to

the

first

Kaunda and UNIP. However,

MMD enjoyed

outcome of the

have an impact on the outcome of the

and

UNIP

campaign and the campaign reporting of the Zambian National
Broadcasting

Company (ZNBC) was

UNIP’s

favored rural constituencies where

it

all

over the country, Kaunda’s and

elections in their favor did not really

elections.^^’

multiparty elections the playing field prior to the second

was somewhat more

level in

Kenya and much

less level in

Zambia. Compared with the 1992 elections there have been some modest

improvements regarding the 1997 elections

were appointed

to the Electoral

somewhat more

it

would be wrong

the 1997 elections, since

the 1997 elections

Kenya. For instance, opposition members

in

Commission and

freely in the entire country

media. However,

the opposition parties could campaign

and had access

many of the

make

that

to the

government-run

the believe that the playing field

reforms aimed

at leveling the

were implemented just a few weeks

therefore did not really

much of a

was

1999 elections

appointed a

new

old one. This

Electoral

became

electoral districts out

See chapters

to increase its

prior to the elections and

difference anymore. In Malawi, the Muluzi

6.3.2;

in

when

July 1998, which was more pro

the

Commission proposed

of which 42 would have been

and 6.3.3 of this

in

1992 prior

chances to win them. For instance, Muluzi

Commission

quite obvious

level prior to

playing field prior to

government applied some of the same measures the Moi government did
to the

Malawi

thesis.

147

in the

UDF

to create

UDF dominated

than the

70 new

Southern

Region. Furthermore the Commission tried to bloc the joint presidential

and

AFORD without success.

The Muluzi government

Malawi Broadcasting Cooperation (MBC)

some

only used state resources and the media

Commission

that

mismanaged

its

MBC was called by

why

the Chiluba government not

and appointed a pro

the voter registration process, but

constitution with the aim to bar

In

Zambia

in its favor

of MCP

also used state resources and the

in its favor. That’s

the Muluzi Broadcasting Cooperation. In

ticket

it

main challenger Kaunda from

also

MMD Electoral
changed the

running.^^*

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia policy debates hardly took place during the

campaigns. As a result the politicians used ethnicity and regional
voters. Consequently, voting

affiliations to

mainly took place along ethnoregional

lines

with ethnicity

being somewhat more salient in Kenya and regionalism being somewhat more

Malawi. In contrast

AFORD

and

to

Kenya and Zambia,

in

Malawi

the

MCP managed to join forces prior to the

two main opposition

7.3.3

The

level playing field.

Constitutional

During the

1

constitutions. There

quite

some

See chapters 4.3.2; 4.3.3;

efforts to reform their

variation regarding this process between the three

Malawi undertook

constitutional changes out of the three countries. In

5.3.5;

if there

Reform Process

countries. Prior to the first multiparty elections

See chapters 4.3.3;

parties
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990s Kenya, Malawi and Zambia undertook

was

salient in

1999 elections and by doing so

almost unseated the Muluzi government and probably would have done so

would have been a

mobilize

and 6.3.4 of this

Malawi
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and

6.3.5

of this

most

significant

the National Consultative

thesis.

5.3.4; 5.3.5; 6.3.3; 6.3.4;

the

thesis.

Council (NCC), which was composed of representatives
of all of Malawi’s registered
parties,

was mandated

to draft a

new

constitution.

It

managed

to prepare a constitution

that

can be considered as a significant improvement especially

and

civil rights

compared with

the old one.

and mainly dominated by Malawi’s

in the area

of political

However, the drafting process was rushed

political parties.

Some of them

like

AFORD were

not really interested in making substantive changes such as reducing the
powers of the
president, since their leaders

did not want

its

new

drafting of the

society

powers

to

become Malawi’s next

be curtailed. The general public was hardly involved

In

various civil society organizations. However,

president.

different

it

As

to

rather

weak

in the

civil

review Malawi’s new

prior to the 1994 elections on an interim basis. This

conference was attended by representatives of Malawi’s

conference

still

February 1995 a conference took place

which was adopted

final decisions

president and therefore

constitution and also the input of Malawi’s

was minimal.

constitution,

to

hoped

its

political parties as well as

decisions were not binding and the

were made by parliament, which simply ignored

the decisions of the

did not agree with such as the elimination of the position of a second vice

a result the

new

constitution that

was adopted

in

May

1995 was not much

from the interim constitution and lacked popular legitimacy.

As

in

Malawi, also

in

Zambia

to the first multiparty elections.

participate in the

work of the

efforts

However, unlike

Malawi

of this

new

constitution prior

the opposition refused to

it

objected to

its

pro-

MMD rejected the draft constitution that was

proposed by the Commission and threatened

.5

in

to draft a

Constitutional Commission, since

government character. Consequently, the

See chapters 5.3.2; and 5.3

were made

to boycott the elections.

thesis.
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It

criticized that

too

much power was

vested in the president.

As

a result of mediation efforts

university students and the Anglican church a compromise
that resulted in

changes was reached and Zambia

parliament adopted a

s

new

by

some minor

constitution in August

1991. Similar to Malawi, the input of the general population and

civil society

minimal during the drafting process.

established a

Constitutional

people

all

In

December 1993 Chiluba

Review Commission, which made an

over the country. However, like

in

effort to obtain the

Malawi

in a

discussion and debate of the proposals of the Commission.

enhancements

Commission

in the Bill

that effectively barred

short, constitutional

name, since

of Rights and only accepted

it

Kaunda from

views from

recommendations were not

its

binding and the Chiluba government was not interested

its

broad-based public

It

rejected

new

all

first

aimed

contesting the

1

996

was used

as a

means

ensuring that

elections. In

The only

elections. In contrast to

the elections.

to create a

more

influence the constitutional reform process

it.

The

was

Change (CCCC) incorporated more than

for

Kenya’s
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were

civil society to

the ability of civil society to

quite limited, in

fifty civil

thesis.

prior

lack of a level playing field

Kenya

For instance, Kenya’s Citizens Coalition

See chapters 6.3.2; and 6.3.4 of this

Kenya

level playing field prior to the 1997

Malawi and Zambia where

the driving force behind

in

constitutional changes that took place

was one of the major reasons

push for constitutional changes

that

to ensure Chiluba’s reelection in 1996.^^'

Moi would win

prior to the 1992 elections

and

to the

reform under the Chiluba government did nor really deserve

multiparty elections.

at

rights

own recommendations

Unlike Malawi and Zambia, no constitutional reforms took place
the

was

civil society

was

for Constitutional

society groups and had an estimated

four million members. However, the
civil society

and managed

Moi regime

to split the

refused to talk with representatives of

broad-based movement for constitutional change.

Prior to the 1997 elections Kenya’s political parties agreed
on a package of minimal

reforms, which created a somewhat more level playing

Kenya’s

civil society

field.

After the 1997 elections

kept the issue of constitutional reform on the front burner
by

launching a people-driven constitutional review process, which became known
as the

Ufungamano

Initiative. It

Constitution of Kenya

remains to be seen whether

Review Commission increased

its

incorporation into the

its

influence on the constitutional

reform process. In short, while the broad involvement of civil society groups
constitutional reform efforts

is

in

Kenya’s

encouraging, comprehensive constitutional reforms

have not yet taken place and probably won’t take place

as long as

Moi

is in

still

power.^^^

Prospects for Democratic Consolidation

7.4

So

far certain

elements of democracy such as regular elections have more or

survived in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia and a return to authoritarian rule
unlikely in any of the three countries.

is

less

quite

However, the process of democratic

consolidation has not yet started in the three countries. While Malawi and Zambia

experienced a democratic change in leadership, Kenya has not yet done
quite promising changes in the leadership of Malawi and

by the

bullet as

was

the case in

many other African

See chapters 4.3.2; 4.3.3; and 4.3.4 of this

Zambia by

so. After the

the ballot and not

countries in the past, the political

thesis.

In all three countries people have enjoyed significantly

more freedoms under

the multiparty system

Furthermore
than under the one-party system and are not willing to give up these freedoms again.
into
backsliding
their
accept
not
would
three countries are dependent on foreign aid and donors
authoritarian rule.
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all

developments

in both countries after the first multiparty
elections did not increase the

prospects for democratic consolidation. The leaders of both
countries manipulated the
political process to ensure or at least to significantly increase
their

the second multiparty elections. However,

when they tried

changes of winning

to bring about constitutional

changes to run for a third term, they did not succeed mainly due

to popular opposition.

In both countries various civil society groups such as the churches opposed
the third-

term ambitions of Chiluba and Muluzi vehemently. The

ability

of civil society

to

mobilize against undemocratic tendencies in both countries increases the prospects

democratic consolidation. In the context of Malawi the relative independence
judiciary

is

quite positive and in

be quite serious

Zambia

in bringing about

For instance, in a

fairly

its

new

much needed

bold step on

1 1

President

for

if its

Levy Mwanawasa seems

to

reforms and in rooting out corruption.

July 2002 he asked Zambia’s parliament to

Chiluba’ s immunity so that “the government can put him on

trial

lift

on charges of

corruption and abuse of office’’.^^'^ Kenya’s prospects for democratic consolidation will

depend

to a certain extent

process.

on the outcome of the

still

ongoing constitutional reform

A new constitution that reduces the powers of the president would increase the

prospects for democratic consolidation.

the conditions are

more conducive

Compared with Malawi and Zambia,

for the

development of a democratic

throughout the country. For instance, more than 28,000 Kenyans from
areas

worked

in

Kenya

political culture

rural

and urban

as local election observers during the 1997 elections. Furthermore, civil

“Zambians back president’s bid

to try predecessor”
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by Shapi Shacinda, Reuters News,

1

2 July 2002.

society organizations played a crucial role in pushing forward the country’s
constitutional reform process.

While

certain elements

Malawi and Zambia during
to

democratic consolidation

of democracy became more entrenched

in

Kenya,

the last ten years, formidable challenges remain on the road
in all three countries.

Among them

are the high levels of

poverty, low literacy rates, the debt burden and the devastating impact of the

HIV/AIDS

disease. Furthermore, the salience of ethnicity and regionalism often reduces the

political process to a

state

and

its

zero-sum game

resources.

in

which

The replacement of the

mixed or a proportional

electoral

different groups try to gain control of the

first-past-the-post electoral system with a

system as well as the formation of political parties

appeal to voters across different ethnic groups and regions are

might increase the prospects

for democratic consolidation in

Zambia.

See chapters 4.4;

5.4;

and 6.4 of this

thesis.
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among the measures

Kenya, Malawi and

that

that

CHAPTER 8
CONCLUSION

The

final chapter

of this study has three

variables will be identified that

variable. Second,

it

will

democracy emerged

in

may

explain

parts. First, several

some of the

independent

variation in the dependent

be discussed which adjectives best describe what type of

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia during the

last ten years.

This

discussion will be based on Diamond’s typology that was introduced in chapter two.

measures will be suggested

Finally, various

for possibly increasing the prospects for

democratic consolidation in the countries that are the focus of this

thesis.

In contrast to case studies of the democratization process in Kenya,

Zambia done independently from each

other, the comparative method,

of this study

transfer

The

the 1990s.

first

variation in the dependent variable can be

summarized

as

multiparty elections in Malawi and Zambia resulted in a peaceful

Muluzi and from Kaunda

Moi managed

to

win

During the 1990s a

much

The

to

(UDF,

applied

dependent variable. The dependent variable

of power from Banda

while in Kenya

parties

is

the trajectory of the democratization process in Kenya, Malawi, and

is

Zambia during
follows:

in the

which

which independent variables

in this study, provides a better foundation for identifying

can be used to explain the variation

Malawi and

the

fairly stable party

first

to

Chiluba respectively,

and the second multiparty

system emerged

in

elections.

Malawi, consisting of three

AFORD and MCP), while in Kenya and in Zambia the party system was

less stable. In

elections and in

Kenya various new

political parties

Zambia a number of new

emerged

political parties

154

after the

1992

emerged basically

in

two

waves
force

prior to the 1996 and the 2001 elections. In Kenya,
civil society

beyond

society

the constitutional reform process, while in

was hardly involved. Several of the independent

was

the driving

Malawi and Zambia
variables that

may

civil

explain the

variation in the dependent variable are described below.

The independent

variable “structure of civil society” explains

variation in the dependent variable. For instance,

opposition was able to defeat

The existence of a strong

Kaunda

trade union

in

it

some of the

can be used to explain

Zambia but was unable

movement, which was

to defeat

why
Moi

the

in

Kenya.

the core of Zambia’s civil

society during the period of political liberalization, enabled the opposition to easily

mobilize thousands of formal sector workers
against the

who were

Kaunda government. This provided

organized in trade unions

the opposition

movement with broad-

based support. As a result of the severe economic decline and the

SAPs

that

were implemented by the Kaunda government,

social costs of the

had become extremely

it

unpopular, which facilitated the formation of a broad-based protest movement, the

MMD.

The

MMD could use the already existing organizational structure of the trade

unions to quickly establish an efficient and effective party infrastructure throughout the
country. In

Kenya

the opposition

former politicians. They were not

movement was mainly

led

by

clerics,

lawyers and

in a position to organize equally large mass-protests

against Moi, since they did not have the

same experience and

infrastructure at their disposal as the trade union leaders in

experienced in organizing large strikes already prior
process.
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organizational

Zambia who were

to the onset

quite

of the democratization

In contrast to

Kenya and Zambia,

the independent variable “structure of civil

society” cannot be used to explain the different trajectories of the democratization

process

in

Kenya and Malawi,

Malawi, which has a weaker

With regard

to

civil society than

Kenya and Malawi

used to explain

Moi was

since a peaceful change in leadership occurred

at least to

some

Kenya, while none occurred

in

in

Kenya.

the independent variable “role of donors” can be

extent

why Muluzi was

able to replace

Banda and why

able to hold on to power. While in both countries donor-imposed political

conditionalities

were primarily responsible

with the multiparty system,

in

for the

Malawi the degree of donor involvement

multiparty elections

was considerably higher than

was

They

rather removed.

replacement of the one-party system

in

Kenya.

In

Kenya

prior to the

first

the role of donors

failed to ensure a level playing field prior to the elections

they endorsed the results of the seriously flawed 1992 elections fearing instability
they would not have done so.

By

refusing to apply

government Kenya’s donors basically sabotaged
to bring about a level playing field prior to the

more pressure

against the

and

if

Moi

the efforts of various domestic actors

1992 elections.

Malawi the donors played a much more proactive

In contrast to

role prior to the

Kenya,

in

1994 elections.

Coordinated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) they assisted
with the drafting of a

new

constitution and they “participated in every step of the

elections
transition process, guaranteeing that the plebiscite and the subsequent

reasonably free and

fair”.^^^

Another independent variable
and Banda

lost

Brown 2000:

power

p.

were

in the first

that is

of some value

in

multiparty elections while

437.
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explaining

why Kaunda

Moi managed

to hold

on

to

power

is

the degree to

which the incumbents believed they would
win

Zambia and Malawi Kaunda and Banda were
elections they convened. This explains

some

quite sure that they

why they gave

influence over the preparations for the

first

the elections. In

would win

the international

the

community

quite

multiparty elections, which resulted in

a playing field that was fairly level. In contrast to Banda
and Kaunda, Moi was very
well aware of the fact that his core support was limited
to his

own

ethnic group, the

Kalenjin and some other smaller ethnic groups like the Maasai
and that he would have

no choice of winning against an opposition

that

would bring together Kenya’s

largest

ethnic groups, namely, the Kikuyu, the Luhya, and the Luo. For
precisely this reason he

gave the international community much

less

room

to ensure that there

was a

level

playing field prior to the elections and undertook various measures to increase his

chances to emerge victorious from the

first

multiparty elections as has been illustrated

in chapter 4.3.2.^^^

The independent
explaining

why civil

variable “structure of civil society”

society

was

the driving force

is

beyond the

also quite useful in

constitutional reform

process in Kenya, while in was hardly involved in Malawi and Zambia. As has been
illustrated in chapter 4.2

Kenya’s

degree of independence from the

Kenya’s

legal profession

Moi government

Human Rights Commission

International

Commission of Jurists

and

to

Law

become

managed

to maintain a relatively high

during the 1980s. This enabled

Society as well as

the driving force

its

section of the

beyond the Citizens

Coalition for Constitutional Change (CCCC), which grew rapidly and included more

than

fifty civil society

groups and had an estimated 4 million members by the end of

See van de Walle 2002:

p. 71.
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1997. Besides the lawyers also Kenya’s churches managed to maintain
a high degree of

autonomy during

The

the 1980s.

preaching the Gospel against
congregations and explains

community

fact that especially

state oppression since the late

why Kenya’s

to

and

after the

Furthermore the recruitment, training and posting of 28,000
elections

by a

for the

the National Council of Churches of Kenya

Ufungamano

1997 elections. In contrast

Zambia’s

civil society

as the one in Kenya,

Initiative for constitutional

to

while

its

legal profession

was by

which explains why Zambia’s

was very weak

explains

1997 elections.
1997

at the

far not as active

civil society

the

role in preparing the

reform that emerged

after the

core of

and numerous

was hardly involved

Compared with Kenya and Zambia, Malawi’s

as a result of the highly authoritarian

why Malawi’s

(NCCK), and

Kenya, the trade union movement was

the constitutional reform process.

society

legal

local observers for the

of Education for Democracy (lED) played an important

Institute

its

their

coalition that brought together the Catholic Justice and Peace

Commission (CJPC),

ground

1980s politicized

churches joined forces with

push for constitutional reforms prior

to

Kenya’s younger clergy was

civil society

was hardly

in

civil

Banda regime, which

able to influence the drafting of its

interim constitution prior to the 1994 elections and

its

finalization thereafter.

comparison of the structure of Kenya’s, Malawi’s and Zambia’s

A

civil society reveals

that there is a correlation

between the degree of authoritarianism of the ancien regime

and the structure of civil

society.

A possible explanation for the fact that in Malawi a fairly stable party system
emerged during the 1990s while

Zambia could be

that in

this

was not

the case in

Malawi regionalism was
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the

Kenya and

to a lesser extent in

main cleavage along which

AFORD and UDF were

formed while

Kenya and Zambia

in

important role than regionalism as a cleavage along which

According

to the

by Freedom House
ratings

combined average

for 2001-2002'''

on a scale from

1

ethnicity played a

political parties

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia received the following

Malawi and Zambia were both

classified as partly free with ratings of 3.0 and 4.5 respectively,
while

House

fall

into Larry

of 5.5. Countries

fall into

Diamond

s

Kenya was

that are considered free

Diamond’s category of liberal democracies,

considered partly free

were formed.

rating of political rights and civil
liberties

.0 (free) to 7.0 (not free)."’

classified as not free with a rating

more

by Freedom

countries that are

category of electoral democracies, and

countries that are considered not free either

fall

into

Diamond’s categories of

pseudodemocracies''^® or purely authoritarian regimes. Consequently, according to the
latest

Freedom House

ratings

Malawi and Zambia could be

characterized as electoral

democracies, while Kenya could be characterized as pseudodemocracy. Based on the
analysis of the political developments in

chapters five and six

it

seems

to

be justified

democracies. During the years after the

reasonably free and

fair,

Malawi and Zambia during

first

them

to categorize

the 1990s in

as electoral

multiparty elections, which have been

both countries have experienced some democratic backsliding.

In both countries the constitutional reform process failed to increase ‘horizontal’
I

accountability

by reducing

the presidential powers in favor or the parliament and the

j

I

This rating

is

available

on the web

site

of Freedom House (www.freedomhouse.org).

According the Freedom House a country with a rating between .0 and 2.5 is considered free. A
country with a rating between 3.0 and 5.5 is considered partly free and a country with a rating
1

between 5.5 and 7.0

is

considered not

free.

Besides the term “pseudodemocarcy” also the terms “electoral authoritarian
in the literature. In a recent article

Diamond

and hybrid are used

further divided electoval authoritarian regimes into

159

judiciary. Furthermore, the freedom of the press

was

restricted in both countries

especially prior to the second multiparty elections. However, the
most recent

developments
limits

by

least for

1990s

in both countries, especially the upholding of the

in favor

now. Based on the analysis of the

developments

political

in

the

4 the author of this study has certain reservations with the

Freedom House. While both multiparty
and

political rights

that

Kenya’s vibrant and energetic

and

civil liberties

local observers for the

have been

civil society

most

somewhat, since
even

5.5 rating

was
it

the driving force

recruited, trained

if

Moi won’t

likely increase the

it

he

will be hard for

tries to

by

restricted to varying degrees, the fact

beyond

to transfer his

handpick him or

5.5 in the

stand again in the upcoming

power of Kenya’s

Moi

the

and posted 28,000

1997 elections merits a somewhat better rating than

author’s view. Furthermore, the fact that

elections alone will

its

elections during the 1990s have been flawed

country’s constitutional reform process and that

to his successor

at

Kenya during

categorization of Kenya as a pseudodemocracy or as not free based on

at least

of term

suggests that the democratic backsliding has been reversed

civil society,

in chapter

norm

her.

legislature

and judiciary

enormous personal power

This alone of course

is

not

sufficient to increase the prospects for democratic consolidation in Kenya. In his recent

article

Nicolas van de Walle makes another point that gives reason for cautious

optimism regarding the prospects
Zambia.

He points

to the

for democratic consolidation in

phenomenon of institutional

democracy involves acquired behavior on
stands to reason that the

more experience

Kenya, Malawi and

learning. “Since genuine

the part of both individuals and institutions
a country has had with democratic decisions

ones (see Diamond 2002:
competitive authoritarian ones and hegemonic electoral authoritarian
25).
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p.

it

(whether taken by voters, lawmakers, judges, or the press) the
more likely
experience democratic learning. This
to

occur even

To

if

is

good news,

it is

to

particularly as this learning

is

likely

those processes are imperfect”.^'*'

increase the prospects for democratic consolidation Kenya,
Malawi and

Zambia must carry out

further constitutional and electoral reforms. These can be

divided into minor and more substantive reforms.

Among the

the introduction of the requirement that the president

is

minor reforms would be

elected with an absolute and not

just as simple majority. If none of the candidates receives an absolute majority in the
first

round of voting, a run-off election would take place among the two top vote-

getters.

This would

facilitate the

formation of broad-based alliances and reduce the

salience of ethnoregional considerations. Furthermore, constituency boundaries should

be drawn

in

such a

way that

each constituency contains more or

of voters and safeguards need

to

be

in place to ensure the

less the

independence of the electoral

commission. For instance, instead of being appointed by the president
should be appointed or elected by parliament.
significant reduction of the presidential

judiciary. Furthermore a

more

same number

its

members

Among the major reforms would be

powers

in favor

of the parliament and the

inclusive political system should be designed to

transform the political process from a zero-sum game into more of a win-win

An

a

situation.

important step of creating such a more inclusive political system would be the

replacement of the first-past-the-post electoral system with a proportional or a mixed
electoral system.

For instance,

in a

mixed system half of the MPs would be

elected in

constituencies on a plurality basis and the other half would be elected via party

van de Walle 2002:

p. 74.

lists

on a

de
See also Herbst 2000: pp. 245-258; Ndegwa 2001: pp. 1-17; and van

Walle 2002: pp. 72-79.
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proportional basis. Such an electoral system would
ensure that half of the

have direct

ties to their constituencies

and would be sensitive

to issues

MP’s would

of concern

to

them, while the other half would be elected on a
proportional basis, which would ensure
that also ethno-linguistic

and religious minorities would achieve a certain

level

of

parliamentary representation. Evidence from South Africa and
Namibia suggests
proportional or a

to voters

mixed

electoral

system would encourage

political parties to reach out

from other ethnic groups or regions and by doing so would
promote

formation of cross-cutting cleavages around certain ideologies or

over time reduce the salience of primordial and parochial

and would replace them with different ideologies or
to the creation

of more stable party systems over

the

policies. This

key

would

criteria in electoral politics

policies,

which would

in turn lead

time.^'^^

Besides the various electoral and constitutional reforms outlined above
multilateral donors also could play a

that a

bi-

and

role in increasing the prospects for democratic

consolidation in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. So far their involvement with these three
countries has been a

in

mixed

blessing.

While they undoubtedly played an important

bringing about political liberalization

in

each of them either through imposing

economic or

political conditionalities or both, they

commitment

to assist

them

In all three countries they

reforms

(i.e.

systems.

As

have not shown much of a

to extend “democratic practices

were more concerned with

SAPs) than with

role

beyond periodic

political stability

voting”.^'*^

and economic

the establishment of inclusive and participatory political

a matter of fact their insistence that Chiluba and Muluzi continue with the

See Sandbrook 1996: pp. 70-81; Monga 1997: pp. 168-168; Reynolds 1999: pp. 272-275;
Burnell 2001: p. 248.
p. 68; Baker 2000: pp. 19-21; May 2000: pp. 172-175; and

Brown 2000:

p.

452.
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Phiri 2000:

implementation of the rigid SAPs,

their predecessors

had

started,

basis undermined the democratic process in both
countries.

SAPs by the World Bank and

the

IMF

The

on a

take-it-or-leave-it

external imposition of

provided the democratically elected parliaments

and presidents of Malawi and Zambia with very

little

room

decision-making with regard to macroeconomic policies.

for independent domestic

By doing

so they constrained

“the formal institutions of democratic rule that are a constituent
part of

The implementation of donor-imposed SAPs exacerbated

democratization”.

existing social conflicts in

Malawi and Zambia and made

it

already

next to impossible for

Chiluba and Muluzi to adequately address the concerns of the majority of their
This led to an unprecedented wave of strikes in both countries

in the years

voters.

following the

multiparty elections. Furthermore, the experience of Kenya, Malawi and Zambia

first

with

SAPs makes

it

quite clear that they have failed to help these countries to

headway with reducing poverty, which
If the bi-

them

is

make any

absolutely crucial for democracy to take hold.

and multilateral donors of Kenya, Malawi, and Zambia are serious

in assisting

as well as other African countries in establishing sustainable democracies, they

have to find innovative ways

to help

them

to carry out the necessary

without undermining the democratic process. This

first

economic reforms

and foremost requires

provide more room for independent domestic decision-making with regard

macroeconomic

policies.

By doing so

that they

to

they would enable political parties to develop

different policy platforms. Ultimately this could help to replace the current fragmented,

unstable and ethnoregionally based party systems with less fragmented and more stable
party systems that consist of political parties that favor different policies and try to win

Mkandawire 1999:

p. 123.
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the support of voters from different ethnic groups
and regions. Finally, support for

democracy
and

Sub-Saharan Africa requires

in

that

donors make long-term commitments

that they devise innovative programs. For instance,

one such program could

African countries in setting up a system of party financing
based on
they receive in the

how many

assist

votes

elections.^"^^

This thesis has shown that

it

is

undoubtedly easier

to replace single-party

systems with multiparty systems than to establish consolidated democracies.
Even so
corruption, abuses of power and economic problems

Zambia,

all

three countries are measurably

still

exist in

more democratic

at the

century compared with the late 1980s. Also the population in

all

a significant degree of popular support for democracy, which

is

willingness of many of their citizens to walk for

hours to cast their votes. Observers
after ten years

who

in

shown

can

still

mind

in

is

no doubt

of Sub-Saharan Africa. However,
international

it

evident in the

to patiently

Kenya, Malawi and Zambia

that

wait for

is

that

democracy

will take time

decades

after

democracy has taken decades

occur as the 2000 presidential elections

quite clearly. There

21’*‘

three countries displays

many miles and

firmly established in other parts of the world and even if it

irregularities

beginning of the

are overly critical of what has been achieved

of democratic experiments

of authoritarian rule should keep

Kenya, Malawi and

to

become

firmly established serious

in the

United States have

will take root in

many

countries

and the continued support of the

community.

See Chabal 1998: pp. 300-303; Mkandawire 1999: pp. 119-133; Brown 2000: pp. 423-485; and
Murungi 2000: pp. 202-208.
See Bratton

/

Mattes 2001:

p. 120;

and van de Walle 2002: pp. 66-67.
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APPENDIX C

KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1992: PIE

CHART ILLUSTRATION

OF RESULTS BY PROVINCE
(”/o

of votes for the four main candidates)

Danrel a:ao Moi (KANU)

Vlwa' Kibaki (OP)

Kenneth Mai;ba (FORD-As:lil
Oginga Odinga iFOBD-Kenva!

Tana

ethnic group
provincial boundary

Source: Foeken

/

Dietz 2000:
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Source The //eek-y Rev-ew. January

p.
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•
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APPENDIX D

KENYAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

1992:

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS

BY PROVINCE

Province

KANU FORD
(K)

Nairobi

1

Central
Eastern

21

FORD

1

6

1

14

8

1

2

Rift Valley

36

2

4

Western

10

3

7

7

20

100

31

TOTAL

KSC

PICK TOTAL
8

9

17

Nyanza

KNC

10

1

Coast

North-East

DP

(A)

25
32

1

10

1

20
44

1

2

20
1

23

31

Source: Throup

/

1

Hornsby 1998;

168

29

1

1

p.

443

1

188

APPENDIX E

KENYAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1997:

RESULTS BY PROVINCE AND

CANDIDATE

Table

Nairobi

Coast

The 1997 Kenya General

2:

Moi

Kibaki

kanu

dp

75,272

160,124

Elections; Presidential Vote by Province
Raila

Kijana

Ngilu

NDPK

FORDK

SDP

59,415

24,971

39.707

16.23%

6,82%

10.85%

20.56%

44%

229.084

50,540

22,794

11,156

37.600

.05%

13.4%

6.07%

2.97%

10.02%

61

46,121

11,741

Eastern

18.60%

210
0.33%

4,418

73.08%

7.00%

466
0.58%

Eastern

368,801

296,262

7,755

7,009

332.578

35,87%

28.81%

0.75%

0.68%

32.35%

55,822

885,382

6.812

3,067

29.473

5,59%

88.73%

0.68%

0.31%

2.95%

343.529

36,022

102,178

11,345

20.90%

2.19%

6.22%

0.69%

314,669

9,755

13,458

338,120

3,429

44.67%

1.38%

1.91%

48.00%

0.49%

138,194

519,259

14,623

15,309

215.923

15.05%

56.55%

1

.59%

1.57%

1,895,527

665,725

505,542

North

Central

Rift

Valley

Western

Nyanza

1,140,109

69%

23.53%
Total

2,445,801

Source; Ajulu 1998;

169

p.

281

469,807

APPENDIX

KENYAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

F
1997:

DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS

BY PROVINCE

KANU
Nairobi

Coast
N/Eastern
Eastern
Central
Rift

Valley

Western

Nyanza
Total

1

18
9
14
0

39
15

8
104

DP
5
2
0
8
17
7
0
0
39

NDPK
1

0
0
0
1

0
0
19
21

F(K)

0
0
0
1

0
3
9
4
17

SDP
1

0

0
10

5
0
0
0
16

Source, compiled from Parliamentary Election Results, Electoral Commission

Source: Ajulu 1998;

p.

279

of

Kenya.

1

5 January

1

998
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MAP OF MALAWI
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Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information,

Map
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APPENDIX H
1993

REFERENDUM: RESULTS BY DISTRICT
(in

District

Votes cast

Invalid votes

%)

Valid votes

Multi-party

One-party

system

system

North

70.6

1.0

99.0

89.3

10.7

Chitipa

70.3

0.7

99.3

91.2

8.8

Karonga

59.1

0.8

99.2

94.1

5.9

Rumphi

86.6

1.4

98.6

86.8

13.2

Nkhata Bay

46.5

1.4

98.6

92.6

7.4

Mzimba

83.3

1.0

99.0

87.2

12.8

Central

69.3

3.0

97.0

32.5

67.5

Kasungu

77.3

2.7

97.3

28.0

72.0

Nkhotakota

59.3

3.6

96.4

47.0

53.0

Ntchisi

81.1

1.7

98.3

21.9

78.1
85.1

Dowa

72.0

2.5

97.5

14.9

Mchinji

59.3

5.9

94.1

31.5

68.5

Lilongwe

65.1

3.3

96.7

28.2

71.8

Salima

83.2

2.4

97.6

45.1

54.9

Dedza

75.5

2.9

97.1

25.6

74.4

Ntcheu

70.8

1.1

98.9

74.7

25.3
14.8
9.1

South

64.4

2.0

98.0

85.2

Mangochi
Machinga

57.2

1.8

98.2

90.9

58.4

1.4

98.6

91.3

8.7

Zomba

65.6

0.9

99.1

86.7

13.3

Mulanje

55.2

4.4

95.6

79.3

20.7

4.2

95.8

89.2

10.8

99.1

86.7

13.3

28.5

Chiradzulu

B Ian tyre

83.7

85.0

0.9

Mwanza

55.5

1.8

98.2

71.5

Thyolo

82.4

1.6

98.4

81.3

18.7

76.5

23.5

Chikwawa
Nsanje
Total

54.8

1.8

98.2

55.4

1.4

98.6

82.6

17.4

2.3

97.7

64.7

35.3

67.1

Source: Meinhardt 1999a;

172

p.

557

APPENDIX
1993

I

REFERENDUM: GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION OF RESULTS BY
DISTRICT
(Vote for the Multiparty System

SP

in y^^)

> 80*

m
=

70 - 80«
40

-

60»

20

-

30«

< 204

Chltipa
Karonga

24
23
22
21
20

Rumphi

Nkhata Bay
Mzimba
Kasungu

19
18 Nlihotakota
17 Ntchisi
16 Dowa
15 Mchinjl
14

13
12
11
10
9
8
7

6
5
4

3

2
1

Source: Meinhardt 1997:

173

p.

195

Lilongwe
Salima
Dedza
Ntcheu
Mangochi
Machinga
Zomba
Mwanza
Blantyre
Chiradzulu
Mulanje
Thyolo
ChiKwawa
Nsange

APPENDIX J

MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(in

District

Votes

Invalid

Valid

cast

votes

votes

RESULTS BY DISTRICT

1994:

%)

Muluzi

Banda

Chihana

Kalua

Chitipa

86.0

1.0

99.0

1.8

9.6

88.3

0.3

Karonga

84.6

2.1

97.9

2.9

5.2

91.6

0.4

Rumphi

86.7

1.1

98.9

4.7

5.6

89.4

0.4

Nkhata Bay

83.3

1.6

98.4

8.5

6.2

84.7

0.7

Mzimba

86.5

1.2

98.8

4.5

8.2

87.0

0.3

Kasungu

81.3

2.0

98.0

15.1

65.5

18.9

0.4

Nkhotakota

84.8

2.3

97.7

37.9

46.6

15.2

0.4

Ntchisi

80.0

3.4

96.6

30.9

65.2

3.5

0.5

Dowa

81.9

2.5

97.5

15.0

80.5

3.8

0.7

Salima

77.4

2.9

97.1

47.7

47.3

4.4

0.6

Mchinji

79.5

2.3

97.7

26.8

69.5

3.3

0.4

Lilongwe

85.6

2.1

97.9

20.2

71.7

7.8

0.3

Dedza

74.0

3.5

96.5

26.3

71.6

2.3

0.4

Ntcheu

76.6

2.5

97.5

72.0

23.8

3.7

0.6

81.1

1.9

98.1

88.7

7.5

3.3

0.5

1.9

98.1

91.2

7.0

1.5

0.4
0.6

Mangochi
Machinga

84.3

Zomba

82.5

1.8

98.2

84.1

11.2

4.1

Chiradzulu

70.0

1.9

98.1

89.1

9.0

1.5

0.4

Blantyre

82.7

1.5

98.5

78.4

13.2

7.9

0.6

Mwanza

79.8

3.2

96.8

69.1

25.1

4.6

1.2

77.3

2.6

97.4

71.4

19.9

7.7

0.5

66.4

3.4

96.6

66.7

20.8

11.8

0.6

97.6

56.8

38.5

3.4

1

2.9

1.6

18.9

Thyolo
Mulanje

Chikwawa

75.9

2.4

Nsanje

81.4

3.4

96.6

42.6

52.9

Total

80.5

2.0

98.0

47.2

33.5

Source: Meinhardt 1999a:

174

p.

562
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APPENDIX K

MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1994:

GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION

OF VOTES FOR THE AFORD CANDIDATE CHIHANA BY DISTRICT

> 80»
10

-

204

< 10%

24 Chitipa

23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21

Nkhata Bay

20 Mzimba
19 Kasungu
18 Nkhotakota
17 Ntchisi
1

6

Dowa

15 Mchin^i
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7

6

5
4

3

2
1

Source: Meinhardt 1997:

175

p.

281

Lilongwe
Salima
Dedza
Ntcheu
Mangochi
Machinga
Zomba
Mwanza
Blantyre
Chiradzulu
Mulanje
Thyolo
Chikwawa
Nsanje

APPENDIX L

MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

1994;

GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION

OF VOTES FOR THE MCP CANDIDATE BANDA BY DISTRICT

> 80«

70

-

801

60

-

7q»

50

-

60%

40 - 50%

40%

30

-

;0

-

30%

10

-

:-o%

<

24

10

%

Chitipa

23 Karonga
22 Rumphi
21 Ntchata Bay
20 Msimba
19 Kasuriiju
18 Nkhotakota
1’’

Ntchisi

16 Dowa
15 Mclunji

Lilongwe
Salima
Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4
Mulanie
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
Nsanie
1

14
13
12

Source; Meinhardt 1997: 282
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APPENDIX

MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

M
1994:

GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATION

OF VOTES FOR THE UDF CANDIDATE MULUZI BY DISTRICT

> «0

»

70

-

60

-

70»

50

-

60»

40

-

50«

80»

30 - 40»
20

-

30»

10

-

20 *

< 10 »

24
23
22
21
20
19

Chitipa
Karonga
Rumphi
Nkhata Bay
Mzimba
Kasunqu

Nkhotakota
Ntchisi
Dowa
15 Mchinji
14 Lilongwe
13 Salima
12 Dedza
11 Ntcheu
10 Mangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
5 Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
Nsanje
1
18
17
16

Source; Meinhardt 1997:

177

p.

283

APPENDIX N

MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
(in

1994:

RESULTS BY DISTRICT

%)

UDF

MCP

Chitipa

89.2

3.2

8.4

87.7

Karonga

85.7

2.2

7.6

87.4

Rumphi

86.8

5.0

4.9

89.1

Nkhata Bay

80.6

12.1

8.7

72.6

Mzimba

83.4

4.6

9.0

86.0

Kasungu

80.5

19.1

62.9

21.8

Nkhotakota

85.2

41.4

44.7

12.6

Ntchisi

80.2

33.2

62.6

4.3

Dowa

82.9

15.1

78.8

4.9

Salima

77.3

42.0

52.2

5.1

Mchinji

74.7

26.2

70.4

3.2

Lilongwe
Dedza
Ntcheu

82.8

19.7

74.0

6.1

70.7

24.9

72.2

2.5

77.3

69.0

24.9

4.3

Mangochi
Machinga

78.2

85.3

8.3

6.0

82.2

90.3

7.9

1.0

Zomba

80.4

81.1

10.0

5.9

Chiradzulu

84.4

86.4

9.9

3.0

7.6

Votes cast

District

AFORD^

Blantyre

73.5

75.0

15.8

Mwanza

79.6

68.7

24.8

3.9

Thyolo
Mulanje

75.4

68.2

21.0

9.4

78.6

62.4

20.6

15.8

Chikwawa

74.9

56.2

38.7

4.4

67.1

46.3

52.8

0.7

46.4

33.7

19.0

Nsanje

79.6

Total'’
^

In the

following districts

AFORD

presented a candidate only

in

some

constituencies:

Nkho-

out of 17), Dedza (seven out of eight),
takota (two out of five constituencies), Lilongwe (16
Thyolo (seven out of eight), Nsanje (one
eight),
of
out
(seven
Zomba
Machinga (three out of 0),
1

out of

five).

Differences to

100%

are

due

to the share

of small

parties.

Source: Meinhardt 1999a: 559

APPENDIX O

MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

1994:

SEATS PER PARTY BY

DISTRICT

District

UDP

MCP

Chitipa

0

0

5

Karonga

0

0

5

4

AFORD

Rumphi

0

0

Nkhata Bay

0

0

7

Mzimba

0

0

12

Kasungu

0

7

2

Nkhotakota

2

2

1

Ntchisi

0

4

0

Dowa

0

7

0

Salima

2

3

0

Mchinji

0

6

0

Lilongwe
Dedza

3

14

0

1

7

0

Ntcheu

6

1

0

Mangochi
Machinga

10

0

0

10

0

0

Zomba

8

0

0

Chiradzulu

5

0

0

Blantyre

10

0

0

Mwanza

4

0

0

Thyolo
Mulanje

7

0

0

11

Chikwawa
Nsanje
Total

0

0

5

1

0

1

4

0

85

56

36

Source: Meinhardt 1999a: 561
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P

KLFX"I’I()NS 1994: (iRAPlIK’

ILLUSTRATION OF VOTKS FOR AFORI) BY

DIS'I

RK

> 80*

70

-

20

-

30»

10

-

20«

<

80»

10*

24
23
22
21
20
19

Clutlpa
Karonga

18
17

Nkhotakota
Ntchisi

Rumphi
Nkhata Bay
Mzlmba
Kasungu

16 Dowa
IS Mchlnji

Lilongwe
Salima
Dedza
Ntcheu
Hangochi
9 Machinga
8 Zomba
7 Mwanza
6 Blantyre
S Chiradzulu
4 Mulanje
3 Thyolo
2 Chikwawa
Nsanja
1

14

13
12
11
10

MALAWI

Mcinhardt 1997:

180

p.

289

APPKNDIX Q
IMAI.AWIAN PARLIAMKN TARY KI.KC

I

IONS

ILLUSTRATION OF VOTKS FOR MC'P BY

1994:

DIS

I

ORAPIIK

RKT

> 70»

60

-

60«

SO
40

-

SOI

30

-

401

20

-

301

10

-

201

<

24
23
22
21
20
19

11

Nt.chsu

10
9

Mangochl
Machlnga
Zomba
Mwanza
Blantyre
Chlradzulu
Mulanj*
Thyolo
Chikwawa
Nsanj*

7

4

3

2
1
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Chltipa
Karong«

18
17
16
IS
14
13
12

8

p.

101

Rumphi
Nkhata Bay
Mzlmba
Kasungu
Nkhotakota
Ntchisi
Dowa
Mchinji
Lilongwe
Salima
Oadza

6
S

Source: Mcinhardt 1997:

70*

APPENDIX R

MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

1994:

GRAPHIC

ILLUSTRATION OF VOTES FOR UDF BY DISTRICT

> 80%
70 - 80%
60 - 70%
50 - 60%
40 - 50%

30

-

40%

20

-

30%

10

-

20 %

< 10 %

24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
1 4

13
12
11
10
9
8

7

6
5
4

3

2
1

Source: Meinhardt 1997: p. 290
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Chitipa
Karonga
Rumphi
Nkhata Bay
Mzimba
Kasungu
Nkhotakota
Ntchisi
Dowa
Mchinji
Lilongwe
Salima
Dedza
Ntcheu
Mangochi
Machinga
Zomba
Mwanza
Blantyre
Chiradzulu
Mulanje
Thyolo
Chikwawa
Nsanje

APPENDIX

S

MALAWIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(in

1999:

RESULTS BY REGION

%)

Moluzi

Chakuambm

North

UDF
9%

Centre

3 5 Vo

MCP/AFORD
88%
61%

South

77V.

18%

TOTAL

51%

44%

Region

Source;

Brown 2000:

183

p.

327

Others
(3)

2%
2%
3%
2%

APPENDIX T

MALAWIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
(seats

UDF

Region

MCP

and

1999:

RESULTS BY REGION

%)

AFORD

Indepcn-

TOTAL

dCBt

North

I

(3%)

4(12%)
54 (75%)

28 (85%)

0 (0%)

10%)

South

76 (87%)

8 (9%)

(1%)
0 (0%)

TOTAL

93 (4«%)

66 (34%)

29(15%)

Source:

Brown 2000:

Centre

16

(22%)

1

184

3

(3%)

4 (2%)

p.

329

(100%)
72(100%)
87(100%)
33

192(100%)

APPENDIX U

MAP OF ZAMBIA

Source: United Nations, Department of Public Information, Cartographic Section

Map No.

3731, Rev.
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3,

July 2000

APPENDIX V

ZAMBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(in

199P

Kaunda
(UNIP)

Central

RESULTS BY PROVINCE

1991:

%)

Chiluba

Valid

Invalid

Votes

(MMD)

votes

votes

cast

25.6

74.4

96.9

3.1

9.4

90.6

97.5

2.5

50.8

74.1

25.9

95.2

4.8

49.4

Luapula

10.9

89.1

97.3

2.7

47.1

Lusaka

23.4

76.6

97.3

2.7

43.9

Northern

14.9

85.1

96.3

3.7

44.4

N. Western

29.8

70.2

97.4

2.6

42.7

Southern

14.8

85.2

97.0

3.0

43.6

Western

18.6

81.4

96.8

3.2

41.3

Total

24.2

75.8

96.9

3.1

45.4

Copperbelt
Eastern

'

The percentages given

votes in

refer to: votes per candidate in

% of valid

votes; valid votes and invalid

% of total votes cast; votes cast in % of registered voters.

Source; Krennerich 1999: p. 958
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APPENDIX

W

ZAMBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

RESULTS BY PROV INCE

1991:

%)

(in

1991 (percentages)

MMD

UNIP

NPD

DP

Central

72.8

26.9

-

0.2

—

—

100

Copperbelt

89.1

10.4

0.2

0.1

0.0

0.2

100

Eastern

24.5

73.5
12.5

-

100

Lusaka

75.7

22.6

0.7

0.2

0.7

100

Northern

83.6

15.8

100

66.4

29.7

-

0.5

N. -Western

3.9

100

Southern

83.4

15.7

0.8

100

Western

79.9

19.2

-

-

-

100

87.5

-

2.0

Luapula

-

0.9

100

Total

74.3

24.7

0.1

0.1

0.0

0.8

100

“

Due

to

rounding the added

total

NADA

0.0

of the percentages

is

not always 100.

Source; Krennerich 1999;

187

p.

951

Indep.

TotaP

APPENDIX X

ZAMBIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS
(in

1996

Chiluba

(MMD)

1996:

RESULTS BY PROVINCE

%)

Mung’omba Mulemba Mbikusita Chakom(ZDC)
(NP)
(AZ)
boka
(MDP)

Valid
Votes"

Central

73.2

14.3

5.2

2.2

5.3

100

Copperbelt

86.3

7.7

3.3

1.0

1.7

100

Eastern

64.0

19.6

6.9

3.5

6.1

100

Luapula

85.4

6.0

1.7

4.9

2.0

100

Lusaka

74.4

17.1

3.7

2.8

2.0

100

Northern

80.5

1

1.9

2.5

1.2

3.9

100

N. Western

52.2

6.3

37.7

1.5

2.3

100

Southern

67.1

18.3

5.2

4.7

4.7

100

Western

43.1

15.4

8.1

29.5

3.9

100

Total

72.6

12.7

6.7

4.7

3.3

100

*

Due

to

rounding the added

total

of the percentages

is

not always 100.

Source: Krennerich 1999:

188

p.

958

APPENDIX Y

ZAMBIAN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
(in

1

1996:

RESULTS BY PROVINCE

%)

996 (percentages)

MMD

ZDC

NP

NLP

Central

49.8

9.7

4.0

12.4

0.2

23.9

100

Copperbelt

70.5

9.3

5.3

7.3

0.2

7.4

100

Eastern

61.9

24.3

6.4

4.0

1.0

2.3

100

Luapula
Lusaka

70.2

10.6

2.4

6.3

0.1

10.4

100

64.3

15.6

4.4

5.4

0.4

10.0

100

Northern

63.0

12.9

3.6

2.8

17.7

100

N.-Westem

44.4

7.7

35.8

3.8

-

8.3

100

Southern

57.0

19.5

3.6

12.5

2.6

4.8

100

Western

49.8

16.3

10.0

0.5

15.0

8.3

100

Total

61.0

13.8

7.1

6.4

1.8

9.8

100

'

Due

to

rounding the added

total

of the percentages

is

not always 100.

Source: Krennerich 1999:

189

Others

p.

952

Indep.

TotaP
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